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Art. I. — The Progress from Brute to Man.

(Two Chapters from a forthcoming work on the Doctrine of Evolution.) *

I.

The chief difficulty which most persons find in accepting the Doctrine of Evolution, as applied to the origin of the human race, is the difficulty of realizing in imagination the kinship between the higher and the lower forms of intelligence and emotion. And this difficulty is enhanced by a tendency of which our daily associations make it hard to rid ourselves. This is a tendency to exaggerate the contrasts which really exist, by leaving out of mind the intermediate phenomena and considering only the extremes. Many critics, both among those who are hostile to the Development Theory and among those who regard it with favor, habitually argue as if the intelligence and morality of the human race might be fairly represented by the intelligence and morality of a minority of highly organized

* In thus publishing as an independent article what is really a fragmentary portion of an integral work, I have unavoidably been compelled to make occasional reference to arguments contained in other chapters of the work, the full force of which, therefore, will not be here apparent. This slight inconvenience, however, will probably make little difference to the reader. For he who already understands and accepts the Development Theory will have no difficulty in following my argument; while to him who neither understands nor accepts the Development Theory my argument will have no significance or value whatever.

and highly educated people in the most civilized communities. When speaking of mankind they are speaking of that which is represented to their imagination by the small number of upright, cultivated, and well-bred people with whom they are directly acquainted, and also to some extent by a few of those quite exceptional men and women who have left names recorded in history. Though other elements are admitted into the conception, these are, nevertheless, the ones which chiefly give to it its character. Employing then this conception of mankind, abstracted from these inadequate instances, our critics ask us how it is possible to imagine that a race possessed of such a godlike intellect, such a keen æsthetic sense, and such a lofty soul should ever have descended from a race of mere brutes. And again they ask us how can a race endowed with such a capacity for progress be genetically akin to those lower races of which even the highest show no advance from one generation to another. Confronted thus by difficulties which reason and imagination seem alike incompetent to overcome, they too often either give up the problem as insoluble, or else — which amounts to nearly the same thing — have recourse to the *deus ex machina* as an aid in solving it.

Influenced, no doubt, by some such mental habit as this, Mr. St. George Mivart declares that, while thoroughly agreeing with Mr. Darwin as to man's zoölogical position, he nevertheless regards the difference between ape and mushroom as less important than the difference between ape and man, so soon as we take into the account "the totality of man's being." (Nature, April 20, 1871.) In this emphatic statement there is a certain amount of truth, though Mr. Mivart is not justified in implying that it is a truth which the Darwinian is bound not to recognize. The enormous difference between civilized man and the highest of brute animals is by no one more emphatically recognized than by the evolutionist, who holds that to the process of organic development there has been superadded a stupendous process of social development, and who must therefore admit that with the beginning of human civilization there was opened a new chapter in the history of the universe, so far as we know it. From the human point of view we may contentedly grant that, for all practical purposes, the difference

between an ape and a mushroom is of less consequence than the difference between an ape and an educated European of the nineteenth century. But to take this educated European as a typical sample of mankind, and to contrast him directly with chimpanzees and gibbons, is in the highest degree fallacious; since the proceeding involves the omission of a host of facts which, when taken into account, must essentially modify the aspect of the whole case.

When we take the refined and intellectual Teuton, with his one hundred and fourteen cubic inches of brain, and set him alongside of the chimpanzee with his thirty-five cubic inches of brain, the difference seems so enormous as to be incompatible with any original kinship. But when we interpose the Australian, whose brain, measuring seventy cubic inches, comes considerably nearer to that of the chimpanzee than to that of the Teuton, the case is entirely altered, and we are no longer inclined to admit sweeping statements about the immeasurable superiority of man, which we may still admit, provided they are restricted to civilized man. If we examine the anatomical composition of these brains, the discovery that in structural complexity the Teutonic cerebrum surpasses the Australian even more than the latter surpasses that of the chimpanzee, serves to strengthen us in our position. And when we pass from facts of anatomy to facts of psychology, we obtain still further confirmation; for we find that the difference in structure is fully paralleled by the difference in functional manifestation. If the Englishman shows such wonderful command of relations of space, time, and number as to be able to tell us that to an observer stationed at Greenwich on the 7th of June, A. D. 2004, at precisely nine minutes and fifty-six seconds after five o'clock in the morning, Venus will begin to cross the sun's disk, the Australian, on the other hand, is able to count only up to five or six, and cannot tell us the number of fingers on his two hands, since so large a number as ten excites in him only an indefinite impression of plurality.* Our conception of

* The Dammaras, according to Mr. Galton, are even worse off than this. "When they wish to express four, they take to their fingers, which are to them as formidable instruments of calculation as a sliding rule is to an English school-boy. They puzzle very much after five, because no spare hand remains to grasp and secure the

the godlike intellect evidently will not apply here. If the emotions of the German and his intellectual perceptions of the fitness of harmonious sounds for expressing emotion are so deep and subtile and varied as to result in the production of choruses like those of Handel and symphonies like those of Beethoven, the crude emotions of the Australian, on the other hand, are quite adequately expressed by the discordant yells and howls which constitute the sole kind of music appreciable by his undeveloped ears. We look in vain here for traces of the keen æsthetic sense which in a measure links together our intellectual and moral natures. Again, if the American student has been known to be actuated by such noble ethical impulses and guided by such lofty conceptions of morality as to leave his comfortable home and his favorite pursuits, and engage in rough warfare, at the risk of life and limb, solely or chiefly that he might assist in relieving the miseries of far inferior men, whose direct claim upon his personal sympathies

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fingers that are required for units. Yet they seldom lose oxen; the way in which they discover the loss of one is not by the number of the herd being diminished, but by the absence of a face they know. When bartering is going on, each sheep must be paid for separately. Thus, suppose two sticks of tobacco to be the rate of exchange for one sheep, it would sorely puzzle a Dammara to take two sheep and give him four sticks. I have done so, and seen a man put two of the sticks apart, and take a sight over them at one of the sheep he was about to sell. Having satisfied himself that that one was honestly paid for, and finding to his surprise that exactly two sticks remained in hand to settle the account for the other sheep, he would be afflicted with doubts; the transaction seemed to come out too 'pat' to be correct, and he would refer back to the first couple of sticks; and then his mind got hazy and confused, and wandered from one sheep to the other, and he broke off the transaction until two sticks were put into his hand, and one sheep driven away, and then the other two sticks given him, and the second sheep driven away. . . . . Once while I watched a Dammara floundering hopelessly in a calculation on one side of me, I observed Dinah, my spaniel, equally embarrassed on the other. She was overlooking half a dozen of her new-born puppies, which had been removed two or three times from her, and her anxiety was excessive, as she tried to find out if they were all present, or if any were still missing. She kept puzzling and running her eyes over them, backwards and forwards, but could not satisfy herself. She evidently had a vague notion of counting, but the figure was too large for her brain. Taking the two as they stood, dog and Dammara, the comparison reflected no great honor on the man." — Galton, Tropical South Africa, p. 132, cited in Lubbock, Origin of Civilization, Amer. ed., p. 294. See also Tylor, Primitive Culture, Vol. I. pp. 218–246. Probably the dual number, in grammar, "preserves the memorial of that stage of thought when all beyond two was an idea of indefinite number." Id., p. 240.

could never be other than slight, on the other hand the Australian has no words in his language to express the ideas of justice and benevolence, and no amount of teaching can make him comprehend those ideas. For although, like some brute animals, he is not wholly destitute of the feelings which underlie them, yet these feelings are so seldom repeated in his experience that he is unable to generalize from them. The lofty soul, which is too sweepingly attributed to man in distinction from other animals, is here as difficult to discover as the god-like intellect or the keen æsthetic sense.

In similar wise is made to disappear the sharp contrast between human and brute animals in capability of progress. Hardly any fact is more imposing to the imagination than the fact that each generation of men is perceptibly more enlightened than the preceding one, while each generation of brutes exactly resembles those which have come before it. But the contrast is obtained only by comparing the civilized European of to-day directly with the brute animals known to us through the short period of recorded human history. The capability of progress, however, is by no means shared alike by all races of men. Of the numerous races historically known to us, it has been manifested in a marked degree only by two, — the Aryan and Semitic. To a much less conspicuous extent it has been exhibited by the Chinese and Japanese, the Copts of Egypt, and a few of the highest American races. On the other hand, the small-brained races — the Australians and Papuans, the Hottentots, and the majority of tribes constituting the wide-spread Malay and American families — appear almost wholly incapable of progress, even under the guidance of higher races. The most that can be said for them is, that they are somewhat more imitative and somewhat more teachable than any brute animals. In the presence of the Aryan, even under the most favorable circumstances, they tend to become extinguished, rather than to appropriate the results of a civilization which there is no reason to suppose they could ever have originated. The two great races of Middle Africa, the Negroes and Kaffirs, have shown, by their ability to endure slave labor, their superiority to those above mentioned; but their career, where it has not been interfered with by white men, has been but little less

monotonous than the career of a brute species. Of all these barbarian races, we commonly say that they have no history; and by this we mean that throughout long ages they have made no appreciable progress. In a similar sense we should say of a race of monkeys or elephants, that it has no history.

Of like import is the fact, that as we go backward in time we find the progressiveness of the civilized races continually diminishing. No previous century ever saw anything approaching to the increase in social complexity which has been wrought in America and Europe since 1789. In science and in the industrial arts the change has been greater than in the ten preceding centuries taken together. Contrast the seventeen centuries which it took to remodel the astronomy of Hipparchus with the forty years which it has taken to remodel the chemistry of Berzelius and the biology of Cuvier. Note how the law of gravitation was nearly a century in getting generally accepted by foreign astronomers,* while within half a dozen years from its promulgation, Darwinism became the accepted creed of the great majority of naturalists. How small the difference between the clumsy wagons of the Tudor period and the mail-coach in which our grandfathers rode, compared to the difference between the mail-coach and the railway train! How enormous the revolution in philosophic thinking since the time of the *Encyclopédistes*, in comparison with the slow changes which occurred between the epoch of Aristotle and the epoch of Descartes! In morality, both individual and national, and in general humanity of disposition and refinement of manners, the increased rapidity of change has been no less marked.

But these considerations are immensely increased in force when we take into account those epochs which, in the light of our present knowledge, can alone properly be termed ancient. Far beyond the comparatively recent period at which human

* It was still on trial in France in 1749, when Clairaut and Lalande magnificently verified it by calculating the retardation of Halley's comet. It may be said that the French are notoriously slow in adopting ideas which have originated in other countries, and that they now ignore natural selection much as they formerly ignored gravitation. Nevertheless, in spite of the Academy and Monsieur Flourens, there are plain indications that the doctrine of special creations is doomed speedily to suffer the fate in France which it has already suffered in Germany, England, and America.

history began on the eastern shores of the Mediterranean, extend the ages during which, as paleontology shows us, both the eastern and the western hemispheres were peopled by races of men. Ten thousand centuries before the time of Homer and the Vedic poets, wild men, with brute-like crania, carried on the struggle for existence with mammoths, tigers, and gigantic bears, long since extinct. And recent researches make it probable that even this enormous period must be multiplied six or eight fold before we can arrive at the time when men first appeared upon the earth as creatures zoölogically distinct from apes. The significance of these conclusions, even when we take into account only the shorter epoch of a single million of years, cannot be too strongly insisted upon. They show us that it is only in recent times that man has become widely distinguished from other animals by his capability of progress. If, as evidence of our present progressiveness, we cite the superiority of our Whitworth guns and Chassepot rifles over the howitzers and flintlocks used by our grandfathers, we must also remember that more than twenty thousand generations lived and died before the primitive stone hatchets and stone-pointed arrows were superseded by battle-axes and javelins headed with bronze. During these long ages each generation must have imitated its predecessor almost as closely as is the case with brute animals. The godlike intellect, of whose achievements we are now so justly proud, was then being acquired by almost infinitely minute increments. In the face of the proved fact of man's immense antiquity, no other conclusion is admissible.

I have introduced these considerations, not so much to confirm the theory of the descent of man from an ape-like animal, — which I regard as already sufficiently proved by the evidence presented in previous chapters, — as to illustrate the true point of view from which the evolution of humanity should be regarded. In treating of the doctrine of evolution in general, Mr. Spencer has shown it to be a corollary from the persistence of force that the process of evolution, which at first goes on with comparative slowness, must, owing to the multiplication of effects, go on with increasing rapidity. And he shows, moreover, that those most conspicuous aspects of evolution which consist in increase of definite complexity in structure and func

tion must be much more conspicuous in the more compound than in the more simple kinds of evolution. In illustration of these closely allied truths, we may note that in all cases a long period of time elapses before any lower order of evolution gives rise to a distinctly higher order. Long ages must have passed before the slow integration of our solar nebula into a planetary system resulted in the appearance of distinctly geologic phenomena upon the several planets. Again, it was a long time before geologic evolution had proceeded sufficiently far to admit of the evolution of life: upon Saturn and Jupiter, as we have seen, the genesis of anything like what we know as life would appear still to be impossible. Again, after the first appearance of life upon our earth, a long time must have elapsed before protists, simple plants, and nerveless animals were succeeded by animals sufficiently complex to manifest even the most rudimentary phases of psychical life. And again, as we can now see, the evolution of physical and psychical life to the very high degree exemplified in the primeval ape-like man was followed by a somewhat long period, during which the still higher psychical changes constituting social evolution were slowly assuming their distinctive characteristics.

Social evolution, therefore, regarded as a complicated series of intellectual and emotional changes determined by the aggregation of men into communities, is a new order of evolution, more highly compounded than any that have gone before it. When, in the course of the struggle for existence, men began to unite in family groups of comparatively permanent organization, a new era was begun in the progress of things upon the earth's surface. A new set of structural and functional changes began, which, for a long while proceeding with the slowness characteristic of the early stages of every order of evolution, are at last proceeding with a rapidity only to be slackened when the ultimate stage of equilibrium is approached. Hence it is in the highest degree unphilosophical to attempt to explain the present position of civilized man solely by reference to the laws of organic and psychical evolution as obtained by the study of life in general. It is for biology to explain the differences between the human hand and foot and the hands and feet of the other primates; but the chief differences

between civilized man and the other members of the order to which he belongs are psychological differences, and the immense series of psychical changes to which they are due has been all along determined by social conditions.

The all-important contrast, therefore, is not between man and other primates, extinct and contemporary, but between civilized man and primitive man. Already we have found that the lowest contemporary man, whose social organization has never reached any higher form than that of the simplest tribal community, exhibits but scanty traces of the godlike intellect, the refined tastes, or the lofty soul which we are accustomed to ascribe to humanity in general as its distinctive attributes. Humanity, zoölogically considered, exists to-day, to which these attributes cannot be ascribed without a considerable strain upon the accepted meaning of our words. Zoölogically, the Australian belongs to the genus Homo, and is therefore nearer to us than to the gorilla or gibbon; psychologically, he is in many respects further removed from us than from these manlike apes. No one will deny that the intellectual progress implied in counting up to five or six, though equally important, is immeasurably inferior in quantity to the subsequent progress implied in the solution of dynamical problems by means of the integral calculus, — an achievement for which the average modern engineer is competent. But in going back to the primeval man, we must descend to a lower grade of intelligence than that which is occupied by the Australian. We must traverse the immensely long period during which the average human skull was enlarging from a capacity of thirty-five inches, like that of the highest apes, to a capacity of seventy inches, like those post-glacial European skulls, of which the one found at Neanderthal is a specimen, and which are about on a par with the skulls of Australians. And when we have reached the beginning of this period — possibly in the Miocene epoch — we may fairly represent to ourselves the individuals of the human genus as animals differing in little save a more marked sociality from the dryopithecus and other extinct half-human apes. We may represent primitive man as an animal in whom, physical and psychical changes having hitherto proceeded *pari passu*, intelligence had at length arrived at a point where variations

in it would sooner be seized on by natural selection than variations in physical structure. When, among primates possessed of such an intelligence, the family groups temporarily formed among all mammals began to become permanent, then we must say that there began the career of humanity as distinguished from animality. For countless ages our ancestors probably were still but slightly distinguished from other primates, save that their increasing intelligence, their use of weapons, and their habits of combination rendered them more than a match for much larger and stronger animals. In the later Pliocene times these primitive men may have come to bear some resemblance to the lowest contemporary savages. Human remains and relics of the still later glacial period supply clear proof of such a resemblance; yet the absence of any improvement in weapons and implements for many ages longer shows that as yet there was but little capability of progress. Of the career of mankind during the eight hundred thousand years which would seem to have elapsed since the era of the cave bear and woolly rhinoceros,* we possess many vestiges. But everything indicates the most extreme barbarism; nowhere does there appear a trace of anything like even the rudest civilization, until we reach that comparatively recent epoch antecedent to the dawn of history, but accessible to philology. The partial restoration of the Aryan mother-tongue enables us to go back perhaps a dozen or fifteen centuries beyond the age of Homer and the Vedas, and catch a few glimpses of the prehistoric Aryans, — an agricultural race completely tribal in organiza-

* In assigning this conjectural date, I follow the theory which connects the great glacial epoch with that notable increase in the eccentricity of the earth's orbit which, as calculated by Mr. Croll, began about 950,000 years B. C., and lasted 200,000 years. But while the fact of this great increase of eccentricity is, I presume, well established, and while it can hardly fail to have wrought marked climatic changes, it is by no means proved that the glaciation of Europe and North America was produced solely or chiefly by this circumstance; and accordingly I do not care to insist upon the chronology which I have adopted in the text. Nor is it necessary for the validity of my argument that it should be insisted on. What we do know is, that men existed both in Europe and in North America at the beginning of the glacial period; that this extensive dispersal implies the existence of the human race for a long time previous to this epoch; and thus we obtain a dumb antiquity in comparison with which the whole duration of the voice of historic tradition shrinks to a mere point of time. And this is all that my argument requires.

tion, but acquainted with the use of metals, and showing marks of an intelligence decidedly above that of high contemporary barbarians like the Kaffirs. At the same time, the deciphering of hieroglyphics on Egyptian monuments reveals to us the existence in the valley of the Nile of an old and immobile civilization, organized on a tribal basis, like that of China, already sinking in political decrepitude at the ill-defined era at which we first catch sight of it. Of the beginnings of civilization on the Nile, and also, indeed, on the Euphrates, and of the stages by which the Aryans arrived at the intellectual pre-eminence to which their recovered language bears witness, we know absolutely nothing. But even if we were to allow twenty thousand years for these proceedings, — an interval nearly seven times as long as that which separates the Homeric age from our own time, — we should obtain but a brief period compared with the countless ages of unmitigated barbarism which preceded it. The progress of mankind is like a geometrical progression. For a good while the repeated doubling produces quite unobtrusive results; but as we begin to reach the large numbers the increase suddenly becomes astonishing. Since the beginning of recorded history we have been moving among the large numbers, and each decade now witnesses a greater amount of psychical achievement than could have been witnessed in thousands of years among preglacial men. Such a result is just what the Doctrine of Evolution teaches us to anticipate; and it thoroughly confirms our statement that, in point of intelligence and capacity for progress, the real contrast is not between all mankind and other primates, but between civilized and primeval man.

Let us now consider some of the leading characteristics of this gradual but increasingly rapid intellectual progress, regarded as a growing correspondence between the human mind and its environment.

In his essay on "The Genesis of Science," Mr. Spencer has shown that the highest kinds of scientific knowledge differ only in degree from the lowest kinds of what is called ordinary knowledge. In spite of their great differences in mental capacity, it is obvious that the antelope who on hearing a roar from the neighboring thicket infers that it is high time to run for his

life, the Bushman who on seeing the torn carcass of the antelope infers that a lion has recently been present, and the astronomer who on witnessing certain unforeseen irregularities in the motions of Uranus infers that an unknown planet is attracting it, perform one and all the same kind of mental operation. In the three cases the processes are fundamentally the same, though differing in complexity according to the number and remoteness of the past and present relations which are compared. In each case the process is at bottom a grouping of objects and of relations according to their likenesses and unlikenesses. It similarly appears that all knowledge is a classification of experiences, and that every act of knowledge is an act of classification; that an act of *inference*, such as is involved in simple cases of perception, is "the attributing to a body, in consequence of some of its properties, all those properties by virtue of which it is referred to a particular class"; that the "forming of a *generalization* is the putting together in one class all those cases which present like relations"; and that "the drawing a *deduction* is essentially the perception that a particular case belongs to a certain class of cases previously generalized. So that, as ordinary classification is a grouping together of *like things*, reasoning is a grouping together of *like relations* among things." * In this fundamental doctrine the two different schools of modern psychology, represented respectively by Mr. Bain and Mr. Mansel, will thoroughly agree. But from this it inevitably follows that the highest and the lowest manifestations of intelligence consist respectively of processes which differ only in heterogeneity and definiteness and in the extent to which they are compounded.

But while proving that science is but an extension of ordinary knowledge, Mr. Spencer shows also that the higher orders of knowledge differ from the lower in the greater remoteness, generality, and abstractness of the relations which they formulate, in the greater definiteness of their formulas, and in their more complete organization. His inquiry into the mutual relations of life and intelligence † has elicited an exactly parallel set of conclusions. It is there shown that psychical life

* Spencer's Essays, I. 189.

† Spencer, Principles of Psychology, Part III.

consists in the continuous establishment of subjective relations answering to objective relations; and that, as we advance through the animal kingdom from the lowest to the highest forms, this correspondence between the mind and its environment extends to relations which are continually more remote in space and time, more clearly defined, but at the same time more general; and finally there is also traced a progressive organization of correspondences. Continually, while passing in review the various aspects of the progress of intelligence in the animal kingdom, the author finds himself ending with illustrations drawn from that progress of human intelligence which is determined by social conditions. Let us now illustrate this subject somewhat further by tracing out the intellectual correspondence between man and his environment, as increasing in remoteness, in speciality and generality, in complexity, in definiteness, and in coherent organization.

The extension of the correspondence in space is a marked characteristic of intellectual progress, which we have already traced through the ascending groups of the animal kingdom, but which is carried much further by man than by any lower animal. It is no doubt true that the direct adjustments of pyschical relations to distant objective relations, effected by unaided perception, have a narrower range in civilized men than in uncivilized men or in several of the higher mammals and birds. It is a familiar fact that the senses of civilized man — or at least the three senses which have a considerable range in space — are less acute and less extensive in range than those of the barbarian. It is said that the Bushman can see as far with the naked eye as a European can see with a field-glass; and certain wild and domestic birds and mammals, as the falcon, the vulture, and perhaps the greyhound, have still longer vision. Among the different classes of civilized men, those who, by living on the fruits of brain-work done in-doors, are most widely differentiated from primeval men, have as a general rule the shortest vision. And the rapid increase of in-door life, which is one of the marked symptoms of modern civilization, tends not only to make myopia more frequent, but also to diminish the average range of vision in persons who are not myopic. There may very likely have been a similar, though

less conspicuous and less carefully observed, decrease in the range of hearing. And the sense of smell, which is so marvellously efficient in the majority of mammals and in many savages, is to us of little use as an aid in effecting correspondences in space.

In the case also of those simpler indirect adjustments which would seem to involve the use of the cerebellum chiefly, we have partially lost certain powers possessed by savages and lower animals. There are few things in which civilized men differ among themselves more conspicuously than the recollection of places, the identification of landmarks, and the ability to reach a distant point through crooked streets without losing the way. But in these respects the most sagacious of us are but bunglers compared with primitive men or with dogs and foxes. Few things are more striking than the unerring instinct with which the Indian makes his way through utterly trackless forests, seldom stopping to make up his mind, and taking in at a single glance whole groups of signs which to his civilized companion are inappreciable. The loss of this power of co-ordination, like the decrease in the range of the senses, is undoubtedly due to disuse, the circumstances of civilized life affording little or no occasion for the exercise of these faculties.*

But although in these respects the correspondence in space does not seem to have been extended with the progress of civilization, yet in those far more indirect and complicated adjustments which, as involving time-relations of force and cause, depend largely on the aid of the cerebrum, the civilized man surpasses the savage to a much greater extent than the savage surpasses the wolf or lion. "By combining his own perceptions with the perceptions of others as registered in maps," the modern "can reach special places lying thousands of miles away over the earth's surface. A ship, guided by compass and

* In the course of the recent interesting discussion and correspondence in *Nature* concerning the "sense of direction" exhibited in barbarians and lower animals, it was observed that a party of Samoyeds will travel in a direct line from one point to another over trackless fields of ice, even on cloudy nights when there is accordingly nothing whatever that is visible to guide their course. It would be too much to assert that this faculty is utterly lost in civilized man, so that a temporary recurrence to the conditions of barbaric life might not revive it; but even if retained at all, it is certainly kept quite in abeyance.

stars and chronometer, brings him from the antipodes information by which his purchases here are adapted to prices there. From the characters of exposed strata he infers the presence of coal below; and thereupon adjusts the sequences of his actions to coexistences a thousand feet beneath. Nor is the environment through which his correspondences reach limited to the surface and the substance of the earth. It stretches into the surrounding sphere of infinity." In all these respects, the extension of the correspondence achieved during the progress of civilization has been much greater than that achieved during the immediately preceding stages of the evolution of man from an inferior primate. "From early races acquainted only with neighboring localities, up to modern geographers who specify the latitude and longitude of every place on the globe; from the ancient builders and metallurgists, knowing but surface deposits, up to the geologists of our day whose data in some cases enable them to describe the material existing at a depth never yet reached by the miner; from the savage barely able to say in how many days a full moon will return, up to the astronomer who ascertains the period of revolution of a double star; — there has been" an enormous "widening of the surrounding region throughout which the adjustment of inner to outer relations extends." * It only remains to add that the later and more conspicuous stages of this progress have been determined by that increase in the size and heterogeneity of the social environment which results from the growing interdependence of communities once isolated, and which I have elsewhere shown to be the chief determining cause of progress in general.† For this integration of communities has not only directly enlarged the area throughout which adjustments are required to be made, but it has indirectly aided the advances in scientific knowledge requisite for making the adjustments.

Great, however, as has been the extension of the correspondence in space which has characterized the progress of the favored portion of humanity from barbarism to civilization, the extension of the correspondence in time is a much more conspicuous and more distinctively human phenomenon. As we

* Spencer, Psychology, I. 317, 319.

† See "The Laws of History," North American Review, July, 1869.

trace this kind of mental evolution through sundry classes and orders of the animal kingdom in an ascending series, it is to be observed that until we reach the higher mammals the two kinds of correspondence advance together, — the distance at which outer relations are cognized forming a measure of the interval by which their effects may be anticipated. But among the higher mammals there is observed a higher order of adjustments to future emergencies, which advances more rapidly than the extension of the correspondence in space, and which in the human race first acquires a notable development. "Not that the transition is sudden," observes Mr. Spencer. "During the first stages of human progress, the method of estimating epochs does not differ in nature from that employed by the more intelligent animals. There are historical traces of the fact that originally the civilized races adjusted their actions to the longer sequences in the environment, just as Australians and Bushmen do now, by observing their coincidence with the migrations of birds, the floodings of rivers, the flowerings of plants. And it is obvious that the savages who, after the ripening of a certain berry, travel to the sea-shore, knowing that they will then find a particular shell-fish in season, are guided by much the same process as the dog who, on seeing the cloth laid for dinner, goes to the window to watch for his master. But when these phenomena of the seasons are observed to coincide with recurring phenomena in the heavens, — when, as was the case with the aboriginal Hottentots, periods come to be measured partly by astronomical and partly by terrestrial changes, — then we see making its appearance a means whereby the correspondence in time may be indefinitely extended. The sun's daily movements and the monthly phases of the moon having once been generalized, and some small power of counting having been reached, it becomes possible to recognize the interval between antecedents and consequents that are long apart, and to adjust the actions to them. Multitudes of sequences in the environment which, in the absence of answering functional periods, cannot be directly responded to by the organism, may be discerned and indirectly responded to when there arises this ability of numbering days and lunations." *

* Spencer, Psychology, Vol. I. p. 326.

In the advance to high stages of civilization, the extension of the correspondence in time is most conspicuously exemplified in the habitual adjustment of our theories and actions to sequences more or less remote in the future. In no other respect is civilized man more strikingly distinguished from the barbarian than in his power to adapt his conduct to future events, whether contingent or certain to occur. The ability to forego present enjoyment in order to avoid the risk of future disaster is what we call prudence or providence; and the barbarian is above all things imprudent and improvident. Doubtless the superior prudence of the civilized man is due in great part to his superior power of self-restraint; so that this class of phenomena may be regarded as illustrating one of the phases of moral progress. Nevertheless, there are several purely intellectual elements which enter as important factors into the case. The power of economizing in harvest-time or in youth, in order to retain something upon which to live comfortably in winter or in old age, is obviously dependent upon the vividness with which distant sets of circumstances can be pictured in the imagination. The direction of the volitions involved in the power of self-restraint must be to a great extent determined by the comparative vividness with which the distant circumstances and the present circumstances are mentally realized. And the power of distinctly imagining objective relations not present to sense is probably the most fundamental of the many intellectual differences between the civilized man and the barbarian, since it underlies both the class of phenomena which we are now considering and the class of phenomena comprised in artistic, scientific, and philosophic progress. The savage, with his small and undeveloped cerebrum, plays all summer, like the grasshopper in the fable, eating and wasting whatever he can get; for although he knows that the dreaded winter is coming, during which he must starve and shiver, he is nevertheless unable to realize these distant feelings with sufficient force to determine his volition in the presence of his actual feeling of repugnance to toil. But the civilized man, with his large and complex cerebrum, has so keen a sense of remote contingencies that he willingly submits to long years of drudgery, in order to avoid poverty in old age,

pays out each year a portion of his hard-earned money to provide for losses by fire which may never occur, builds houses and accumulates fortunes for posterity to enjoy, and now and then enacts laws to forestall possible disturbances or usurpations a century hence. Again, the progress of scientific knowledge, familiarizing civilized man with the idea of an inexorable regularity of sequence among events, greatly assists him in the adjustment of his actions to far-distant emergencies. He who ascribes certain kinds of suffering to antecedent neglect of natural laws is more likely to shape his conduct so as to avoid a recurrence of the infliction, than he who attributes the same kinds of suffering to the wrath of an offended Deity, and fondly hopes, by ceremonial propitiation of the Deity, to escape in future.

This power of shaping actions so as to meet future contingencies has been justly recognized by political economists as an indispensable prerequisite to the accumulation of wealth in any community, without which no considerable degree of progress can be attained. The impossibility of getting barbarians to work, save under the stimulus of actually present necessities, has been one of the chief obstacles in the way of missionaries who have attempted to civilize tribal communities. The Jesuits, in the seventeenth century, were the most successful of Christian missionaries, and their proceedings with the Indians of Paraguay constitute one of the most brilliant feats in missionary annals. Such unparalleled ascendency did the priests acquire over the imaginations of these barbarians, that they actually made them cease from warfare. They taught them European methods of agriculture, as well as the arts of house-building, painting, dyeing, furniture-making, even the use of watches; and they administered the affairs of the community with a despotic power which has seldom been equalled either in absoluteness or in beneficence. Nevertheless, the superficiality of all this show of civilization was illustrated by the fact that, unless perpetually watched, the workmen would go home leaving their oxen yoked to the plough, or would even cut them up for supper, if no other meat happened to be at hand. Examples of a state of things intermediate between this barbaric improvidence and the care-taking foresight of the

European are to be found among the Chinese, — a people who have risen far above barbarism, but whose civilization is still of a primitive type. The illustration is rendered peculiarly forcible by the fact that the Chinese are a very industrious people, and where the returns for labor are immediate will work as steadily as Germans or Americans. Owing to their crowded population, every rood of ground is needed for cultivation, and upon their great rivers the traveller continually meets with little floating farms constructed upon rafts and held in place by anchors. Yet side by side with these elaborate but fragile structures are to be seen acres of swamp-land which only need a few years of careful draining to become permanently fit for tillage. So incapable are the Chinese of adapting their actions to sequences at all remote, that they continue, age after age, to resort to such temporary devices, rather than to bestow their labor where its fruits, however enduring, cannot be enjoyed from the outset.* The contrast proves that the cause is the intellectual inability to realize vividly a group of future conditions, involving benefits not immediately to be felt.

Of the correspondence in time, even more forcibly than of the correspondence in space, it may be said that its extension during the process of social evolution has been much greater than during the organic evolution of the human race from some ancestral primate. Between the Australian, on the one hand, who cannot estimate the length of a month, or provide even for certain disaster which does not stare him in the face, and whose theory of things is adapted only to events which occur during his own lifetime; and, on the other hand, the European, with his practical foresight, his elaborate scientific previsions, and his systems of philosophy, which embrace alike the earliest traceable cosmical changes and the latest results of civilization; the intellectual gulf is certainly far wider than that which divides the Australian from the fox, who hides the bird which he has killed, in order to return when hungry to eat it.

It remains to add that the later and more conspicuous stages of this kind of intellectual progress have obviously been determined by the increase in the size and heterogeneity of the so-

* See Mill, Political Economy, Book I. chap. xi.

cial environment. For the integration of communities to which this increase is due has not only indirectly aided the advances in scientific knowledge requisite for making mental adjustments to long sequences, past and future, but it has also directly assisted the disposition to work patiently in anticipation of future returns, by increasing the general security and diminishing the chances that the returns to labor may be lost.

The extension of the correspondence between subjective and objective relations in time and in space answers to that kind of primary integration which underlies the process of evolution in general. In treating of the enlarged area, in time and space, throughout which inner relations are adjusted to outer relations, we have been treating of intellectual progress regarded as a growth. But in proceeding to speak of the increasing heterogeneity, definiteness, and coherence of the adjustments, we proceed to treat of intellectual progress regarded as a development. Here, as elsewhere, throughout all save the simplest orders of evolution, quantitative increase is accompanied by qualitative increase. The knowledge is not only greater and the intellectual capacity greater, but the knowledge is more complex, accurate, and unified, and the intellectual capacity is more varied.

The increase of the correspondence in definiteness may be sufficiently illustrated by the following brief citation from Mr. Spencer: "Manifestly the reduction of objective phenomena to definite measures gives to those subjective actions that correspond with them a degree of precision, a special fitness, greatly beyond that possessed by ordinary actions. There is an immense contrast in this respect between the doings of the astronomer who, on a certain day, hour, and minute, adjusts his instrument to watch an eclipse, and those of the farmer who so arranges his work that he may have hands enough for reaping some time in August or September. The chemist who calculates how many pounds of quicklime will be required to decompose and precipitate all the bicarbonate of lime which the water in a given reservoir contains in a certain percentage, exhibits an adjustment of inner to outer relations incomparably more specific than does the laundress who softens a tubful of hard water by a handful of soda. In their adaptations to ex-

ternal coexistences and sequences, there is a wide difference between the proceedings of ancient besiegers, whose battering-rams were indeterminate in their actions, and those of modern artillery officers, who, by means of a specific quantity of powder, consisting of specific ingredients, in specific proportions, placed in a tube at a specific inclination, send a bomb of specific weight on to a specific object, and cause it to explode at a specific moment." * It only remains to note that the difference in specific accuracy, here illustrated by contrasting the operations of science with those of ordinary knowledge, is equally conspicuous when, on a somewhat wider scale, we contrast the proceedings, both scientific and artistic, of civilized men with the proceedings of the lowest savages. The most ignorant man in New England probably knows in June that winter is just six months distant; the Australian, to whom, as to the civilized child, time appears to go slowly, knows only that it is a long way off. So, too, the crude knives and hammers and the uncouth pottery of primeval men are distinguished alike by their indefiniteness of contour and by their uselessness in operations which require specific accuracy. And here, as before, in the extreme vagueness and lack of speciality, both in his knowledge and in the actions which are guided by it, the primeval man appears to stand nearer to the highest brutes than to the civilized moderns.

Along with this increase in specialization, entailing greater definiteness of adjustment, there goes on an increase in generalization, involving an increased power of abstraction, of which barely the germs are to be found either in the lowest men or in other highly organized mammals. The inability of savage races to make generalizations involving any abstraction is sufficiently proved by the absence or extreme paucity of abstract expressions in their languages. As Mr. Farrar observes, "The Society-Islanders have words for dog's tail, bird's tail, and sheep's tail, yet no word for tail; the Mohicans have verbs for every kind of cutting, and yet no verb 'to cut.' The Australians have no generic term for fish, bird, or tree. The Malays have no term for tree or herb, yet they have words for

* Spencer, Psychology, I. 340.

fibre, root, tree-crown, stalk, stock, trunk, twig, and shoot. Some American tongues have separate verbs for 'I wish to eat meat,' and 'I wish to eat soup,' but no verb for 'I wish'; and separate words for a blow with a sharp and a blow with a blunt instrument, but no abstract word for blow."* Between the stage of intellectual progress thus illustrated and that in which an unlimited capacity for generalization produces such words as "individuation" or "equilibration," the contrast is sufficiently obvious; and it fully confirms our theorem, that the amount of intellectual progress achieved since man became human far exceeds that which was needed to transfer him from apehood to manhood.

The increase of the correspondence in complexity, already illustrated incidentally in the treatment of these other aspects of the case, is still further exemplified in the growing complication of the interdependence between science and the arts. When tracing the complexity of correspondence through the lower stages of the evolution of intelligence in the animal kingdom, Mr. Spencer hints that the evolution of the executive faculties displayed in the organs of prehension and locomotion is closely related to that of the directive faculties displayed in the cephalic ganglia and in the organs of sense. The parallelism may be summed up in the statement that in most, if not all, the principal classes of the animal kingdom, the animals with the most perfect prehensile organs are the most intelligent. Thus the cuttle-fish is the most intelligent of mollusks, and the crab similarly stands at the head of crustaceans, while the parrot outranks all other birds alike in sagacity and in power of handling things, and the ape and elephant are, with the exception of man, the most sagacious of mammals.† Of the human race, too, it may be said that, although Anaxagoras was wrong in asserting that brutes would have been men had they had hands, he might safely have asserted that without hands men could never have become human. Now this interdependence of the directive and executive faculties is continued throughout the process of social evolution in the shape of the interdependence of the sciences and the arts. "We may properly

* Chapters on Language, p. 199.

† Spencer, Psychology, I. 368–372.

say that, in its higher forms, the correspondence between the organism and its environment is effected by means of supplementary senses and supplementary limbs. . . . . The magnifying-glass adds but another lens to the lenses existing in the eye. The crow-bar is but one more lever attached to the series of levers forming the arm and hand. And the relationship, which is so obvious in these first steps, holds throughout." We may, indeed, go still deeper, and say that science is but an extension of our ordinary sense-perceptions by the aid of reasoning, while art is but an extension of the ordinary function of our muscular system, of expressing our psychical states by means of motion. Hence it is that "each great step towards a knowledge of laws has facilitated men's operations on things; while each more successful operation on things has, by its results, facilitated the discovery of further laws." Hence the sciences and arts, originating together, — as in the cases of "astronomy and agriculture, geometry and the laying out of buildings, mechanics and the weighing of commodities," — have all along reached upon each other, in an increasing variety of ways. It is sufficient to mention the reciprocal connections between navigation and astronomy, between geology and mining, between chemistry and all the arts; while telescopes and microscopes illustrate the truth that "there is scarcely an observation now made in science, but what involves the use of instruments supplied by the arts; while there is scarcely an art process but what involves some of the provisions of science." Just as in organic evolution we find the mutual dependence of the directive and executive faculties ever increasing, so that "complete visual and tactual perceptions are impossible without complex muscular adjustments, while elaborate actions require the constant overseeing of the senses"; so in social evolution we find between science and art an increasing reciprocity "such that each further cognition implies elaborate operative aid, and each new operation implies sundry elaborate cognitions." I need only add that, in this as in the other aspects of intellectual progress, the increase in complexity of adjustment achieved during the process of social evolution is far greater than that achieved during the immediately preceding stages of the process of organic evolution. Between the

ape and the primitive man, with his rude levers and hatchets and his few simple previsions, the difference in complexity of correspondence is obviously less than between the primitive man and the modern, with his steam-hammers and thermo-electric multipliers, and his long list of sciences and sub-sciences, any one of which it would take much more than a lifetime to master in detail.

We have thus passed in review the various aspects of intellectual progress, regarded as a process of adjustment of inner to outer relations, and we have seen that in all the most essential features of this progress there is a wider difference between the civilized man and the lowest savage than between the savage and the ape. It appears that those rare and admirable qualities upon which we felicitate ourselves as marks which absolutely distinguish us from brute animals, have been slowly acquired through long ages of social evolution, and are shared only to a quite insignificant extent by the lowest contemporary races of humanity. As long as we regard things statically, as forever fixed, we may well imagine an impassable gulf between ourselves and all other forms of organic existence. But as soon as we regard things dynamically, as forever changing, we are taught that the gulf has been for the most part established during an epoch at the very beginning of which we were zoölogically the same that we now are.

The next step in our argument will be facilitated by an inquiry into the common characteristic of the various intellectual differences between the civilized and the primitive man which we have above enumerated. The nature of this characteristic was hinted at when we were discussing the improvidence of the barbarian. It was observed that the power of distinctly imagining objective relations not present to sense is the most fundamental of the many intellectual differences between the civilized man and the barbarian. Making this statement somewhat wider, we may now safely assert that the entire intellectual superiority of the civilized man over the savage, or of the modern man over the primeval man, is summed up in his superior power of *representing* that which is not present to the senses. For it is not only in what we call providence that this superiority of representation shows itself, but

also in all those combinations of present with past impressions which accompany the extension of the correspondence in space and time, and its increase in heterogeneity, definiteness, and coherence. It is his ability to reproduce copies of his own vanished states of consciousness, and of those of his fellows, that enables the civilized man to adjust his actions to sequences occurring at the antipodes. It is the same power of representation which underlies his power of forming abstract and general conceptions. For the peculiarity of abstract conceptions is that "the matter of thought is no longer any one object, or any one action, but a trait common to many"; and it is, therefore, only when a number of distinct objects or relations possessing some common trait can be represented in consciousness that there becomes possible that comparison which results in the abstraction of the common trait as the object of thought. Obviously, then, the greater the power of abstraction and generalization which is observed, the greater is the power of representation which is implied. The case is the same with that definiteness of the intellectual processes which we have noted as distinguishing modern from primitive thinking. For the conception which underlies definiteness of thinking is the conception of *exact likeness*, — a highly abstract conception which can only be framed after the comparison of numerous represented cases in which degree of likeness is the common trait that is thought about. Hence not only the improvidence of the savage, but likewise the vagueness of his conceptions, his inability to form generalizations involving abstraction, and the limited area covered by his adjustments are facts which one and all find their ultimate explanation in his relative incapacity for calling up representative states of consciousness.

From this same incapacity results that inflexibility of thought in which the savage resembles the brute, and which is one of the chief proximate causes of his unprogressiveness. "One of the greatest pains to human nature," says Mr. Bagehot, "is the pain of a new idea." This pain, which only to a few of the most highly cultivated minds in the most highly civilized communities has ceased to be a pain and become a pleasure, is to the savage not so much a pain as a numbing or paralyzing shock. To rearrange the elements of his beliefs is for the

uncivilized man an impossible task. It is not so much that he does not dare to sever some traditional association of ideas which he was taught in childhood, as it is that he is incapable of holding together in thought the clusters of representations with the continuity of which the given association is incompatible. This important point is so ably and succinctly stated by Mr. Spencer, that I cannot do better than quote his exposition entire. After reminding us that "mental evolution, both intellectual and emotional, may be measured by the degree of remoteness from primitive reflex action," Mr. Spencer observes that "in reflex action, which is the action of nervous structures that effect few, simple, and often-repeated co-ordinations, the sequent nervous state follows irresistibly the antecedent nervous state; and does this not only for the reason that the discharge follows a perfectly permeable channel, but also for the reason that no alternative channel exists." From this stage, in which the psychical life is automatically restrained within the narrowest limits, up through higher stages in which increasing nervous complexities give increasing varieties of actions and possibilities of new combinations, the process continues the same; and it continues the same as we advance from the savage to the civilized man. For where the life furnishes relatively few and little-varied experiences, where the restricted sphere in which it is passed yields no sign of the multitudinous combinations of phenomena that occur elsewhere, the thought follows irresistibly one or other of the few channels which the experiences have made for it, — cannot be determined in some other direction for want of some other channel. But as fast as advancing civilization brings more numerous experiences to each man, as well as accumulations of other men's experiences, past and present, the ever-multiplying connections of ideas that result imply ever-multiplying possibilities of thought. The convictions throughout a wide range of cases are rendered less fixed. Other causes than those which are usual become conceivable; other effects can be imagined; and hence there comes an increasing modifiability of opinion. This modifiability of opinion reaches its extreme in those most highly cultured whose multitudinous experiences include many experiences of errors discovered,

and whose representativeness of thought is so far-reaching that they habitually call to mind the various possibilities of error, as constituting a general reason for seeking new evidence and subjecting their conclusions to revision.

"If we glance over the series of contrasted modes of thinking which civilization presents, beginning with the savage who, seized by the fancy that something is a charm or an omen, thereafter continues firmly fixed in that belief, and ending with the man of science whose convictions, firm where he is conscious of long-accumulated evidence having no exception, are plastic where the evidence though abundant is not yet overwhelming, we see how an increase in freedom of thought goes along with that higher representativeness accompanying further mental evolution." *

If now we inquire for a moment into the causes of this higher representativeness of civilized thinking, we shall see most beautifully exemplified the way in which intellectual progress, as it goes on in the human race, is determined by social evolution. Intellectual progress is indeed a cause as well as a consequence of the evolution of society; but amid the dense entanglement of causes and effects our present purpose requires us to single out especially the dependence of progress in representativeness upon social complexity, since herein will be found the secret of the mental pre-eminence of civilized man. Now the integration of small tribes into larger and more complex social aggregates, which is the fundamental phenomenon in civilization, tends directly to heighten representativeness of thinking by widening and varying the experiences of the members of society. The member of a savage tribe must think indefinitely, concretely, rigidly, improvidently, because his intellectual experiences are so few in number and so monotonous in character. Increase in social complexity renders possible, or indeed directly produces, fresh associations of ideas in greater and greater variety and abundance, so that the decomposition and recombination of thoughts involved in abstraction and generalization is facilitated; and along with this, the definiteness and the plasticity of thought is increased,

* Spencer, Psychology, Vol. II. p. 524.

and the contents of the mind become representative in higher and higher degrees. Thus in every way it is brought before us that sociality has been the great agent in the achievement of man's intellectual pre-eminence, and that it has operated by widening and diversifying human experience, or, in other words, by increasing the number, remoteness, and heterogeneity of the environing relations to which each individual's actions have had to be adjusted. An inquiry into the genesis of sociality will therefore best show us how the chasm which divides man intellectually from the brute is to be crossed.

But before we proceed to this somewhat lengthy and circuitous inquiry, we may profitably contemplate under a new aspect the intellectual difference which we have assigned as the fundamental one between civilized and primeval man. We have observed that the intellectual superiority of man over brute and of the civilized man over the barbarian essentially consists in a greater capacity for mentally representing objects and relations remote from sense. And we have insisted upon the point that in this capacity of representation the difference between the highest and lowest specimens of normal humanity known to us far exceeds the difference between the lowest men and the highest apes. Now in closest connection with these conclusions stands the physical fact that the chief structural difference between man and ape, as also between civilized and uncivilized man, is the difference in size and complexity of cerebrum. The cerebrum is the organ especially set apart for the compounding and recompounding of impressions that are not immediately sensory. The business of co-ordinating immediately presentative impressions is performed by the medulla and other subordinate centres. The cerebrum is especially the organ of that portion of psychical life which is entirely representative. Obviously, then, the progress to higher and higher representativeness ought to be accompanied by a well-marked growth of the cerebrum relatively to the other parts of the nervous system. Now, in the light of the present argument, how significant is the fact that the cranial capacity of the modern Englishman surpasses that of the aboriginal non-Aryan Hindu by a difference of sixty-eight cubic inches, while between this Hindu skull and the skull of the gorilla the

difference in capacity is but eleven cubic inches! That is to say, the difference in volume of brain between the highest and the lowest men is at least six times as great as the difference between the lowest men and the highest apes. And if we were to take into account the differences in structural complexity, as indicated by the creasing and furrowing of the brain-surface, we should obtain a yet more astonishing contrast. Yet, powerfully as this anatomical fact confirms the position we have all along been upholding, its full value will not be apparent if we are so dazzled by it as to overlook the significance of the lesser difference between the gorilla and the aboriginal inhabitant of India. As the Duke of Argyll very properly observes, we do right in setting a higher value in classification upon the eleven inches which intervene between the gorilla and the Hindu than upon the sixty-eight inches which intervene between the Hindu and the Englishman. For "the significance set by the facts of nature upon that difference of eleven cubic inches . . . . is the difference between an irrational brute confined to some one climate and to some limited area of the globe, — which no outward conditions can modify or improve, — and a being equally adapted to the whole habitable world, with powers, however undeveloped, of comparison, of reflection, of judgment, of reason, with a sense of right and wrong, and with all these capable of accumulated acquisition, and therefore of indefinite advance." Though considerably exaggerated in what it denies to the brute, and still more in what it claims for the aboriginal man, this statement contains a kernel of truth which is of value for our present purpose, and which is further illustrated by the fact that a minimum of brain-substance "is constantly and uniformly associated with all the other anatomical peculiarities of man. Below that minimum the whole accompanying structure undergoes far more than a corresponding change, — even the whole change between the lowest savage and the highest ape. Above that minimum, all subsequent variations in quantity are accompanied by no changes whatever in physical structure."* Here again, though the antithesis is a little too

* Duke of Argyll, Primeval Man, pp. 57–64.

absolutely stated, we have set before us a real distinction. Up to a certain point, the brain and the rest of the body are alike alterable by natural selection and such other agencies as may be concerned in the slow modification of organisms. But when the brain has reached a certain point in size and complexity, the rest of the body ceases to change, save in a few slight particulars, and the agencies concerned in forwarding the process of evolution seem to confine themselves to the brain, and specially to the cerebrum, — the result being marked psychical development, unattended by any notable physical alteration. Here we have reached a fact of prime importance. We may grant to the Duke of Argyll that when those eleven additional cubic inches of brain had been acquired, some kind of a Rubicon had been crossed, and a new state of things inaugurated. What was that Rubicon?

The answer has been furnished by Mr. Wallace, and must rank as one of the most brilliant contributions ever yet made to the Doctrine of Evolution. Since inferior animals respond chiefly by physical changes to changes in their environment, natural selection deals chiefly with such changes, to the visible modification of their bodily structure. In the case of sheep or bears, for instance, increased cold can only select for preservation the individuals most warmly coated; or if a race of lions, which has hitherto subsisted upon small and sluggish ruminants until these have been nearly exterminated, is at last obliged to attack antelopes and buffaloes, natural selection can only preserve the swiftest and strongest or most ferocious lions. But when an animal has once appeared, endowed with sufficient intelligence to chip a stone tool and hurl a weapon, natural selection will take advantage of variations in this intelligence, to the neglect of purely physical variations. Communities whose members are best able to meet by intelligent contrivances the changes in the environment will prevail over other communities, and will be less easily destroyed by physical catastrophes. Still more strikingly must this superior availability of variations in intelligence be exemplified, when the intelligence has progressed so far as to sharpen spears, to use rude bows, to dig pitfalls, to cover the body with leaves or skins, and to strike fire by rubbing sticks, according to the Indian version of the myth of Prometheus.

So soon, in short, as the intelligence of an animal has, through ages of natural selection and direct adaptation, become so considerable that a slight variation in it is of more use to the animal than any variation in physical structure, then such variations will be more and more constantly selected, while purely physical variations, being of less vital importance to the species, will be more and more neglected. Thus, while the external appearance of such an animal, and the structure of his internal nutritive and muscular apparatus, may vary but little in many ages, his cerebral structure will vary with comparative rapidity, entailing a more or less rapid variation in intellectual and emotional attributes.

Here we would seem to have the key to the singular contrast in the relations of man to contemporary anthropoid apes. We may now understand why man differs so little, in general physical structure and external appearance, from the chimpanzee and gorilla, while, with regard to the special point of cerebral structure and its correlative intelligence, he differs so vastly from these, his nearest living congeners, and the most sagacious of animals save himself. Coupled with what we now know concerning the immense antiquity of the human race, Mr. Wallace's brilliant suggestion goes far to bridge over the interval, which formerly seemed so impracticable, between brute and man. If we take the thousands of centuries during which the human race has covered both the eastern and the western hemispheres, and compare with them the entire duration of recorded human history, we shall have set before us a profitable subject of reflection. Since the period during which man has possessed sufficient intelligence to leave a traditionary record of himself is but an infinitesimal fraction of the period during which he has existed upon the earth, it is but fair to conclude that, during those long ages of which none but a geologic record of his existence remains, he was slowly *acquiring* that superior intelligence which now so widely distinguishes him from all other animals. Throughout an enormous period of time, his brain-structure and its correlated intellectual and emotional functions must have been constantly modified both by natural selection and by direct adaptation, while his outward physical appearance has undergone few modifications;

and of these the most striking would seem to be directly or indirectly consequent upon the cerebral changes.*

It is a corollary from the foregoing considerations, that no race of organisms can in future be produced through the agency of natural selection and direct adaptation which shall be zoologically distinct from, and superior to, the human race. As the same causes which physically modify lower species have, for countless ages, modified man directly and greatly in intelligence and only indirectly and slightly in physical constitution, it follows that mankind is destined to advance during future ages in psychical attributes, but is likely to undergo only slight changes in outward appearance. It is by the co-ordination of intellectual and moral relations that man maintains himself in equilibrium with the physical, intellectual, and moral relations arising in his ever-changing environment. And hence in the future, as in the recent past, the dominant fact in the career of humanity is not physical modification, but CIVILIZATION.

Here we are brought to the verge of that profound theory of civilization which I have elsewhere sought to elucidate.† We have touched upon a grand truth, of which it would be difficult to overrate the importance. For we can now admit — not as a concession to Mr. St. George Mivart, but as a legitimate result of our own method of inquiry — that when "the totality

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* To the general observer, as to the anatomist, the most notable points of difference between civilized and uncivilized man, as well as between man and the chimpanzee or gorilla, are the differences in the size of the jaws and the inclination of the forehead. The latter difference is directly consequent upon increase of intelligence; and the former is indirectly occasioned by the same circumstance. For the diminution of the jaws, entailed by civilization, is, no doubt, primarily due to disuse; and the disuse is occasioned partly by difference in food, and partly by the employment of tools, and the consequent increased reliance upon the hands as prehensile organs. All these circumstances are the result of increased intelligence. And in addition to this, it is probable that increased frontal development has directly tended, by correlation of growth, to diminish the size of the jaws, as well as to push forward the bridge of the nose. To the increased reliance upon the hands as prehensile organs — a circumstance which we have seen to be in an especial degree characteristic of developing intelligence — is probably also due the complete attainment of the erect position of the body, already partially obtained by the anthropoid apes. Cerebral development thus accounts for all the conspicuous physical peculiarities of man except his bare skin, — a phenomenon for which no satisfactory explanation has yet been suggested.

† See "The Laws of History," North American Review, July, 1869.

of man's being" is taken into the account, the difference between ape and mushroom is less important than the difference between ape and man. And without conceding aught to that superlative nonsense known as the "doctrine of special creations," we may admit, with the Duke of Argyll, that the eleven cubic inches of brain-space, by which the aboriginal Hindu surpasses the gorilla, have a higher value, for purposes of classification, than the sixty-eight cubic inches by which the modern Englishman surpasses the Hindu. We now see what kind of a Rubicon it was which was crossed when those eleven cubic inches of brain (or even when four or five of them) had been gained. The crossing of the Rubicon was the point at which natural selection began to confine itself chiefly to variations in psychical manifestation. The ape-like progenitor of man, in whom physical and psychical changes had gone on *pari passu* for countless æons, until he had reached the grade of intelligence implied by the possession of a brain four or five cubic inches more capacious than that of the gorilla, had now, as we may suppose, obtained a brain upon which could be devolved, to a greater and greater extent, the task of maintaining relations with the environment. Then began a new chapter in the history of the evolution of life. Henceforward the survival of the fittest, in the line of man's ancestry, was the survival of the cerebrums best able to form representative combinations. The agencies which had hitherto been at work in producing an organic form endowed with rare physical capacities, now began steadfastly to labor in producing a mind capable to a greater and greater extent of ideally resuscitating and combining relations not present to the senses.

But immense as was the step thus achieved in advance, the progress from brute to man was not yet accomplished. As we have already shown, the circumstances which by widening and diversifying experience have mainly contributed to heighten man's faculty of representativeness, have been for the most part circumstances attendant upon man's sociality, or the capacity of individuals for aggregating into communities of increasing extent and complexity. Here we become involved in considerations relating to the emotions as well as to the intelligence. The capacity for sustaining the various relationships

implied by the existence of a social aggregate — whether in the case of a primeval family community or of a modern nation — cannot be explained without taking into account the genesis of those moral feelings by the possession of which man has come to differ from the highest brutes even more conspicuously than by his purely intellectual achievements. The task now before us, therefore, is to explain the genesis of the moral feelings which lie at the bottom of sociality in the human race; and with reference to this question I shall presently have a suggestion to offer, which will be found as serviceable as it is interesting and novel. Let us for the moment, however, consider the implications of current ethical theories, and especially let us examine the scientific basis of what is too crudely designated as utilitarianism.

II.

There are two things, said Kant, which fill me with awe because of their sublimity, — the starry heavens above us, and the moral law within us. From the modern point of view there is interest as well as instruction to be found in the implied antithesis. While in the study of the stellar universe we contemplate the process of evolution on a scale so vast that reason and imagination are alike baffled in the effort to trace out its real significance, and we are overpowered by the sense of the infinity that surrounds us; on the other hand, in the study of the moral sense we contemplate the last and noblest product of evolution which we can ever know, — the attribute latest to be unfolded in the development of psychical life, and by the possession of which we have indeed become as gods, knowing the good and the evil. The theorems of astronomy and the theorems of ethics present to us the process of evolution in its extremes of extension and of intension respectively. For although upon other worlds far out in space there may be modes of existence immeasurably transcending humanity, yet these must remain unknowable by us. And while this possibility should be allowed its due weight in restraining us from the vain endeavor to formulate the infinite and eternal Sustainer of the universe in terms of our own human nature, as if the highest

symbols intelligible to us were in reality the highest symbols, nevertheless it can in no way influence or modify our science. To us the development of the noblest of human attributes must ever remain the last term in the stupendous series of cosmic changes, of which the development of planetary systems is the first term. And our special synthesis of the phenomena of cosmic evolution, which began by seeking to explain the genesis of the earth and its companion worlds,* will be fitly concluded when we have offered a theory of the genesis of those psychical activities whose end is to secure to mankind the most perfect fulness of life upon this earth which is its dwelling-place.

The great philosopher whose remark has suggested these reflections would not, however, have been ready to assent to the interpretation here given. Though Kant was one of the chief pioneers of the doctrine of evolution, having been the first to propose and to elaborate in detail the theory of the nebular origin of planetary systems, yet the conception of a continuous development of life in all its modes, physical and psychical, was not sufficiently advanced, in Kant's day, to be adopted into philosophy. Hence in his treatment of the mind, as regards both intelligence and emotion, Kant took what I have elsewhere called a statical view of the subject; and finding in the adult civilized mind, upon the study of which his systems of psychology and ethics were founded, a number of organized moral intuitions and an organized moral sense, which urges men to seek the right and shun the wrong, irrespective of utilitarian considerations of pleasure and pain, he proceeded to deal with these moral intuitions and this moral sense as if they were ultimate facts, incapable of being analyzed into simpler emotional elements. Now as the following exposition may look like a defence of utilitarianism, it being really my intention to show that utilitarianism in the deepest and widest sense is the ethical philosophy imperatively required by the facts, it is well to state, at the outset, that the existence of a moral sense and moral intuitions in civilized man is fully granted. It is admitted that civilized man possesses a complex group of emotions, leading him to seek the right and avoid the

* The reference is to the unpublished chapter on Planetary Evolution.

wrong, without any reference to considerations of utility; and I disagree entirely with those utilitarian disciples of Locke, who would apparently refer these ethical emotions to the organization of experiences of pleasure and pain in the case of each individual. So long as the subject is contemplated from a statical point of view, so long as individual experience is studied without reference to ancestral experience, the follower of Kant can always hold his ground against the follower of Locke, in ethics as well as in psychology. When the Kantian asserts that the intuitions of right and wrong, as well as the intuitions of time and space, are independent of experience, he occupies a position which is impregnable, so long as the organization of experiences through successive generations is left out of the discussion. But as soon as we begin to study the subject dynamically, everything is shown up in a new light. Admitting the truth of the Kantian position, that there exists in us a moral sense, for analyzing which our individual experience does not afford the requisite data, and which must therefore be regarded as ultimate for each individual, it is nevertheless open to us to inquire into the emotional antecedents of this organized moral sense as exhibited in ancestral types of psychical life. The inquiry will result in the conviction that the moral sense is not ultimate, but derivative, and that it has been built up out of slowly organized experiences of pleasures and pains.

But before we can proceed directly upon the course thus marked out, it is necessary that we should determine what are meant by pleasures and pains. What are the common characteristics, on the one hand, of the states of consciousness which we call pleasures, and, on the other hand, of the states of consciousness which we call pains? According to Sir William Hamilton, "pleasure is a reflex of the spontaneous and unimpeded exertion of a power of whose energy we are conscious; pain is a reflex of the overstrained or repressed exertion of such a power." That this theory, which is nearly identical with that of Aristotle, is inadequate to account for all the phenomena of pleasure and pain, has been, I think, conclusively proved by Mr. Mill. With its complete adequacy, however, we need not now concern ourselves; as we shall presently see that

a different though somewhat allied statement will much better express the facts in the case. Hamilton's statement, however inadequate, is illustrated by a number of truths which for our present purpose are of importance. A large proportion of our painful states of consciousness are attendant upon the inaction, or what Hamilton less accurately calls the "repressed exertion," of certain organic functions. According to the character of the functions in question, these painful states are known as cravings or yearnings. Inaction of the alimentary canal and that molecular inaction due to deficiency of water in the system are attended by feelings of hunger and thirst, which vary from slight discomfort to intense agony according as the inaction is prolonged. Of kindred character are the acquired cravings for tobacco, alcohol, and other narcotics. Inaction of the muscles causes great discomfort in children who are compelled to sit still, and grown persons feel similar annoyance when the enforced stillness is long enough kept up. Prisoners kept in dark cells soon feel an intense craving for light, which in time becomes scarcely less intolerable than raging hunger. A similar explanation suffices for the emotional yearnings involved in home-sickness, ennui, deprivation of the approval of our fellow-creatures, or in separation from our favorite pursuits. All these painful states are due to the enforced inaction of certain feelings, social or æsthetic. And in similar wise, as Mr. Spencer observes, the bitter grief attendant upon the death of a friend results from the ideal representation of a future in which certain groups of habitual emotions must remain inactive or unsatisfied by outward expression.

The objection may be made that all this is but an elaborate way of saying that certain pains result from the deprivation of certain pleasures. But since such an objection, in its very statement, recognizes that certain kinds of unimpeded activity, physical or psychical, are pleasures, it need not disturb us, or lead us to underestimate the value of Hamilton's suggestion. Let us note next that excessive action of any function, equally with deficient action, is attended by pain. Local pain results from intensified sensations of heat, light, sound, or pressure; and though it may be in some cases true, as Mr. Spencer asserts, that sweet tastes are not rendered positively disagreeable by

any degree of intensity,* the alleged fact seems contrary to my own experience, and to that of several other persons whom I have questioned. Other local pains, as in inflammation and sundry other forms of disease, are apparently due to increased molecular activity in the parts affected. And the feelings of pain or discomfort, both local and systemic, attendant upon over-exercise, over-eating, or excessive use of a narcotic, are to be similarly explained.

Thus we may say that pleasure, generally speaking, is "the concomitant of an activity which is neither too small nor too great," and we get at the significance of the Epicurean maxim, *μηδὲν ἄγαν*. But this doctrine, as already hinted, is by no means complete. For, as Mr. Mill and Mr. Spencer ask, "What constitutes a medium activity? What determines that lower limit of pleasurable action below which there is craving, and that higher limit of pleasurable action above which there is pain?" And furthermore, "how happen there to be certain feelings (as among tastes and odors) which are disagreeable in all degrees of intensity, and others that are agreeable in all degrees of intensity?"† The answer, as Mr. Spencer shows, is to be sought in the study of the past conditions under which the feelings have been evolved.

If the tentacles of a polyp are rudely struck by some passing or approaching body, the whole polyp contracts violently in such a manner as to throw itself slightly out of the way; but if a fragment of assimilable food, floating by, happens to touch one of the tentacles gently, the tentacle grasps it and draws it slowly down to the polyp's digestive sac. Now between these contrasted actions there is no such psychical difference as accompanies the similarly contrasted human actions of taking food and ducking the head to avoid a blow; for the polyp's contractions, being simply reflex actions of the lowest sort, are unattended by states of consciousness, either agreeable or disagreeable. Nevertheless there is one respect in which the two cases perfectly agree. In both cases there is a seeking of that which is beneficial to the organism, and a shunning of that which is injurious. And while, in the case of the polyp, there is no

* Spencer, Psychology, I. 276. † Ibid. 277.

conscious pleasure or pain, we may fairly surmise that, as soon as any animal's psychical life becomes sufficiently complex to be attended by distinct states of consciousness, the presence of that which is beneficial is accompanied by a pleasurable feeling which leads to the seeking of it, while the presence of that which is injurious is accompanied by a painful feeling which leads to the shunning of it. Our surmise is strengthened as we reconsider the human actions lately enumerated, and observe that the abnormal activity of a function, either in deficiency or in excess, is injurious, while the normal activity of a function in balance with its companion functions is beneficial. As Mr. Spencer says, "in a mutually dependent set of organs having a consensus of functions, the very existence of a special organ having its special function implies that the absence of its function must cause disturbance of the consensus, — implies, too, that its function may be raised to an excess which must cause disturbance of the consensus, — implies, therefore, that maintenance of the consensus goes along with a medium degree of its function." In accordance with this view, we may note that hunger and thirst are feelings attendant upon a kind of functional inaction which is harmful, and even fatal if prolonged; that inaction or excessive action of the muscles is injurious as well as painful; that the intense heat and cold, and the violent pressure, which cause distress, will also cause more or less injury, and may cause death; that the discomfort following repletion and narcosis is the concomitant of a state of things which, if kept up, must end in dyspepsia, or other forms of disease, entailing usually a permanent lowering of nutrition; and that the intense sounds and lights which distress the ear and eye also tend to produce deafness and blindness. And in like manner, the enforced inaction of the social and æsthetic feelings, which is attended by mental discomfort, is also attended in the long run by a diminution of the fulness and completeness of psychical life, which in extreme cases may result in consumption, insanity, or narcotic craving.

It would seem, therefore, that the class of cases upon which Hamilton relied will justify an interpretation much deeper than the one which he proposed for them. They will appar-

ently justify us in asserting that pleasure is a state of consciousness accompanying modes of activity which tend to increase the fulness of life of an organism, while pain is a state of consciousness accompanying modes of activity which tend to diminish the fulness of life. Before considering the objections to this doctrine, — which, though at first sight formidable, will disappear on further analysis, — let us note, with Mr. Spencer, that, on the theory of evolution, "races of sentient creatures could have come into existence under no other conditions." Omitting the cases which, in human psychology, are complicated by the foresight of remote or inconspicuous consequences, Mr. Spencer observes that pleasure is "a feeling which we seek to bring into consciousness and retain there," while pain is "a feeling which we seek to get out of consciousness and to keep out." Hence it follows that "if the states of consciousness which a creature endeavors to maintain are the correlatives of injurious actions, and if the states of consciousness which it endeavors to expel are the correlatives of beneficial actions, it must quickly disappear through persistence in the injurious and avoidance of the beneficial." In other words, even supposing a race of animals could come into existence, which should habitually seek baneful actions as pleasurable, and shun useful actions as painful, natural selection would immediately exterminate it. Our supposition is therefore a hibernicism; under the operation of natural selection no such race could ever come into existence. Only those races can exist whose feelings, on the average, result in actions which are in harmony with environing relations. Accordingly we may rest upon a still deeper and firmer basis our doctrine of pleasure and pain, and assert that pleasure is a state of consciousness accompanying the relatively complete adjustment of inner to outer relations, while pain is a state of consciousness attendant upon the discordance between inner and outer relations.

We may now consider a class of facts which at first seem inconsistent with the theory, but which in reality serve further to illustrate it. Animals now and then perform self-destructive actions under circumstances which make it difficult to suppose that the performance is not pleasurable. Though the majority of vegetable poisons are disagreeable to the taste,

yet this is not always the case; and hence animals have been known to perish after a greedy meal upon some noxious herb. But here, as in the case of the moth which, in Tennyson's phrase, is "shrivelled in a fruitless fire," there is a new relation in the environment for which there is no corresponding adjustment established in the organism. The cases are like that of the child who ignorantly drinks a sweet poison, or satisfies its desire for muscular activity by climbing out of the window. The dynamic theory of life does not imply the pre-existence of internal relations answering to all possible external relations. Were it so, life would be complete from the outset. For new emergencies there have to be new adjustments. Now manifestly if the whole race of moths could be made to live among lighted candles, one of two things must happen: either there must be generated a tendency to avoid the candles, or the race must be exterminated. If an animal migrates to a district where poisonous herbs abound, its existence can be maintained only on one of two conditions: if it be low in intelligence, a disagreeable taste must be generated, so that the noxious food will be instantly rejected, or the odor must become offensive, so that the taste will be forewarned; but if the animal be possessed of high intelligence, like a bird or mammal, it will be enough if the dangerous object is identified by smell or taste, or even by vision or touch, while along with the recognition there occurs an ideal representation of danger. Hence it is not necessary to the maintenance of a race like mankind that all poisons should be bitter, or that injurious actions, newly tried, should painfully affect any of the senses. The work of making the needful adjustments is thrown largely upon the cerebrum, with its power of forming ideal sequences like those formerly experienced, and of directing action so as to anticipate them. Here, indeed, we come suddenly upon one of the conditions of human progressiveness, as above illustrated.

We can now begin to see why man finds pleasure in so many kinds of activity which are noxious to himself. In no other animal are the failures of adjustment between pleasurable and painful states, and beneficial and hurtful actions, so numerous or so conspicuous as in man. Though in the adjustments upon

which the maintenance of life immediately depends, the correspondence is of necessity unimpaired, yet in those less essential adjustments concerned in keeping up the greatest possible fulness of life, there is frequent and lamentable imperfection. Thus, — to take one instance out of a hundred, — we continually see pleasurable states of consciousness associated with hurtful actions in the cases of men who ruin themselves by the abuse of narcotics. The fact that men, who are so much wiser than brutes, should often persist in conduct unworthy of brute intelligence, has long formed the theme of much sage but fruitless moralizing. By Calvinistic theologians such phenomena were formerly cited in proof of the theory that man is morally the lowest of creatures, having been rendered thoroughly unsound by the eating of the apple in Eden. It is needless to say that science offers a very different explanation. It follows from our inquiry into the causes of organic evolution,* that the adjustments which tend to maintain the highest fulness of life can be kept up only by natural selection or by direct equilibration. Now we have already had occasion to notice that in the human race, partly on account of the extreme complexity of its individual organization, partly on account of superadded social conditions, the action of natural selection is to a great extent checked. I do not allude to the fact that the supremely important human sympathies, which have grown up in the course of social evolution, compel us to protect the idle and intemperate, so that, instead of starving, they are "enabled to multiply at the expense of the capable and industrious." For far deeper than this lies the circumstance that "there are so many kinds of superiorities which severally enable men to survive, notwithstanding accompanying inferiorities, that natural selection cannot by itself rectify any particular unfitness; especially if, as usually happens, there are coexisting unfitnesses which all vary independently." † In a race of inferior animals a function in excess is quickly reduced by natural selection, because, owing to the universal slaughter, the highest completeness of life possible to a given grade of organization is required for the mere maintenance of life. But under the conditions surrounding human

* In an unpublished chapter. † Spencer, Psychology, I. 284.

development, a function in excess may remain in excess, provided its undue exercise is not such as is incompatible with life. Through countless ages, for example, the feelings which insure the maintenance of the race have been strengthened by natural selection, because of their prime importance to every race. But under the conditions of civilized life, the sexual passion has become a function in excess, which natural selection is powerless to reduce, because, although it is probably the source of more crime and misery than any other excessive function, and therefore detracts more from complete individuation or the fulness of human life than any other, it is nevertheless but seldom incompatible with the maintenance of life. In all such cases, mankind has so many other functions, besides the excessive ones, which enable it to subsist and achieve progress in spite of them, that their reduction to the normal standard is left for the slow process of direct equilibration.

The action of direct equilibration, in turn, is greatly complicated, among the progressive races, by the rapid and extensive change of the social environment from age to age. A new set of readjustments need to be made almost before the old ones are completed; and the result is that there are always a number of functions somewhat out of balance. When civilization is rapidly progressing, each generation of men is forced into kinds of activity to which the inherited emotional tendencies, and in some cases even the inherited physical constitutions, are not thoroughly adapted. Hence the number and variety of pathological phenomena, both mental and physical, is greater in civilized than in savage communities. As might be expected, the present century, which has witnessed a far more extensive revolution in the modes of human activity than any previous age, exhibits numerous instances of these minor failures of adjustment. To take the most conspicuous example, — the progress of science and industry during the past three generations has raised the average standard of comfortable living so greatly and so suddenly, that to attain this standard an excessive strain is put upon men's powers. In many respects, it is harder to live to-day than it was a hundred years ago. As a general rule we are overworked until late in life in the mere effort to secure the means of maintain-

ing life. Not only does this continual overwork entail a serious disturbance of the normal equilibrium between pleasures and pains and the correlative benefits and injuries, since it involves the undue exertion of certain faculties and the undue repression of others, but there is further disturbance due to the specific character of the overwork. Throughout a very large and constantly increasing portion of the community, the excessive labor is intellectual labor; the abnormal strain comes upon the nervous system. The task of maintaining the correspondence with environing relations, which in the course of organic evolution has been intrusted more and more largely to the nervous system, and which in the course of social evolution has been thrown more and more upon the cerebrum, has during the past hundred years been thrown upon the cerebrum to a formidable extent. The community, therefore, is suffering not simply from overwork, but from excessive brain-work, in the shape of inordinate thinking and planning, and inordinate anxiety. "Further, it is to be observed that many of the industrial activities which the struggle for existence has thrust on the members of modern societies, are in-door activities, — activities not only unresponded to by the feelings inherited by aboriginal men, but in direct conflict with those more remotely inherited and deeply organized feelings which prompt a varied life in the open air." Hence manifold disturbance. "A sedentary occupation pursued for years in a confined air, regardless of protesting sensations, brings about a degenerate physical state in which the inherited feelings are greatly out of harmony with the superinduced requirements of the body. Desired foods, originally appropriate, become indigestible. An air pleasure-giving by its freshness to those in vigor, brings colds and rheumatisms. Amounts of exertion and excitement naturally healthful and gratifying are found injurious. All which evils, due though they are to continued disregard of the guidance of inherited feelings, come eventually to be mistaken for proofs that the guidance of inherited feelings is worthless." *

* Spencer, Psychology, I. 282, 283. Light is thus thrown upon the misuse of alcohol and tobacco, — one of the most conspicuous of the cases in which man's physical appetites prompt to actions that are injurious. I have shown in another

Further to pursue this interesting subject would be to convert a set of illustrations, already too elaborately stated, into

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work, that in healthy persons the prudent use of these narcotics — so interesting in many ways to the student of psychology — is attended by an increase in vital power. As economizing nervous energy they enhance the general fulness of life, and the pleasure which accompanies the use of them is accordingly at the outset a normal pleasure. But in many cases the incautious use of these substances, and especially of alcohol (which acts directly upon the cerebrum), generates a narcotic craving which is abnormal, as prompting to injurious actions. I do not cite this craving as peculiar to our present stage of civilization, for, like most other forms of mental disease, it has been known for many ages; and recent researches make it somewhat doubtful whether excessive narcosis will develop it in the lifetime of a single individual, unless there is hereditary predisposition. Many persons can use alcohol, and can frequently abuse it, through a long life, without ever acquiring the resistless craving known as methomania or dipsomania. It was formerly supposed that drunkenness tends to produce consumption and certain kinds of insanity, but it is now become probable that the case is just the reverse, the drunkenness being an early symptom of the other disease. Dr. Maudsley has collected evidence which would seem to indicate that the same hereditary taint may result indifferently in dipsomania, insanity, epilepsy, neuralgia, or consumption, — to which list dyspepsia should be added. Now consumption and dyspepsia are at bottom nervous diseases, the conspicuous pulmonary and gastric symptoms being only secondary. The former, indeed, often ends in death from exhaustion, while the lungs are still perfectly sound. Consumption is primarily an excessive lowering of nutrition, an abnormal increase of the ratio of waste to repair, attendant upon defective nerve-stimulus; and it agrees with the other diseases just enumerated, in being rarely, if ever, fully developed in the course of a single generation. In organisms vitiated by the hereditary taint, the requisite lowering of nutrition may be brought about by the inflammation of a cold or fever, or it may equally well be caused by sorrow, anxiety, or overwork. Now all this is true likewise of insanity, neuralgia, and dipsomania. Whether the observed phenomenon is the softening of the brain, the molecular degeneration of a nerve-fibre, the deposit of tubercle, or the ill-understood cerebral change which attends the craving for drink, the underlying fact is the increased ratio of waste to repair; and whatever cause diminishes repair to an extraordinary degree may also produce any of these kindred forms of disease, wherever there is hereditary predisposition. A sudden and violent physical shock may do this. Cases are on record in which persons have immediately become hopeless drunkards after falling from a carriage or receiving a violent blow on the head; and in the cases of this sort which I have in mind, there had been no previous signs of craving for drink, but there was hereditary taint derived from the father or grandfather. But anxiety and excessive brain-work, operating slowly but surely, bring out dipsomania and other forms of insanity much more frequently than they are brought out by physical shocks. We may now, I think, begin to discern the significance of the fact that, while in some other centuries, as the fourteenth, the prevailing diseases were typhoid in character, being chiefly generated by barbaric habits of uncleanness, on the other hand in the nineteenth century the prevailing diseases are those which result from excessive waste or inadequate repair of nerve-tissue. We may also begin to understand the fact that, while further growth of the æsthetic feelings has greatly dimin

an unmanageable digression. Summing up the results now obtained, we see that natural selection, acting less rigidly under the limitations imposed by social evolution, fails to reduce functions that are in excess, and leaves them to be reduced by direct equilibration. The process is accordingly slow, since direct adaptation to a rapidly changing environment is attended by the appearance of minor unfitnesses, which further complicate the emotional disturbance, and disarrange the normal relations between incentives and actions. We need not, therefore, be surprised at the fact that men often find pleasure in detrimental activities; nor need we indorse the Puritanic or ascetic theory, suggested partly by the contemplation of this fact, "that painful actions are beneficial and pleasurable actions detrimental." For if this were to any considerable extent the case, sentient life would inevitably disappear from the face of the earth. The cases which we have cited belong to ethical pathology. And just as pathologic phenomena do not invalidate the laws of physiology, just as the dynamic theory of life is not invalidated by the fact that maladjustments are continually met with, so neither do cases of moral disease invalidate the corollary which inevitably follows from the Doctrine of Evolution, "that pleasures are the incentives to life-supporting acts and pains the deterrents from life-destroying acts."

We are now prepared to deal with the phenomena of right and wrong, and to notice how they become distinguished from the phenomena of pleasure and pain. Though the foregoing discussion forms the basis for a general doctrine of morality, it is nevertheless an inadequate basis, until properly supple-

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ished the gluttony and convivial drunkenness characteristic of preceding centuries, nevertheless, so far as can be ascertained, dyspepsia and dipsomania have not decreased during the present century. We can see that these diseases, along with phthisis, insanity, and general paralysis (which is the sudden breakdown of the nervous system after long-continued structural degradation) are emphatically diseases incident upon a rapid change in the social environment which the energies of the organism are strained to the utmost in meeting. And we can also see that among the minor failures of adjustment which accompany such a rapid change, there must occur cases of abnormal appetites which, owing to the great complication of their causes and the ability of society to exist in spite of them, are but slowly and partially checked by natural selection.

mented. The existence of a moral sense has purposely been as far as possible unrecognized; for I believe that in dealing with these complex subjects, little can be accomplished, save on the plan of separately cornering the various elements in the problem, and flooring them one by one. Any philosophy of ethics, therefore, which might be founded upon the preceding analysis, could be nothing more than a theory of Hedonism, recognizing no other incentive to proper action than the pleasing of one's self. By one of the innumerable tricks which the misuse of current words plays with the understanding, the so-called utilitarian theory has been, and still is, not unfrequently identified with this kind of hedonistic philosophy, which is in truth its very antipodes. The error is much like that involved in the accusation of fatalism, commonly hurled at those who maintain the obvious and harmless assertion that moral actions conform to law. But the difference, comprising the entire difference between the noblest self-sacrifice and the meanest self-fondling, is as follows: In our theory of pleasure and pain, which if taken as ultimate would be hedonism, the well-being of the community has been as far as possible omitted from the account. Wherever I have introduced references to social phenomena, I have considered them only in their effects upon the fulness of life of the individual. In dealing with the incentives to action in a race of brute animals, the foregoing considerations would be sufficient. But in the so-called utilitarian theory as it is now to be expounded, the well-being of the community, even when incompatible with that of the individual, is the all-important consideration. While the actions deemed pleasurable are those which conduce to the fulness of life of the individual, the actions deemed right are those which conduce to the fulness of life of the community. And while the actions deemed painful are those which detract from the fulness of life of the individual, the actions deemed wrong are those which detract from the fulness of life of the community. According to utilitarianism, therefore, as here expounded, the conduct approved as moral is the disinterested service of the community, and the conduct stigmatized as immoral is the selfish preference of individual interests to those of the community. And bearing in mind

that the community, which primevally comprised only the little tribe, has by long-continued social integration come to comprise the entire human race, we have the ultimate theorem of the utilitarian philosophy, as properly understood, that actions morally right are those which are beneficial to humanity, while actions morally wrong are those which are detrimental to humanity.

Are we to maintain, then, that when we approve of certain actions, we do so because we consciously and deliberately reason out, in each particular case, the conclusion that these actions are beneficial to mankind? By no means. Not only is it that the highest science cannot always enable us to say surely of a given action that it is useful to mankind, but it is also that we do not stop to apply science to the matter at all. We approve of certain actions and disapprove of certain actions quite instinctively. We shrink from stealing or lying as we shrink from burning our fingers; and we no more stop to frame the theorem that stealing and lying, if universally practised, must entail social dissolution and a reversion to primeval barbarism, than we stop to frame the theorem that frequent burning of the fingers must entail an incapacity for efficient manual operations. In short, there is in our psychical structure a moral sense which is as quickly and directly hurt by wrong-doing or the idea of wrong-doing as our tactile sense is hurt by stinging.

Shall we, then, maintain, as a corollary from the Doctrine of Evolution, that our moral sense is due to the organic registration, through countless ages, of deliberate inferences that some actions benefit humanity, while others injure it? Shall we say that the primeval savage began by reasoning his way to the conclusion that if treachery were to be generally allowed, within the limits of the tribe, then the tribe must succumb in the struggle for existence to other tribes in which treachery was forbidden; and that, by a gradual organization of such inductions from experience, our moral sense has slowly arisen? This position is no more tenable than the other. Mr. Richard Hutton and Mr. St. George Mivart have attributed to Mr. Spencer some such doctrine. But Mr. Spencer is too profound a thinker to ignore so completely the conditions under which

permanent emotional states are generated. Our moral sense has arisen in no such way. But to understand the way in which it has arisen, we must recur to our fundamental problem, and seek for the conditions which first enabled social evolution, as distinguished from organic evolution, to start upon its career.

It is now time to propose an answer to the question, already twice suggested and partly answered, How did social evolution originate? Starting from the researches of Sir Henry Maine, which are supported by those of Messrs. Tylor, M'Lennan, and Lubbock, we have come to the conclusion that it originated when families, temporarily organized among all the higher mammals, became in the case of the highest mammal permanently organized. Starting from the deductions of Mr. Wallace, we have seen reason for believing that civilization originated when in the highest mammal variations in intelligence became so much more important than variations in physical structure that they began to be seized upon by natural selection to the exclusion of the latter. In the permanent family we have the germ of society. In the response to outer relations by psychical changes which almost completely subordinate physical changes, we have the germ of civilization. Let us now see what can be done by combining these two theorems, so that the permanent organization of families and the complex intelligence of the highest mammal will appear in their causal relations to each other.

Many mammals are gregarious, and gregariousness implies incipient power of combination and of mutual protection. But gregariousness differs from sociality by the absence of definite family relationships, except during the brief and intermittent periods in which there are helpless offspring to be protected. Now it might be maintained that the complex intelligence of the highest mammal led him vaguely to recognize the advantage of associating in more and more permanent groups for the sake of mutual protection. From this point of view Mr. Darwin argues that men were originally a race of weak and mild creatures, like chimpanzees, and not a race of strong and ferocious creatures like gorillas, and were accordingly forced to combine because unable to defend themselves

singly. It is undeniable that man is, relatively to his size, a weak animal; and there is much value in Mr. Darwin's suggestion. Nevertheless, it can hardly be said to explain sociality as distinguished from gregariousness. It may also be argued that the superior sagacity even of the lowest savage makes him quite a formidable antagonist to animals much more powerful than himself. Besides, the study of savage life brings out results at variance with the notion of man's primitive gentleness. A strong case might be made in support of the statement that uncivilized man is an extremely ferocious animal, and that among savage races, which certainly differ very notably in natural ferocity of disposition, the most ferocious tribes are often the most likely to become dominant and assist social integration by subduing other tribes. The earliest annals of the highest of human races, the Aryan, certainly bear witness to extreme ferocity, checked and determined in its direction by a moral sense further developed than that of savages. While recognizing, therefore, the value of Mr. Darwin's suggestion, so far as it goes, I believe that the true explanation lies much further beneath the surface.

It will be remembered that, when treating of the parallel evolution of the mind and the nervous system,* it was shown that the increase of intelligence in complexity and speciality involves a lengthening of the period during which the nervous connections involved in ordinary adjustments are becoming organized. Even if the physical interpretation there given should turn out to be inadequate, the fact remains undeniable, that while the nervous connections accompanying a simple intelligence are already organized at birth, the nervous connections accompanying a complex intelligence are chiefly organized after birth. Thus there arise the phenomena of infancy, which are non-existent among those animals whose psychical actions are purely reflex and instinctive. Infancy, psychologically considered, is the period during which the nerve-connections and correlative ideal associations necessary for self-maintenance are becoming permanently established. Now this period, which only begins to exist when the intelligence is considerably complex, becomes longer and longer as the intelligence increases in complexity.

* The reference is to the unpublished chapter on the Evolution of Mind.

In the human race it is much longer than in any other race of mammals, and it is much longer in the civilized man than in the savage.* Indeed among the educated classes of civilized society, its average duration may be said to be rather more than a quarter of a century, since during all this time those who are to live by brain-work are simply acquiring the capacity to do so, and are usually supported upon the products of parental labor.

It need not be said that, on the general theory of evolution, the passage from the short infancy of other primates to the relatively long infancy witnessed among the lowest contemporary savages, cannot have been a sudden one.† But a special reason may be assigned why Nature, which never makes long jumps, must have been incapable of making this particular jump. Throughout the animal kingdom the period of infancy is correlated with feelings of parental affection, sometimes confined to the mother, but often shared by the father, in the case of animals which mate. Where, as among the lower animals, there is no infancy, there is no parental affection. Where the infancy is very short, the parental feeling, though intense while it lasts, presently disappears, and the offspring cease to be distinguished from strangers of the same species. And in general the duration of the feelings which insure the protection of the offspring is determined by the duration of the infancy. The agency of natural selection in maintaining this balance is too obvious to need illustration. Hence, if long infancies could have suddenly come into existence among a primitive race of ape-like men, the race would have quickly perished from inadequate persistence of the parental affections. The prolongation must therefore have been gradual, and the same increase of intelligence to which it was

* Possibly there may be a kindred implication in the fact that women attain maturity earlier than men.

† In this connection it is interesting to observe that the phenomena of infancy seem to be decidedly more marked in the anthropoid apes than in other non-human primates. At the age of one month the orang-outang begins to learn to walk, holding on to convenient objects of support, like a human infant. Up to this time it lies on its back, tossing about and examining its hands and feet. A monkey at the same age has reached maturity, so far as locomotion and prehension are concerned. See Mr. Wallace's interesting experience with an infant orang-outang, in his Malay Archipelago, Vol. I. pp. 68 – 71.

due must also have prolonged the correlative parental feelings, by associating them more and more with anticipations and memories. The concluding phases of this long change may be witnessed in the course of civilization. Our parental affections now endure through life; and while their fundamental instinct is perhaps no stronger than in savages, they are, nevertheless, far more effectively powerful, owing to our far greater power of remembering the past and anticipating the future.

I believe we have now reached a very thorough and satisfactory explanation of the change from gregariousness to sociality. Bear in mind that I am not indulging in pure hypothesis. The prolongation of infancy accompanying the development of intelligence, and the correlative extension of parental feelings, are facts established by observation wherever observation is possible. And to maintain that the correlation of these phenomena was kept up during an epoch which is hidden from observation, and can only be known by inference, is to make a genuine induction, involving no other assumption than that the operations of nature are uniform. To him who still believes that the human race was created by miracle in a single day, with all its attributes, physical and psychical, compounded and proportional just as they now are, the present inquiry, is, of course, devoid of significance. But for the evolutionist there would seem to be no alternative but to accept, when once propounded, the present series of inferences.

For the process here described, when long enough continued, must inevitably differentiate and integrate a herd or troop of gregarious ape-like men into a number of small family communities such as are now found among the lowest savages. The prolonged helplessness of the offspring must keep the parents together for longer and longer periods in successive epochs; and when at last the association is so long kept up that the older children are growing mature while the younger ones still need protection, the family relations begin to become permanent. The parents have lived so long in company, that to seek new companionships involves some disturbance of engrained habits; and meanwhile the older sons are more likely to continue their original association with each other than to estab-

lish associations with strangers, since they have common objects to achieve, and common enmities, bequeathed and acquired, with neighboring families. As the parent dies, the headship of the family thus established devolves upon the oldest, or bravest, or most sagacious male remaining. Thus the little group gradually becomes a clan, the members of which are united by ties considerably stronger than those which ally them to members of adjacent clans, with whom they may indeed combine to resist the aggressions of yet further outlying clans, or of formidable beasts, but towards whom their feelings are usually those of hostile rivalry. It remains to add, that the family groups thus constituted differ widely in many respects from modern families, and do not afford the materials for an idyllic picture of primeval life. Though always ready to combine against the attack of a neighboring clan, the members of the group are by no means indisposed to fight among themselves. The sociality is but nascent: infants are drowned, wives are beaten to death, and there are deadly quarrels between brothers. So in modern families evanescent barbarism shows itself in internal quarrels, while nevertheless injury offered from without is resented in common. A more conspicuous difference is the absence of monogamy in the primitive clan. It has been, I think, demonstrated, — and for the evidence in detail I would refer to Sir John Lubbock's excellent treatise on the Origin of Civilization, and to the learned works of M'Lennan and Tylor, — that in the primitive clan all the women are the wives of all the men. Traces of this state of things, which some of our half-educated "reformers" would fain restore, are found all over the world, both in modern savage communities and in traditional observances preserved by communities anciently civilized. There was also, as Sir Henry Maine has proved, entire community of lands and goods, and the individual possessed no personal rights as against the interests of the clan. And let us note, in conclusion, that this state of things, while chiefly brought about by the process of direct equilibration above described, is just that which natural selection must assist and maintain so long as the incipient community is small and encompassed by dangers.

Thus we cross the chasm which divides animality from humanity, gregariousness from sociality, hedonism from morality, the sense of pleasure and pain from the sense of right and wrong. For note that by the time integration has resulted in the establishment of a permanent family group with definite relationships between the members, the incentives to action in each member of the group have become quite different from what they were in a state of mere gregariousness. Sympathy, or the power of ideally reproducing in one's self the pleasures and pains of another person, is manifested in a rudimentary form by all gregarious animals of moderate intelligence. Not unfrequently, as Mr. Darwin shows, a baboon has been known to risk his life to save that of a comrade; and the higher apes habitually take under their care young orphans of their own species. It is evident that this power of sympathy must be strengthened and further developed when a number of individuals are brought into closer and more enduring relationships, even though these come far short of what, from our modern ethical standard, would be termed loving. Affection in the savage clan is but partially preventive of fiendish cruelty; yet there is an ability in the members to understand each other's feelings, and there is a desire for the approbation of fellow-clansmen. Kinship in blood, as well as community of pursuits and interests, promotes these feelings. Even to-day we can usually understand the mental habits, desires, and repugnances of our own immediate kindred better than we can understand those of other people unrelated to us, even though circumstances may now and then have led us to prefer the society of the latter. We can more readily admire their excellences and condone their faults, for their faults and excellences are likely to be in a measure our own.

Given this rudimentary capacity of sympathy, we can see how family integration must alter and complicate the emotional incentives to action. While the individual may still exercise his brute-like predatory instincts upon strangers and lower animals, and will, indeed, be more highly approved the more he does so, on the other hand there is a curb upon his exercise of them within the limits of the clan. There is a nascent public opinion which lauds actions beneficial to the clan, and

frowns upon actions detrimental to it; though for this it is not necessary that there should be a generalization of the effects of certain actions, any more than a generalization of the effects of hunger is needed to insure the individual's approval of eating. The mere present sense of collective pleasure or pain is enough to organize the complex feeling. For example, when a marauding expedition upon a neighboring clan is defeated by the cowardice or treachery of one of the party, the offender is perhaps beaten, kicked, or killed. The present sense of collective pain immediately prompts the actions which tend to repress the cowardice or treachery. On the other hand, the pleasurable states which result in all the members of the clan, in common, after an exhibition of successful bravery, immediately generate approval of the man who is brave, along with the desire to imitate him. In short, — to quote Mr. Spencer, — one of the things that come to be strongly associated in the mind of the young savage, with marks of approval, "which are symbolical of pleasures in general, is courage; and one of the things that come to be associated in his mind with frowns and other marks of enmity, which form his symbol of unhappiness, is cowardice. These feelings are not formed in him because he has reasoned his way to the truth that courage is useful to the tribe, and by implication to himself, or to the truth that cowardice is a cause of evil. In adult life he may, perhaps, see this; but he certainly does not see it at the time when bravery is thus associated in his consciousness with all that is good, and cowardice with all that is bad. Similarly there are produced in him feelings of inclination or repugnance towards other lines of conduct that have become established or interdicted, because they are beneficial or injurious to the tribe; though neither the young nor the adults know why they have become established or interdicted. Instance the praiseworthiness of wife-stealing and the viciousness of marrying within the tribe." * In these ways the establishment of permanent family relationships generates new incentives to action, unknown in the previous epoch of mere gregariousness, which must often, and in some instances habitually, overrule the merely animal incentives comprised in personal pleasures and

* Spencer, Recent Discussions, p. 23.

pains. The good of the individual must begin to yield to the good of the community.

Next in order comes the genesis of the feelings of regret and remorse, which are the fundamental ingredients of conscience. This part of the subject has been ably treated by Mr. Darwin, whose chapter on the Moral Sense is one of the most profound and suggestive chapters in his recent work on the "Descent of Man." Mr. Darwin points to the important fact, that, while the incentives to actions beneficial to the community are always steadily in operation, on the other hand the purely selfish impulses, although frequently strong enough to acquire temporary mastery over the others, are nevertheless accompanied by pleasures that are brief in duration and leave behind memories of comparatively slight vividness. Now, when intelligence has progressed to a point where there is some definite memory of particular past actions, the workings of the mind, with reference to conduct, begin to assume a more strictly moral character. Though at the moment of action a man may yield to the desire of gratifying hunger, or revenge, or cupidity, at the cost of violating the rules enforced by social sanctions, yet afterwards, when "past and weaker impressions are contrasted with the ever-enduring social instincts, retribution will surely come. Man will then feel dissatisfied with himself, and will resolve, with more or less force, to act differently for the future. This is conscience; for conscience looks backward and judges past actions, inducing that kind of dissatisfaction which, if weak, we call regret, and, if severe, remorse." *

All these varieties of incentive are next reinforced by incentives of a mysterious and supernatural character. When intelligence has progressed to the point where some curiosity is felt concerning the causes of phenomena, — a point barely reached by the lowest contemporary savages, — mythologies begin to be framed. A mythology is a rudimentary cosmic philosophy; and let me note, in passing, that an uncivilized race must have attained considerable latent philosophic capacity before it can construct a rich mythology, — instance the luxuriant folk-lore of Greece as contrasted with the scanty mythology of savages. Now, the earliest kind of philosophy is fetichism, by which

* Descent of Man, I. 87.

natural phenomena are attributed to the volitions of countless supernatural agencies. What are these agencies? Recent researches have elicited the fact that they are supposed to be the ghosts of the dead ancestors of the tribe. The dead chief, who appears to the savage in dreams, is supposed to rule the winds and floods, and to visit with his wrath those who violate the rules of action established in the tribe. When one of Mr. Darwin's companions, in Terra del Fuego, shot some birds to preserve as specimens, a Fuegian present exclaimed, "O Mr. Bynoe, rain much, much wind, blow much!" thus indicating his belief that the wasting of food, condemned by tribal rules, would be visited with condign punishment by the tutelar deities of the tribe. "This transfigured form of restraint," says Mr. Spencer, "differing at first but little from the original form, is capable of immense development." As the fetichistic agencies are generalized into the deities of polytheism, and these in time are summed up in a single anthropomorphic deity, there slowly grows up the theory of a hell in which actions condemned by the community will be punished. The complex conceptions of good and evil are thus so widely differentiated from the simpler conceptions of pleasure and pain, that the traces of the original kinship are obscured. This kind of restraint has not ceased to operate upon numbers of civilized men at the present day; and theologians tell us that, if it were removed, there would ensue a moral retrogression. So doubtless there would, if it could be removed prematurely.

Returning to our savage, it may be observed that these combined agencies have enforced upon him an amount of self-restraint, in view of tribal sanctions, which differentiates him widely from any gregarious animal. Savages are not unfrequently capable of extreme devotion and self-sacrifice when the interests of the tribe are at stake: instances are not rare in which they will deliberately choose to be shot rather than betray the plans of their fellow-tribesmen. It is to such cases as these that we must attribute the discrepancies in the accounts of savage morality given by different travellers. If we do not stop to analyze the matter, such instances may seem to prove that the savage is morally on a level with us. But the analysis of countless seemingly inconsistent observations shows that

savage virtues are, in general, confined to the clan. The same savage who will suffer torture with equanimity, rather than betray his comrades, is also capable of the most fiendish cruelty and treachery toward the members of another clan. For the very forces which, during long ages, have brought him to the point at which he can sacrifice his own pleasure to the good of the tribe, have also been impressing upon him the meritoriousness of letting loose all his brutal instincts beyond the tribal limits. The savage has no sense of the wickedness of killing, stealing, and lying, in the abstract, or of the horrible cruelty of tying his enemy to a tree and slowly burning him to death with firebrands. To the Indians described by Mr. Parkman, such villany formed the most delightful of recreations.

Thus, though the savage has the germ of a moral sense, which prompts him, irrespective of utilitarian considerations, to postpone his personal welfare to that of his clan, he can by no means be accredited with a fully developed moral sense. And the incentives which influence him are not what we call moral sentiments, in the strict sense of the phrase. "They are simply sentiments that precede and make possible those highest sentiments which do not refer either to personal benefits or evils to be expected from men, or to more remote rewards and punishments." The lower incentives have indeed continued to exert a powerful, perhaps a predominating, influence down to the present time. So long as readers are found for ethical treatises, like that of Jonathan Dymond, in which the sole ground of moral obligation is held to be the supernaturally revealed fiat of an anthropomorphic Deity; "while sermons set forth the torments of the damned and the joys of the blessed as the chief deterrents and incentives; and while we have prepared for us printed instructions 'how to make the best of both worlds,'— it cannot be denied that the feelings which impel and restrain men are still largely composed of elements like those operative on the savage, — the dread, partly vague, partly specific, associated with the idea of reprobation, human and divine, and the sense of satisfaction, partly vague, partly specific, associated with the idea of approbation, human and divine."*

* Spencer, Psychology, II. 602.

But a sound ethical philosophy regards it as degrading to perform good actions or to refrain from performing bad actions merely in order to win applause or to secure a place in heaven. Something more is needed to complete our account of the moral sense.

Nevertheless, the more perilous portions of the labyrinth have been traversed, I hope, with safety, and we now need only one more clew to bring us to the light. We shall best realize the character of this additional element needed, if we consider for a moment the most general aspects of the two groups of feelings already described. While the feelings of which we first treated under the head of pleasures and pains are purely egoistic or self-regarding feelings, on the other hand the feelings which we have lately described as underlying and forming the groundwork of the moral sense in a state of sociality have been happily characterized by Mr. Spencer as "ego-altruistic" feelings. That is, they concern the happiness of the individual in so far as it depends upon the feelings with which his fellow-creatures regard him. The mixed feeling ordinarily known as generosity, for example, is often to a very large extent ego-altruistic. "The state of consciousness which accompanies performance of an act beneficial to another is usually mixed; and often the pleasure given is represented less vividly than are the recipient's feeling toward the giver and the approval of spectators. The sentiment of generosity proper is, however, unmixed in those cases where the benefaction is anonymous: provided, also, that there is no contemplation of a reward to be reaped hereafter. These conditions being fulfilled, the benefaction clearly implies a vivid representation of the pleasurable feelings (usually themselves representative) which the recipient will have."*

The vivid representation of the pleasurable or painful feelings experienced by others is sympathy; and the additional factor to be taken into the account, in order to complete the explanation of the moral sense, is the enormous expansion of sympathy which has been due to the continued integration of communities, and to the accompanying decrease of warlike or predatory activity. A word of passing comment only is needed

* Spencer, Psychology, II. 613.

for the cynical theory that sympathy is but an ethereally refined selfishness, and that when we relieve a fellow-creature in distress we do it only because it pains us to see him suffer. This is true; but when the pain occasioned by the sight of another's suffering, or by the idea of suffering and wrong when generalized and detached from the incidents of particular cases, becomes so strong as to determine our actions, then the chasm is entirely crossed which divides us psychically from the brutes. Between the Fiji, who keenly relishes the shrieks of his human victim, and Uncle Toby, who could not kill a fly and pitied even the Devil, the difference has come to be generic. And when this kind of self-pleasing is carried so far as to lead a man to risk his life in the effort to rescue a stranger, or perhaps even an enemy, from fire, or drowning, it is so widely removed from what we mean when we speak of selfishness as to be antithetical to it. We do not describe the workings of Shakespeare's genius as reflex actions, though all intelligence was originally reflex action. Neither are we justified in describing as selfish the actions which are dictated by sympathy, though all sympathy is in its origin a kind of self-pleasing.

As already shown in describing the chief characteristics of the evolution of society,* the primary cause which has developed sympathy at the expense of the egoistic instincts has been the continued integration of communities, originally mere tribes or clans, into social aggregates of higher and higher orders of complexity. For by this long-continued process the opportunities for the exercise of the altruistic feelings have been necessarily increased in number and frequency of occurrence, while the occasions requiring the exercise of the anti-social feelings have become less frequent, so that the former set of feelings have become strengthened by use, while the latter have become relatively weakened by disuse. Along with this direct and obvious effect of social integration, another effect has been wrought, indirect and less obvious. A high development of sympathy cannot be secured without a high development of representativeness, so closely interrelated are our

* See, for the present, the paper on "The Laws of History," above referred to, where the case is crudely stated.

intellectual and moral natures. A very feeble faculty of imagining objects and relations not present to sense must necessitate an absence of active sympathetic emotion, save in its crudest form. It is a familiar fact that many men are cruel, in word or deed, because they are incapable of adequately representing to themselves the pain, physical or mental, of which they are the cause. The validity of such an interpretation is confirmed by the fact that even, where there is very high representative capacity, the lack of the requisite elements of personal experience will prevent the rise of sympathetic feeling. Thus it is notoriously difficult for strong and healthy people to enter into the feelings of those who are weak and nervous. These facts show that the development of sympathy is largely determined by the development of the representative faculty and by increasing width and variety of experience. With the simplest form of sympathy, such as the painful thrill felt on seeing some one in a dangerous position, contrast such a complex sentiment as the sense of injustice, and it becomes evident that the latter feeling differs from the former mainly in degree and quantity of representativeness. In the former case there is a representation of the injury or death impending over some person immediately in sight; and it is the shrinking from this detriment to the fulness of life of another person which constitutes the sympathetic feeling. In the latter case — supposing, for example, the kind of injustice in question to be that against which English-speaking people have made provision in *habeas corpus* acts — there is the sympathetic excitement of that highly representative egoistic sentiment known as the love of personal freedom. At first a mere recalcitration against whatever impedes the free action of the limbs, this egoistic feeling has, through increased power of representation, developed into a dislike and dread of whatever possible combination of circumstances may in any way, however remotely, interfere with the fullest legitimate exercise of all the functions of physical and psychical life. To have this complex feeling sympathetically excited for persons whom one has never seen, and who are perhaps yet unborn, — and still more, to be so far possessed by this highly generalized and impersonal sympathy as to risk one's own liberty and life in efforts to avert the pos-

sible evils which are the objects of its dread, — implies a power of representing absent relations such as has yet been acquired by only two or three of the most highly gifted families of mankind. And manifestly the sentiments which respond to the notions of justice and injustice in the abstract, are still more remotely representative, still more highly generalized, and still more thoroughly disengaged from the consideration of concrete instances of pleasure and pain.

To this expansion of the power of sympathetically representing feelings detached from the incidents of particular cases, until the sphere of its exercise has become even wider than the human race, and includes all sentient existence, is due our instinctive abhorrence of actions which the organically registered experience of mankind has associated with pain and evil, and our instinctive approval of actions, similarly associated with pleasure and increased fulness of life. It is not that, as in intellectual progress, there has been a registration of inferences, at first conscious, but finally automatic; but it is that there has been a registration of feelings respectively awakened by pleasure-giving and pain-giving actions. And just as men's intellectual conceptions of the causes of phenomena become more and more impersonal as they are extended over wider and wider groups of phenomena, generating at last an abstract conception of Universal Cause, so free from the element of personality that to less cultivated minds it seems atheistic; so in like manner as the sympathetic feelings are extended over wider and wider areas, no longer needing the stimulus of present pains and pleasures to call them forth, they generate at last an abstract moral sense, so free from the element of personality that to grosser minds it is unintelligible. The savage cannot understand the justice which he sees among Europeans, and the mercy of the white man is ascribed by him to imbecility or fear. To him some personal end seems necessary as an incentive to action. But the philanthropist finds an adequate incentive in the contemplation of injustice in the abstract.

Thus the ethical theories, as well as the psychology, of the schools of Hume and Kant, appear to be reconciled in the deeper synthesis rendered possible by the theory of evolution.

On the one hand, it is a corollary from the laws of life that actions desired by the individual and approved by the community must in the long run be those which tend to heighten the life respectively of the individual and of the community. And on the other hand, it is equally true that there is a highly complex feeling, the product of a slow emotional evolution, which prompts us to certain lines of conduct irrespective of any conscious estimate of pleasures or utilities. In no department of inquiry is the grandeur of the Doctrine of Evolution more magnificently illustrated than in the province of ethics.

Before we conclude, there are one or two further points to which it seems necessary to allude. In asserting that we possess an instinctive and inherited moral sense, it is not meant that we possess, anterior to education and experience, an organic preference for certain particular good actions, and an organic repugnance to certain particular bad actions. We do not inherit a horror of stealing, any more than the Hindu inherits the horror of killing cattle. We simply inherit a feeling which leads us, when we are told that stealing is wrong, to shun it, without needing to be taught that it is detrimental to society. Hence there is a chance for pathological disturbances in the relations between the moral sense and the actions with which it is concerned. Imperfectly adjusted moral codes arise, and false principles of action gain temporary currency. These, nevertheless, come ultimately to outrage our sympathies, and are consequently overthrown; while the principles of action which really tend to heighten the life of society are sustained by our sympathies ever more and more forcibly, and at last become invested with a sacredness which is denied to the others. Hence arises the ethical distinction between *mala prohibita* and *mala in se*.

Finally, it is not to be denied that, when the intelligence is very high, there is likely to arise a deliberate pursuit of moral excellence, attended by a distinct knowledge of the elements in which such excellence consists. Instead of being primeval, as the cruder utilitarianism seems to have imagined, such conscious devotion to ends conducive to the happiness of society is the latest and highest product of social evolution, and becomes

possible only when the moral sense is extremely developed. At this stage, ethical conceptions begin to be reflected back upon the conduct of the individual where it concerns solely or chiefly himself; and the self-regarding virtues, as Mr. Darwin calls them, which are quite unknown save in a high state of civilization, come into existence. The injury of one's self, by evil thoughts, intemperate behavior, or indulgence of appetite, comes to be regarded as not only physically injurious, but morally wrong; and there arises the opinion that it is selfish and wicked for one to neglect one's own health or culture. Here we approach the limits at which morality shades off into religion. For, as I shall hereafter show,* Religion views the individual in his relations to the Infinite Power manifested in a universe of causally connected phenomena, as Morality views him in relation to his fellow-creatures. To violate the decrees of nature comes to be considered a sin, capable of awakening keen remorse; for to him whose mental habits have been nurtured by scientific studies, the principles of action prescribed by the need for harmonizing inner with outer relations are, in the truest sense, the decrees of God.

And now, having reached the terminus of our inquiry, let us look back over the course for a moment, that we may see the character of the progress we have achieved. Such a retrospect is here especially needed, because the complexity of our subject has been so great, and the range of our illustrations so wide, that the cardinal points in our argument have perhaps run some risk of getting overlaid and concealed from view, and in particular it may not be sufficiently obvious how completely we have attained the object set before us as the goal of the present chapter, namely, to explain the genesis of the psychical forces which wrought the decisive change from animality to humanity. That we may well appreciate the solid consistency of the entire argument concerning the progress from brute to man, let us therefore contemplate in a single view its various factors.

We have seen that the progress from brute to man has been but slightly characterized by change in general bodily structure in comparison with the enormous change which has been

* The reference is to the unpublished chapter on Science and Religion.

wrought in the cerebrum, and in those highest psychical functions which stand in correlation with the condition of the cerebrum. We have seen that the development of these highest psychical functions, in all their wondrous variety and complexity, has consisted at bottom in the increase of the power of mentally representing objects and relations remote from sense. By the reiterated testimony of many diverse kinds of illustrative facts, we have been convinced that in mere quantity of representative capacity, with its infinitely various consequences, the civilized man surpasses the lowest savage by a far greater interval than that by which the lowest savage surpasses the highest ape; just as the gulf between the cerebral capacity of the Englishman and that of the non-Aryan dweller in Hindostan is six times greater than the gulf which similarly divides the non-Aryan Hindu from the gorilla. And we have indicated in sundry ways how this increase in representative capacity, itself a prerequisite to any high degree of social combination, has been furthered by each advance in social combination, so that the enormous psychical progress achieved since mankind became distinctly human has been mainly dependent upon that increasing heterogeneity of experience which increasing social integration has supplied.

But in spite of the fact that the psychical progress achieved since mankind became distinctly human is so much greater in quantity than that which was required to carry it from apehood to manhood, we were led to adopt the Duke of Argyll's suggestion, that the boundary was really crossed when this preliminary and less conspicuous psychical progress had been achieved. And working out the happy thought which science owes to Mr. Wallace, we concluded that this comparatively inconspicuous but all-essential step in psychical progress was taken when the intelligence of the progenitors of mankind had reached the point where a slight increase in representative capacity came to be of greater utility to the species than any practicable variation in bodily structure. Here our first line of inquiry ended. So far as the mere subordination of physical to psychical modification is concerned, the character of the progress from apehood to manhood now became intelligible.

But at this point we were confronted with a new question,

suggested by some of the conclusions obtained on our first line of inquiry. Having perceived that the intellectual progress, or increase in representative capacity, which distinguishes man from brute, is so intimately connected with man's capacity for social combination, it became needful to search for the circumstances which begot in the progenitors of mankind the capacity for a kind of social combination more definite in the character of its relationships than that quasi-social combination, not uncommon among mammals, which is known as gregariousness. In other words, seeing that such thinkers as Sir Henry Maine have shown that the primordial unit of society, by the manifold compounding of which great tribes and nations have come into existence, was the aboriginal family group, with its nascently ethical relationships between the members, how shall we explain the genesis of these family groups, which have nothing strictly answering to them, either among non-human primates or among other gregarious mammals?

The feature by which the most rudimentary human family group is distinguished from any collocation of kindred individuals among gregarious mammals is the permanent character of the relationships between its constituent members. Enduring from birth until death, these relationships acquire a traditionary value which passes on from generation to generation, and thus there arise reciprocal necessities of behavior between parents and children, husbands and wives, brethren and sisters, in which reciprocal necessities of behavior we have discerned the requisite conditions for the genesis of those ego-altruistic impulses which, when further modified by the expansion of the sympathetic feelings, give birth to moral sentiments. Accordingly the phenomenon which demands explanation is the existence of permanent relationships, giving rise to reciprocal necessities of behavior, among a group of individuals associated for the performance of sexual and parental functions.

The explanation, as I have shown, is to be found in that gradual prolongation of the period of infancy, which is one of the consequences, as yet but partially understood, of increasing intelligence. Let us observe the causal connections, so far as we can trace them out, repeating, in brief, some of the conclusions reached in the chapter on the Evolution of Mind.

In an animal whose relations with its environment are very simple, resulting in an experience which is but slightly varied, the combinations of acts requisite for supporting life take place with a regularity and monotony approaching the monotonous regularity with which the functions of the viscera are performed. Hence the tendency to perform these actions is completely established at birth in each individual, just as the tendency of the viscera to perform their several functions is pre-established, all that is required in addition being simply the direct stimulus of outward physical opportunity. And the psychical life of such an animal we call purely instinctive or automatic. In such an animal the organized experience of the race counts for everything, the experience of the individual for nothing, save as contributing its mite toward the cumulated experience of the race. But in an animal whose relations with its environment are very complex, resulting in an experience which is necessarily varied to a considerable extent from generation to generation, the combinations of acts requisite for supporting life must occur severally with far less frequency than in the case of the lower animal just considered. Hence the tendency to perform any particular group of these actions will *not* be completely established at birth in each individual, like the tendency of the viscera to perform their several functions. On the other hand, there will be a multitude of conflicting tendencies, and it will be left for the circumstances subsequent to birth to determine which groups of tendencies shall be carried out into action. The psychical life of such an animal is no longer purely automatic or instinctive. A portion of its life is spent in giving direction to its future career, and in thus further modifying the inherited tendencies with which its offspring start in life. In such an animal the organized experience of the race counts for much, but the special experience of the individual counts for something in altering the future career of the race. Such an animal is capable of psychical progress, and such an animal must begin life, not with matured faculties, but as an infant. Instead of a few actually realized capacities, it starts with a host of potential capacities, of which the play of circumstance must determine what ones shall be realizable.

Manifestly, therefore, the very state of things which made psychical variation more advantageous to the progenitors of mankind than physical variation, — this very state of things simultaneously conspired to enhance the progressiveness of primeval man and to prolong the period of his infancy, until the plastic or malleable part of his life came to extend over several years, instead of terminating in rigidity in the course of four or five months, as with the orang-outang. Upon the consequences of this state of things, in gradually bringing about that capacity for progress which distinguishes man from all lower animals, I need not further enlarge. What we have here especially to note, amid the entanglement of all these causes conspiring to educe humanity from animality, is the fact, illustrated above, that this prolongation of infancy was manifestly the circumstance which knit those permanent relationships, giving rise to reciprocal necessities of behavior, which distinguish the rudest imaginable family group of men from the highest imaginable association of gregarious non-human primates.

In this line of inquiry, which, so far as I know, has never yet been noticed by any of the able writers who have dealt with the origin of the human race, it seems to me that we have the clew to the solution of the entire problem. In this new suggestion as to the causes and the effects of the prolonged infancy of man, it seems to me that we have a suggestion as fruitful as the one which we owe to Mr. Wallace. And the most beautiful and striking feature in this treatment of the problem is the way in which all the suggestions hitherto made agree in helping us to the solution. That same increase in representativeness, which is at the bottom of intellectual progressiveness, is also at the bottom of sociality, since it necessitates that prolongation of infancy to which the genesis of sociality, as distinguished from mere gregariousness, must look for its explanation. In this phenomenon of the prolonging of the period of infancy we find the bond of connection between the problems which occupy such thinkers as Mr. Wallace and those which occupy such thinkers as Sir Henry Maine. We bridge the gulf which seems, on a superficial view, forever to divide the human from the brute world. And not least, in

the grand result, is the profound meaning which is given to the phenomena of helpless babyhood. From of old we have heard the monition, "Except ye be as babes, ye cannot enter the kingdom of heaven." The latest science now shows us — though in a very different sense of the words — that, unless we had been as babes, the ethical phenomena which give all its significance to the phrase "kingdom of heaven" would have been non-existent for us. Without the circumstances of infancy we might have become formidable among animals through sheer force of sharp-wittedness. But, except for these circumstances, we should never have comprehended the meaning of such phrases as "self-sacrifice" or "devotion." The phenomena of social life would have been omitted from the history of the world, and with them the phenomena of ethics and of religion.

JOHN FISKE.

ART. II. — THE MEANING AND CAUSES OF VALUE.

ALTHOUGH the term "value" plays a most conspicuous part in political economy, yet many economic writers have neglected to define it carefully and correctly, as though the term were of little importance. In consequence of this neglect, they have greatly multiplied the errors to be found in this department of study, which were numerous enough before.

It is certain that the leading terms in political economy must be definitely settled before any progress in it can be made. Macleod has made some remarks upon this subject which are well worthy of a place here. He asks, "Why has political economy not yet attained the same rank as mechanics as an exact science? Because the same care has never yet been given to settle its definitions and axioms. Economic science is now, like mechanics in its early stages, overrun and infested with words, whose meaning has never yet been settled on certain principles, and which are scarcely ever used by any two writers in the same sense, — nay, few even of the best writers are consistent with themselves. The men who have cultivated economic science are probably of as great natural ability as those who

have cultivated physical science; of course, with the exception of certain unapproachable examples. Why, then, have they not come to the same unanimity as their brethren? The simple reason is, that they have not adopted the only means that could by any possibility insure success, namely, a thorough discussion and settlement of the meanings of words, nay, they have systematically despised it." * We think, therefore, that we are justified in using considerable space to define the meaning of value, if thereby we make the meaning plain; and the more justified, because it is the essential term, the deepest root, in the science of political economy.

At the outset, let it be deeply engraven on the mind that value is not a quality inhering in any object whatever. This truth will appear very clearly from Professor Perry's illustration. "If I take up a new lead-pencil from my table, for the purpose of examining all its qualities, I shall immediately perceive those which are visible and tangible. The pencil has length, a cylindrical form, a black color, is hard to the touch, is composed of wood and plumbago in certain relations to each other, and has the quality, when sharpened at the end, of making black marks upon white paper. These qualities, and such as these, may be learned by a study of the pencil itself. But can I learn, by a study of the pencil itself, the *value* of the pencil? Is value a quality? By any examination of its mechanical, or by any analysis of its chemical, properties, can I detect how much the pencil is *worth?* No. The questioning of the senses, however minute, the test of the laboratory, however delicate, applied to the pencil alone can never determine how much it is worth." † Value, then, is not a quality of a thing. It can never be found in any object. The mistakes of economists who have not kept this truth clearly in view have been most deplorable.

Before going further towards finding out the meaning of value, let us stop to define utility. For this is another difficulty which must be removed before the way to the meaning of value can be easily travelled. Nothing, therefore, is lost by stopping to define it.

* Theory and Practice of Banking, Vol. I., Intro., p. 29 (2d ed.).

† Elements of Polit. Economy, p. 46.

Utility is the capacity which an object has to satisfy the desire of its possessor. But the utility here meant is not "that utility which is determined by reason and measured by a philosophical standard." * If an object has capacity to satisfy the desire of its possessor, however strong or weak, however depraved or elevated the desire may be, that object has utility. In this sense of the word, which is the etymological one, ardent spirits have utility the same as wheat. An obscene book, so long as it satisfies desire, has utility, — like the Bible, which satisfies the longing of many a soul. The same thing may have no utility to one man, a low utility to another, and a very high utility to a third. That is, it has no capacity to satisfy a desire of the first, a slight capacity to satisfy the desire of the second, but a very high capacity to satisfy the desire of the other.†

But utility must be carefully distinguished from exchangeability. Utility is the capacity of an object to satisfy the desire of its owner; exchangeability is the capacity of an object to satisfy the desire of one not the owner, combined, also, with his ability to purchase it. Hence, an object may have utility, even though no one beside the owner ever hears of its existence; but an object never has exchangeability unless known to and desired by another.

Yet an article may possess both exchangeability and utility. This is often the case. Thus gold is exchangeable, for it may be desired by another; and also useful, for the owner may wear it as ornament or otherwise, or manufacture it into watches, jewelry, and the like. Having cleared up the meaning of these terms, let us proceed on our way towards defining value.

When Robinson Crusoe recovered from his shipwreck, he found that he was the sole owner and occupant of a comfortable and fertile island. There was abundance for food and clothing; he easily provided himself with a house for shelter and habitation. Yet all these possessions had no value. They had utility, for they could satisfy his wants. Indeed, they were quite as useful to him as if he and they had been in

* Bowen, Am. Polit. Econ., p. 27.

† See Perry's Elements of Polit. Econ., p. 72.

England. Their utility was great, their value nothing; why did they not have value? There must have been some other person having exchangeable objects, who also wanted some of Crusoe's things; and further, an exchange must have actually taken place before the commodities of either person could have had any value. If people, living in the same community, and owning different commodities, never exchanged them with each other, such commodities could have no value. Commodities cannot have value unless their owners exchange them with one another for those things which they desire but have not. Consequently, Crusoe's possessions had no value because he owned everything and was alone. But if another person had lived there, having various things which Crusoe wanted, and which could have been obtained by exchanging a part of his own for them, then the values of the several commodities exchanged could have been ascertained. Hence we find that the value of a commodity is an estimate agreed to between the person parting with and the person receiving it. But in what words or terms is this estimate or value expressed? A has a hat and B a pair of shoes. Each wishes to exchange his product for that of the other. After considerable discussion, in which A declares that he ought to have more than the shoes for his hat, it is agreed that each shall exchange his product for that of the other. The value of the hat, therefore, is expressed by the shoes; thus the hat is said to be worth the pair of shoes; and, likewise, the shoes are worth the hat. The value of each product is expressed by the other. Thus our conception of value is now complete, and may be expressed in the following manner: Value is the estimate agreed to between the person parting with and the person receiving a commodity expressed in some other commodity that is exchanged for it.

We think that this definition of value will be easily apprehended. It will be seen that value does not reside in a commodity, but is an estimate or affection of the mind. It is not an estimate made by one person, however, but by two or more, —by all the parties owning the several articles that are exchanged. Nor can an estimate ever be considered the value of anything unless an exchange actually takes place.

Hence, an *ex parte* estimate, i. e. the estimate of one person,

or the estimates of persons who are not the owners, can never be considered as the value of anything. True, we can tell what the value of a commodity was at the time of the last exchange, as expressed in the commodity exchanged for it; so, likewise, can we tell what it probably will exchange for at some future time. And this is our meaning when we say that a commodity is worth a certain sum or thing. We mean that it was exchanged for some other thing, or can be exchanged for it at some future time. So the merchant, conscious of this truth, can calculate with a reasonable degree of certainty upon the wants of his customers, and what he can probably get for his goods. And because the values, or estimates which men put upon things, undergo but little change, they can buy and sell, and engage in commerce in the most distant parts of the earth. Yet how often men fail to discern the varying and capricious values or estimates that will be put upon things, is a matter of common experience.

Macleod has done so much to clear up the meaning of value that we cannot forbear making some extracts from him. Thus, he says that "however much a person may wish to sell any product of his own, yet, if no one will buy it, it has no value. If an exchange takes place, it can only do so from the reciprocal desire of each for the product of the other. Hence it is clear that *value necessarily requires the concurrence of two minds.*" * It is a little singular, however, that he should have written the following sentence just before those last quoted. "We may observe that, since a thing which cannot be exchanged has no value, the value of anything depends not upon the person who offers it for sale, but upon the desire of the purchaser." Is not that equivalent to saying that the value of a thing depends upon the desire of the purchaser? And is not this statement directly opposed to the one previously quoted, namely, "that value necessarily requires the concurrence of two minds, ... and that if an exchange takes place, it can only do so from the reciprocal desire of each for the product of the other"? Before an exchange can take place, there must be a meeting of minds; which person has the strongest desire to exchange is often difficult to tell, for each generally tries to conceal his desires,

* Theory and Practice of Banking, Vol. I. p. 14.

in part, at least, in the hope of making a better exchange. Suppose the purchaser is in great want of bread, and the seller knows it, will not the latter use his information to increase the value or estimate of his bread? Or suppose a dealer has some article on hand, like perishable fruit, which he is very desirous to dispose of, will not the purchaser often use his knowledge to reduce the value of the fruit? Consequently, the statement is a mistake that "the value of anything depends, not upon the person who offers it for sale, but upon the desire of the purchaser." It depends upon the desires of both; which of them has the strongest or weakest desire cannot easily be told. Macleod, however, has discussed this subject so clearly elsewhere, that we shall do him justice by further quotation. "Value is not a quality of an object, but an *affection of the mind.* The sole source and origin of value is *human desire.* When there is a demand for things, they have value; when the demand ceases, they cease to have value, and the supply being the same, when the demand increases the value increases, and as demand diminishes value diminishes. It is demand which discriminates between the pearl and the shell, the diamond and the rubbish. It is because some people demand cigars that among them cigars have value, and because others do not demand them, that among them they would have no value. It is the intensity of demand that confers such enormous value on the space in the heart of London, and the gradually diminishing demand which makes land less valuable as the distance from the centre increases. What is it that gives value to the produce of the farmer? It is the demand of the people for food and clothing, and their readiness to give something in exchange for its [his] products. These wants are permanent, and, consequently, so long as they exist, the value of the land will be permanent. If it were possible to imagine that men would cease to require food or clothing, or should they change their tastes and require such food or clothing as could not be produced in England, then the value of the land would immediately die off.

"The value of land, then, arises from the fact that it supplies something that is wanted by men. And men invest their money and their labor in cultivating land and rearing cattle

because they expect that they will continue to have a permanent value. So, in the same way, it is the wants and desires of men that cause others to invest their money and labor in any pursuit whatever, and which gives value to that product. The continued desires and wants of men in law, medicine, engineering, literature, art, and science cause other men to devote their money and their labor in becoming lawyers, physicians, engineers, authors, artists, etc., etc., and so on through the whole catalogue of trades and professions. It is the demand of the public, and that only, which confers value on them. And if the demand of the public were to cease, the whole value of the labor of those who had devoted themselves to their acquisition would be lost." *

It is evident from what has been said that a standard of value is impossible. For, supposing that the values of two commodities have changed relatively to each other since a former exchange, in which has the change taken place? Thus, suppose a bushel of wheat was exchanged for a dollar of gold last year; but now that two bushels must be given for a dollar. Has the gold risen in value, or the wheat declined? It is no nearer the truth to say that the wheat has declined than that the gold has risen. Suppose that ten commodities have each been exchanged for the same amount of gold for a hundred years. This year, however, one of them, sugar for example, is exchanged for twice as much gold as ever before. Has sugar, therefore, risen in value, or has the value of gold declined? Put any examples you like, it will always be found that value is a relative expression, and, consequently, that no object can ever have a greater or less value than that with which it is compared and exchanged. So Professor Fawcett has written that "when, therefore, the general value of a commodity declines, less of every commodity can be obtained for it in exchange; but if this be so, the value of all these commodities must rise, when compared with the particular commodity in the value of which it has been supposed a general decline has taken place. These considerations demonstrate the erroneous nature of a statement not unfrequently made, that there is a general rise or fall in the value of all commodities. . . . . It is quite impossible that

* Theory and Practice of Banking, Vol. I. p. 57.

there should be a general rise of values, for if there is a rise in the value of one commodity, there must be a fall in the value of all the commodities with which this one is compared." * The works of Adam Smith and Ricardo are badly infested with error in consequence of their failure to see this truth. Both sought after an invariable standard of value which every living political economist admits cannot be found.

Before quitting this branch of our subject we may define the meaning of price. It is the value of a commodity expressed in money. Thus Bascom says that "the price of anything is its power to command gold, silver, or that which constitutes the currency of the country. Value may be expressed in any commodity whatever: price is expressed in one commodity only." †

We are now ready to consider the causes of value. What are the causes which have led men to agree to the values that have been given to the various articles bought and sold? Though it has been the custom among political economists to treat of the causes of value instead of those of price, yet, as exchanges in all civilized countries are generally expressed in money, our investigations will be simplified if we consider the causes of price rather than those of value. But in so doing, this assumption is involved, which must be kept in view: that when the price of a commodity varies, the variation is always supposed to be produced by something which affects the value of the commodity, and not the value of money. Let us explain our meaning by an illustration. "Suppose it is observed that the price of wheat rises; this rise in the price of wheat may be due to two very distinct causes. In the one case, wheat may become scarcer, and therefore dearer; in the other case, wheat, in common with every other commodity, may rise in price, in consequence of new discoveries of the precious metals, such as those made in Australia and California during the last few years." ‡ In the following investigation, therefore, the assumption is made that variations in price are not caused by an alteration in the value of money.

* Manual of Political Economy, p. 270.

† Political Economy, p. 222.

‡ Fawcett, Manual of Political Economy, p. 272.

What, then, are the causes of price? They are four, namely, difficulty of attainment, exchangeability, personal effort, and willingness of deprivation.

By difficulty of attainment is meant the labor or other difficulty inhering in, or connected with, a commodity which a person who is not the owner desires, and which he had rather buy than perform the labor of attaining directly himself. Hence, if an object having capacity to satisfy the desire of another cannot be had without difficulty, it is valuable, provided the person desiring it be of sufficient ability to pay for it. But if a commodity has no capacity to satisfy the desire of another, or if, having it, it can be had without difficulty, the commodity has no value. A man living in the country may suddenly find the waters of his well dried up so that he has none. To him, therefore, water has become exchangeable. But it may have no value, because he can get it of his neighbor by a very slight personal effort. But now he has gone to the city to live. Here he wants water as before, but he finds that he cannot get it by simply going to his neighbor's well. He cannot get it by direct personal effort without going a considerable distance beyond the city. Rather than go so far, he is willing to pay some one for it in order to have it. Consequently, the water paid for has value, because it could not be had without an effort, — without difficulty of attainment, — which the person had rather pay for than make directly himself.

Whenever, therefore, an exchange actually takes place, price expresses or measures this difficulty. If I pay seventy-five dollars for a watch, the money expresses or represents the difficulty of attaining it, — in other words, the labor expended in making it; I had rather pay this money for the labor of another than make the watch myself. But whenever an exchange does not take place, then difficulty of attainment is only another expression for the labor enhancing the exchangeability of an object. Yet it should be remembered that labor does not always render an object more exchangeable. A man may build a house in the wilderness at vast expense, nevertheless it may have no exchangeability, because no one has such tastes and desires as the builder.

It is most important to remember when difficulty of attain-

ment is used as an equivalent or measure of price, and when it is used as expressing simply the labor bestowed upon an object.

The second cause determining price is exchangeability. This we have previously defined as the capacity of an object to satisfy the desire of one who is not the owner. Now it is evident that whenever the desires of men change, the capacity of things to satisfy their desires changes also. Moreover, it is exceedingly difficult, indeed it is impossible, to find out all the causes which create and influence the desires of men. The causes are varied, often occult, unknown. Part of them lie in the realm of moral science, into which the economist cannot go. But since this is so, since we here find a junction between political economy and moral science, the moralist should not thrust the other study rudely aside, as he often does, for he would find that by cultivating, instead of ignoring it, his power over men would be greatly increased.

So, likewise, Professor Fawcett has said that the exchangeability of "some particular article is the result of various motives, which it is almost impossible to analyze. Thus, to one individual, A, the exchangeability of one of Turner's pictures is 2,000 guineas, for A would rather give this sum than be without the picture. To B, however, the exchangeability of the same picture is only 1,900 guineas. It is quite evident that various motives may induce a greater exchangeability to be attributed to this picture by A than by B; A may be a wealthier man than B, and money may consequently not be of so much importance to him. A may also have a superior taste for art, which makes his appreciation of a painting greater than that of B. A may also be influenced by a hope of future gain, since he may expect to realize considerable sums by granting permission to have the picture engraved; or he may think that, after a few years have elapsed, the demand for the works of the particular artist may so increase as greatly to enhance the value of the picture. In every case, a great variety of motives operate upon different individuals in determining the exchangeability which each may place upon any particular article." *

* Man. of Polit. Economy, p. 279. This is an exact quotation, except that we have substituted "exchangeability" for "value in use."

But the paradoxical proposition has been frequently declared to be true, that not only does price depend upon exchangeability, but also that exchangeability depends upon price. This paradox does not, we think, exist; nor would it ever have been declared to be true, if the distinction between difficulty of attainment as an equivalent of price and as only another expression for labor had been kept in view. Suppose a man is trying to find a house, with the intention of purchasing. After looking at several houses, he finds one that is just what he wants. It is an expensive place; the grounds are laid out with great care and skill. It is the taste and labor displayed about the place which render it so exchangeable. Satisfied that it is such a place as he wants, he then inquires the price. He has never thought of the price which the owner would ask till now. Suppose the owner is unwilling to sell the house except at an enormous price which the other is unwilling to pay. The purchaser has the means to buy, but he is unwilling to pay so much. Perhaps he thinks the owner is trying to drive a sharp bargain with him. He turns away disappointed, but afterwards he learns that the owner is willing to sell at a greatly reduced price. He purchases the house. Yet during all the time between the first examination of the house and the purchase of it its exchangeability was unchanged. Hence it is clear that the exchangeability of objects is not affected by their price; but whether *exchanges actually take place or not*, these depend upon the price of the things exchanged. Take peaches, for example. When they are first brought to market, many say, "We will not buy now, we will wait till the price is lower." They want them in the beginning just as much as afterwards, perhaps more. Their exchangeability is the same from the first to the last of the peach season; but not many exchanges are made till prices fall to a certain point.

There are many rocks which are unseen when the waters are high, that appear to view when the waters recede. Yet the rocks are there, whether the waters are high or low. So with our desires. They are as real when prices are so high that no exchanges are made, as when prices are low and exchanges frequent. The only difference is that when the prices of things rise above a certain point, the desires of men for them are un-

known to the world; when prices fall below a certain point, then the desires of men are found out through their efforts to gratify them.

But there is one class of commodities, the exchangeability of which depends *primarily* upon their value. Remembering that utility is the capacity of an object to satisfy the desire of its possessor, we remark that some commodities have utility solely on account of their value. Thus a diamond is useful at the present time because it has capacity to satisfy desire. Let diamonds become plentiful, however, and not only would their value vanish, but their utility also. Nobody would want them. Now it may be properly said that those articles which are useful simply because they are valuable are only exchangeable for a like reason. But all other commodities are exchangeable because of the labor or other difficulty connected with them. This is the cause which renders them exchangeable. Yet the value of the diamond, so long as it has any, is measured or estimated by difficulty of attainment like other commodities.*

A third cause determining price is personal effort. This is one of the causes which fixes the extremes of price. Thus suppose a purchaser is seeking for a chair. He goes into a store, and finding one that he likes, inquires the price. Being told that it is ten dollars, he remarks that he will not give so much, and that if the dealer will not sell it for nine dollars, he will make one himself. Personal effort, therefore, is the cause that fixes the highest price for the chair. As it is a cause determining the highest price of things, so likewise does it determine the lowest. But what do we mean by the highest and lowest price of a commodity? The first term is easily enough understood. The highest price is the most which a purchaser will pay for a thing. But what is meant by the lowest price?

* This was the assertion really made by Bastiat in his "Harmonies of Political Economy," and which Professor Cairnes has recently attacked. Fort. Rev., Vol. XIV. p 424. But the error into which we think the latter has fal'en is in considering the difficulty of attainment paid for as the difficulty expended by the finder of the diamond. This is only a partial consideration of the whole fact. The price paid for the diamond measures the difficulty of attainment which the purchaser had rather pay for than undertake himself. That is to say, the difficulty actually paid for is the one which the purchaser himself would probably have to overcome in order to find the diamond.

Will not a man get a thing for nothing if he can? Most assuredly; nevertheless we cannot think of a preferable expression. By lowest price, we mean the least that the dealer actually will sell for, and at which he must sell, else the purchaser will obtain the thing desired by a direct personal effort, or by that of some other person.

Willingness of deprivation is the fourth and last cause determining price. When vulcanized rubber goods were first made, they constituted a monopoly as long as the patent existed, so that no one could make them but the patentee and those whom he permitted. A, the purchaser, desires a pair of boots, but B, the monopolist, will not sell them for less than ten dollars. A's unwillingness to be without the boots leads him to give this price. But he would give no more. Either he would get them by personal effort (supposing that he could make them), or he would deprive himself of them rather than buy at a higher price. Thus we see that A's personal effort, or willingness of deprivation, determined the highest price which he would pay for the boots. The same cause may determine their lowest price. The monopoly has expired. A wishes another pair. But now he tells B that he will not give him but four dollars a pair. Why not? Why is he willing to deprive himself of them if he cannot purchase at that price? Because he believes he can buy elsewhere for the price he offers. Willingness of deprivation, therefore, is a cause determining price, for no exchange can take place unless the price comes within the limits which men will pay.

Moreover, willingness of deprivation cannot be resolved into any other cause of price. It is easily distinguished from exchangeability, for that quality may, as we have seen, inhere in an object after willingness of deprivation has prevented a transfer of the ownership thereof.

Let us now inquire when the highest and lowest prices are paid for things; and, also, what is the reasonable price towards which all things are tending.

First, whenever a commodity constitutes a monopoly, then the highest price is paid for it.

Secondly, whenever the supply of a commodity is unlimited,

— that is, when it can be produced without increase of cost, — then the lowest price is paid for it.

Thirdly, the reasonable price of a commodity is the cost of production, by which is meant the money paid for labor, material, etc., together with a reasonable sum for profits.

Let us test the correctness of these principles by applying them to actual exchanges.

Formerly, the screw part of the metal screw had a flat end, so that a hole had to be made in the wood previous to the insertion of the screw. But in 1846 a screw was invented having a point like a gimblet, which could be inserted into pine and other soft woods, such as are most commonly used, without first making a hole. The great advantage of using this screw will be readily seen. It always fitted the wood snugly, and held the pieces secured by it firmly together, while it could be put in more quickly than the old-fashioned screw. Thus it had a greater utility, and likewise a greater exchangeability, than the other. Being a new and useful invention, the patentee had the exclusive right of making it for the succeeding eighteen years. By agreement with the patentee, a company was organized, which began the manufacture and sale of these screws. The company fixed a price at which they were sold, which was not altered very much during the whole time in which the company had the exclusive right of making them. As this company alone could make them, it is evident that they were not obliged to make any at all, or if they did, they could dictate the price at which they could be purchased. Hence it was in their power to sell at the very highest price which people would pay rather than go without. They could fix a price so high that no one would buy them; they could lower it so that only a few would buy, or they could diminish it so low that many would purchase. The price, however, which the company sought to fix was the highest price at which the screw would be generally sold in the place of the old-fashioned one. It was a comparatively easy matter to determine what this price should be, for they could tell by observation and inquiry whether these screws were used in the place of the old ones, and whether they were used where they should be, instead of something else in their place. And as the screws came into general

use soon after their manufacture began, it was evident that the company had set as low a price as was necessary, in order to make extensive sales.

But it is not always easy for the monopolist, in the beginning, to ascertain what is the highest price which he can set upon his monopoly in order to reap the largest profit therefrom. For be it remembered that the monopolist does not always seek to set a price at which the largest quantity can probably be sold, even though he should get a reasonable or great profit from his sales; but rather the highest price at which the largest quantity will probably be sold from which the greatest aggregate profits can be realized during the time in which he has the exclusive right of controlling his monopoly. Thus suppose the monopoly consists of the right to make and sell rubber goods. At first, rubber boots are sold at eight dollars a pair. We will suppose that half of this sum is profit. Thinking that the sales will be largely increased by a reduction of price, the boots are afterward sold for six dollars a pair. More purchasers are found at the latter price than at the former, but as the profits have been reduced one half it is now necessary to sell twice as many goods as before, else the aggregate profits are diminished by the reduction of price. If, therefore, it is found upon trial that a diminution of price does not bring as large aggregate profits as the former price, then a higher price is set upon the goods. And as the monopolist can control the price of his monopoly, whatever it may consist of, to the extent of it, so can he coldly squeeze out of men by trial the highest price which they will pay for his things rather than not have them, without fear of losing his trade or of being undersold, for there is no one to compete with him. This trial of the market, in order to ascertain the best price at which goods can be sold, has been aptly termed by Adam Smith "the higgling and bargaining of the market."

We might have given a simpler illustration, showing how the monopolist can control the highest price of his monopoly. We will suppose him to be the owner of a fine picture by a celebrated master. It is the only one of the kind which the master has ever produced. The owner offers it for sale at the highest price which he thinks any one is willing to pay. Suppose the

price to be ten thousand dollars. A dozen men offer five, three offer seven, two offer eight, and one offers nine thousand dollars for the picture. This is the highest price offered, and at which the owner must sell, if he sells at all. Having a monopoly, therefore, he is so situated that he can draw out the desires of men without losing his picture, and, consequently, can get the very highest price which any one is willing to give.

Another form of monopoly may be mentioned, namely, distance from another market. Let us illustrate the character of this monopoly. On the line of the Chicago and St. Louis railroad lives a miller, who at one time sold a portion of his flour to his neighbors for eight dollars a barrel, and sent the rest to St. Louis, which, after payment of ten cents per barrel for freight, he sold for seven dollars. Hence, he received one dollar and ten cents more upon every barrel sold at home than upon each one sent to St. Louis. Yet it was cheaper for his neighbors to pay him eight dollars than go to St. Louis and buy the flour for six dollars and ninety cents a barrel.

The extent of this monopoly may be easily enough ascertained. It is the difference between the merchant's time and expense of travelling to the market where the things are bought, and the time and expense of his customer. Thus suppose that the expense of doing a retail business in New York and Chicago is the same, and that the merchants at both places intend to sell so as to clear the same net profits. The New York merchant buys a certain kind of silk of an importer and sells the same for three dollars a yard. Now supposing that the Chicago merchant was amply repaid for the cost of transportation, travelling, etc., if he sold the same silk at three dollars and twenty-five cents per yard, yet if he actually sells it for three dollars and fifty cents a yard, the additional twenty-five cents in price is a monopoly which he enjoys in consequence of being so far away from the New York market.

The same principle may also be illustrated in the case of several kinds of labor. A noted artist is a monopolist. He may charge the highest price, and people will readily pay. So with a distinguished lawyer and physician. A Webster or Mott has the field to himself; he can make his own prices. So

with some other men. But in proportion to the number of men exercising the same calling, and having the same skill, does the monopoly decline. Whenever, therefore, labor constitutes a monopoly, its price is controlled by the laborer.

From what we have said, we think the reason clearly appears why every dealer seeks, so far as he can, to make the thing he sells a monopoly. For if he succeeds, then he can get the highest price for it, in other words, the highest price any one will pay; while if he does not succeed, then he can get only the lowest price, that is, a price which, if raised at all, the purchaser will not pay; for either he will acquire the thing by personal effort or obtain it from some other dealer. Let us restate this idea in other language. The dealer, if he be a monopolist, can get the difference between the lowest and highest price which a purchaser will pay for a thing; while if he be not a monopolist, the purchaser saves the difference for himself. Is it strange, therefore, that every dealer should try to become a monopolist, seeing that he has this advantage, that he can get the highest price which the purchaser will pay for his monopoly? So we find all sorts of combinations among men in order to make monopolies out of their trades, products, and professions. This is especially noticeable of late among railways. They combine for various reasons, but a prominent one is to control the price for carrying freight and passengers. And just here, in illustration of what we are saying, may be mentioned a monopoly enjoyed by Commodore Vanderbilt and his friends last winter during the time when the Erie Canal was closed. This was the only avenue for transportation between various places, except the New York Central Railroad. When, therefore, communication by way of the canal was stopped on account of ice, the owners of the railway had a monopoly, which they enjoyed to the fullest extent. Mr. Mill gives a very interesting illustration of the way in which a monopoly was created. The Dutch East India Company at one time owned the Spice Islands, and could control the quantity of produce to be sold. In consequence of being able to limit the quantity, they "obtained a monopoly price for the produce" sold. "But to do so they were obliged, in good seasons, to destroy a portion of the crop. Had they persisted in selling all that they pro-

duced, they must have forced a market by reducing the price, so low, perhaps, that they would have received for the larger quantity a less total return than for the smaller; at least they showed that such was their opinion by destroying their surplus." *

We cannot stop longer to point out other forms of monopoly, but some of them will come to light in connection with other parts of our subject. Besides, whether an article constitutes a monopoly or not, or whether men are seeking to make a monopoly of a particular thing or not, can generally be determined by slight observation. But this is true, that whenever a monopoly exists, whatever it may consist of, the monopolist, to the extent of his monopoly, can get the highest price for his commodities.

Let us, therefore, take up the second principle, and test its correctness by applying it to other exchanges. Take the case of common cotton goods. They can be manufactured to an almost indefinite amount without increase of cost. But there is no monopolist to squeeze out the highest price which the purchaser will pay rather than go without them. In the case of the screws, the monopolist could get the highest price for them because he could control the quantity to be made. He had one end of the string, and that the most important one, which no man could take away. But now the situation is reversed. The purchaser can buy at the lowest price. If the dealer charged any more, the purchaser would go away with the expectation of purchasing of some one else.

The same principle determines the price of common labor. As the number of this class to do the work which they are capable of performing is practically unlimited in very many places, so are their wages the lowest price that they will work for, for which if they will not labor, the employer will either stop his mill or employ others. In fact, the amount of work to be done may be regarded almost as a monopoly, so that the employer can fix his own price. He can give such a price as will just keep the laborer from starving; if he give less, the state must make up the deficiency or the laborer will starve. But as the state will, though imperfectly, protect people from starva-

* Princ. of Political Economy, Vol. I. p. 552.

tion, so the monopolist must, in common with others, pay the expense of this protection by way of taxes. It is usual, therefore, to pay the laborer enough to prevent him from starving. It is true that in this country we pay more than this. But if we do, what is the reason? Because many of the laborers are, to a certain extent, monopolists also. They have capital of their own, so that, if their labor will not support them, they will not starve. And if they cannot make a satisfactory bargain with their employers, and yet have no capital so as to defy them and compel them to raise the rate of wages, still, the great West is open to them, inviting them to come and till her fields. So long as we have such broad acres of cultivable but uncultivated land, the monopolist will be prevented from reducing wages to the starvation point. Nature has put within reach of the son of toil a counter-monopoly, with which he can successfully defy the monopolist.

And now the light breaks forth to clear up the darkness created by the monopolist. As his selfishness leads him to accumulate the largest aggregate profits from his monopoly, so do these high profits, by exciting the selfishness of other men, draw them into the production of the same things, whenever it is possible. Thus it often happens that if a business is exceedingly profitable, others will press into it until production becomes so great that the cost of producing will not be realized. One illustration will suffice. So long as the patent for making vulcanized rubber goods was in force, the owners of it realized great profits therefrom. But upon the death of the patent, so many rushed into the same business that the succeeding gains of the monopolist melted quickly away. So is it ever with monopolies. The selfishness of men which inspires them to create monopolies is counteracted by the selfishness of others, which brings about, sooner or later, their destruction. Hence, while one party in the industrial world is trying to build up monopolies, another party is equally zealous in tearing them down.

Having shown when the highest and lowest price is paid for commodities, we shall make a few observations upon the reasonable price towards which all commodities are tending. And it may be said that this is the ultimate price which will be paid

for all things. For no man will continue to produce permanently at a loss; indeed, he could not do so if he wished, for he would inevitably become a bankrupt. So Mr. Mill says, "Capitalists will not go on permanently producing at a loss. They will not even go on producing at a profit less than they can live upon. Persons whose capital is already embarked, and cannot be easily extricated, will persevere for a considerable time without profit, and have been known to persevere even at a loss, in hopes of better times. But they will not do so indefinitely, or when there is nothing to indicate that times are likely to improve. No new capital will be invested in an employment, unless there be an expectation not only of some profit, but of a profit as great (regard being had to the degree of eligibility of the employment in other respects) as can be hoped for in any other occupation at that time and place. When such profit is evidently not to be had, if people do not actually withdraw their capital, they at least abstain from replacing it when consumed. The cost of production, together with the ordinary profit, may therefore be called the *necessary* price, or value, of all things made by labor and capital. Nobody willingly produces in the prospect of loss. Whoever does so, does it under a miscalculation, which he corrects as fast as he is able."*

Let us give one other illustration for the purpose of bringing into a single view the existence and operation of the foregoing principles. Several years ago checked woollen clothing was extensively worn, it being then fashionable. In the beginning, the quantity that could be obtained was quite limited, and as its exchangeability suddenly increased, it constituted, indeed, a monopoly to a limited extent. The profit to the manufacturer being large, others began to make the same goods as soon as they could, so that the profits on them rapidly fell away to the cost of production. But after a time, fashion made a new decree that checks should no longer be worn. Immediately the exchangeability of the goods declined. Those who followed the decrees of fashion, if daring to trample so far upon her laws as to wear out what checked clothing they had, bought no more. True, some were unmindful of her dictates,

* Princ. of Political Economy, Vol. I. p. 555.

and were willing to wear checks still; to others these goods had always had a certain degree of exchangeability, and when the merchant was willing to sell at a price corresponding with their exchangeability to these purchasers, they were ready to buy. In the beginning, the manufacturer was a qualified monopolist, that is, he controlled the supply for a time, and so fixed the price; in the end, the exchangeability of the goods rapidly declined, so that the purchaser fixed the price; but afterwards, the quantity on hand having diminished, the final price was determined by the cost of production.

It is evident, therefore, that the reasonable price, which is the cost of production, will be the ultimate price of all things. This price will also equalize the division of gains so that no one shall get more or less than he ought to have. It is beyond our space to show that the number of commodities bought and sold at a reasonable price is constantly increasing, yet the evidence of this fact could be abundantly produced.

The difference between the highest and the lowest price of a commodity is often modified by various causes which we may call extrinsic. Thus a man may pay more for a thing because of his friendship to the seller, or sympathy for his condition. People will pay more for things at fairs and festivals in order to aid the objects which such associations represent. So the members of a community may trade at a particular place, even though they pay a somewhat higher price for their goods, on account of the known character of the dealer for honesty, politeness, etc. Again, the desires of a purchaser may often be veiled so that he does not actually pay as high a price as he would, if, his mind being like a piece of glass, the dealer could see what his real desires were. The same is also true of the dealer. But these are seeming, not real, exceptions, to the laws that have been set forth.

Having stated when the highest and lowest price is paid, and also what will be the ultimate price of things, it may be necessary to say something further concerning the fluctuations of price. If, for instance, the price of wheat is one dollar per bushel to-day, and one dollar and a quarter to-morrow, what has produced the change? Many would say it has been produced either because the quantity to be had has diminished or the quan-

tity desired has increased. But this is not always true. Thus suppose that three men are each desirous of purchasing a particular horse, and that each one is willing to give one hundred dollars for it, and no more. Is it not evident that no greater price can be obtained for the horse because there are three customers than if there were only one ? * The same is true in respect to many of the transactions of life. People will give a certain sum for a particular thing, and no more ; no matter whether the quantity that may be had is more or less. The reason of this in many cases is that if the things cannot be purchased at a given price, others are purchased as substitutes therefor. Consequently, if the quantity of a commodity becomes much reduced, the dealer may yet be obliged to sell at the old price, or no one will buy. Remembering, therefore, that personal effort and willingness of deprivation always fix the extremes of price, we remark that the fluctuations in price are the consequences of a change in the exchangeability of things. So long as this is unchanged, whether the article itself becomes plentiful or scarce, its price will remain the same. It is true that when the quantity of a commodity diminishes, its exchangeability often increases, and *vice versa*. Suppose, for illustration, that the wheat crop is only half as great this year as last, so that all cannot have their wants supplied if they remain the same as before. I say to myself, " The wheat crop is short this year, but I mean to have all that I want, whether others get all they want or not." Others say the same thing. It, therefore, becomes more exchangeable, so that all are willing to pay a higher price. Take another example. I noticed not long since that the price of laths in the New York market had advanced a little. What was the reason of this advance ? It was suddenly found that the quantity on hand was quite limited, and the dealers believed that all the laths in market, and more, would be needed at once to finish the buildings in process of construction. The

* Mr. Thornton has succeeded in showing that the law of supply and demand, at least as generally stated, is very defective ; that if it were true, prices should often rise when they do not, and *vice versa*. (" Thornton On Labor," Chap. I.) Though succeeding in this, his attempts to replace it by a law, namely, competition, we think Mr. Mill has shown to be a failure. See review of Thornton's book by J. S. Mill, Fort. Rev., Vol. II. pp. 505 – 518.

dealers took advantage of this state of things to increase the price. They became in fact qualified monopolists, that is, they sought to control the price to a certain extent. When the condition of the market was found out by the builders, they rushed to the dealers to get their wants supplied in order to complete their work. The exchangeability of the laths suddenly increased, — the builders were willing to pay more for them, — and so the dealers could get the additional price which they had fixed. But suppose the builders had met together and agreed not to pay the advance, but to send elsewhere for their supplies, would the advance have continued? Certainly not; it would have sunk down till the purchases were sufficient in number and quantity bought to satisfy the dealers. So it will be found in every case. Personal effort and willingness of deprivation fix the extremes of price, while the variations between them are dependent upon exchangeability, which in turn is affected by many causes, the chief of which may be mentioned as difficulty of attainment.*

ALBERT S. BOLLES.

ART. III. — 1. *The Political and Historical Works of* LOUIS NAPOLEON BONAPARTE. 2 vols. London. 1852.

2. *Histoire du Second Empire.* Par TAXILL DELORD. 3 vols. Paris. 1869–1873.

3. *La Lutte Électorale en* 1863. Par JULES FERRY. Paris. 1863.

4. *Du Suffrage Universel et de la Manière de voter.* Par H. TAINE. Paris. 1872.

5. *La Réforme Électorale en France.* Par ERNEST NOVILLE. Paris. 1871.

UPON no other feature of the government of Napoleon III. has perhaps so great stress been laid by his apologists and supporters as upon that of universal suffrage. The position has often been taken, that, whatever charges may be preferred

* Or labor.

and sustained against the Second Empire, the fact is undeniable that the Emperor received the hearty support of the people, — of the people, too, in the enjoyment of universal suffrage. Many even who themselves have no words of favor for some of the features of that government, claim that it was entitled to support on the very principles of republicanism itself, inasmuch as the result of repeated elections showed that it was the government which a vast majority of the people desired. In the light of such recent authorities as have come to us, we propose to examine the correctness of the claims thus advanced. We shall first inquire into the views of Napoleon concerning the political rights of the masses of the people, and then we shall try to ascertain how far these views were carried out when he came into actual power.

During those turbulent years which intervened between the Revolution of 1830 and the *Coup d'Etat* of 1851 Louis Napoleon took care that the people of France should not be ignorant of his political opinions. Scarcely was Louis Philippe seated on his throne when the publication of the "Political Reveries," embodying Napoleon's "Ideas of a Constitution," made the nation fully aware that Napoleonism had still a living representative, and that this representative entertained definite and positive ideas in regard to the manner in which France should be governed. One who, at the present day, looks over that pamphlet, is surprised that it left no more permanent impression upon the minds of the French people. But then, again, we cannot help reflecting that, in the days of the Republic, those days when the people needed to know what Napoleon had written, there was no freedom of the press, and consequently no revelation and discussion of the thoughts and purposes that the President was entertaining. At the present day it is easy to see that the people had abundant reason to anticipate the ultimate establishment of an empire; for, whatever may be thought of the means by which the imperial throne was set up, it must be admitted that the *fact* of its establishment was entirely consistent with the views which, from the first, Napoleon had advocated. It is a fact of no small importance, that in his first sketch of a constitution, published as early as 1832, the whole scheme of his government was foreshadowed. This in-

strument reminds one of the "*Souper de Beaucaire*," written by Napoleon I. when he was yet a student; for both of these essays, though inherently very unlike, sketched out, with surprising accuracy, the courses which their authors were subsequently to pursue. It is at first thought one of the surprising elements of the Revolution of 1848, that the people were willing to intrust the destinies of the Republic to the hands of one who was so pronounced an Imperialist; but an easy and complete explanation is to be found in the fact that the people cared very little for republicanism, while they cared very much for stability and order. Contrary to the popular impression in America, and for reasons perfectly easy to explain, the masses of the French people, since the overthrow of the First Empire, have shown themselves to be eminently conservative. Amid all the revolutions and political discords that have distracted the country, one feeling has been dominant in the hearts of the peasantry, one ambition has inspired them, one impulse has directed them. Whatever innovation they have had forced upon them, they have accepted it willingly, provided it has brought, or even promised to bring, security to their possessions and their earnings. This fact was the supreme element of strength in the cause of Napoleon III. He early discovered it, and he kept it constantly in view. Of all the Napoleonic family, as Monsieur Delord assures us, this nephew of the first Emperor alone had faith in the restoration of the dynasty; and this faith, it might be added, was founded on a thorough understanding of the desires and sympathies of the great mass of the French people. Inspired by this understanding of the peasantry, and encouraged by this confidence in the future destiny of his family, he had no difficulty in determining what course to pursue. It was only necessary that he should keep himself and his political doctrines before the people; the time would evidently come when both he and his theories, if acceptable to the nation, would be called into action. He took good care that both of these conditions should be fulfilled.

In the early political essays of Louis Napoleon two dominant ideas prevail: the first, that the people are the supreme authority in the nation, the second, that the reins of government should be in the hands of an emperor. Beginning with the

saying of Montesquieu, that "the people, in whom is the sovereign power, ought to do by itself all that it can," he proceeds to show how the will of the people has been stifled, and how the welfare of the nation depends upon its being set free. All political power, he argues, must emanate from the people, and yet, to prevent its abuse, it must be under the constant guidance of a controlling hand. There are two things to be dreaded, absolute power on the one hand, and the Reign of Terror on the other. Under the name of Napoleon there is no occasion to dread the latter, under the shadow of a republic there can be no apprehension of the former. What France needs, then, is a form of government in which the whole people, without distinction, should take part in the election of representatives of the nation. The "masses, which can never be corrupted, and which can never flatter nor dissemble, must be made the constant source from which all power should emanate." "From the opinions which I advance," he says, "it will be seen that my principles are entirely republican." "If, in my scheme of a constitution," he continues, "I give preference to the monarchical form of government, it is because I consider that such a government would be best adapted to France; because it would give greater guarantees of tranquillity, greater strength and greater liberty than any other." Again he says, "At the accession of each new emperor, the sanction of the people will be required. If the sanction is refused, the two Chambers will propose another sovereign in his place. As the people will not have the right of election, but only that of approval, this law will not present the inconveniences of an elective monarchy, which have always been a source of discussion; it will, on the other hand, be a security against political convulsions." Then, coupled with these privileges of the people, there must be the "right of expressing their thoughts and opinions, whether through the medium of the press or in any other manner; as well as the rights of peaceably assembling, and of the free exercise of divine worship."

As early then as 1832 the people of France were informed with considerable clearness respecting the political doctrines of Napoleon. These theories, moreover, in the course of the following sixteen years, were often reiterated, but always with-

out important modification. In 1839, for example, the "*Idées Napoléoniennes*" presented the same political notions in a more elaborate form. This somewhat pretentious essay was little more than the body of the former one clad in another and more seductive costume. The profusion of ornaments brought from the glorious days of the First Empire, and paraded in contrast with the poverty-stricken degeneracy of these latter days, served only to advocate a return to the imperial *régime*, and to reveal the good things in store for the people in case they should avail themselves of their legitimate sovereignty. Again, in 1841, the author took occasion to revive his favorite theme, and to elaborate more fully his ideas of the true sphere of a monarch. Guizot's History of the English Revolution had just been published, and had presented to the public in a powerful light the opinions of that eminent statesman in regard to what should be the position of the constitutional sovereign on all matters of national policy. The view advocated by Guizot was that which he afterward in the service of Louis Philippe so well exemplified, namely, that the monarch should be a moderator or manager of diverse influences in the state, rather than a leader of public opinion. Nothing could be more opposed to the Napoleonic idea of a government. It had been no part of the First Emperor's policy to wait for an expression of popular opinion before he took action; it had been his habit rather to act independently of that opinion, and to trust to the moral force of the accomplished fact for its ratification. The nephew was no more inclined to follow the lead of the people than was the uncle. When, therefore, Guizot's history appeared, it afforded the prisoner at Ham an opportunity which he was not likely to neglect. He needed to keep himself before the people, and to have the people entertain what he believed to be correct notions of the proper relations of the governing and the governed. Both of these ends he did something to obtain in the paper referred to. Reviewing the whole period of the English Revolution, he had no difficulty in finding material which he could press into the service of Napoleonism. Guizot had taken the ground that the great fault of the Stuarts was that they never recognized the spirit of the age; in other words, that they set up for themselves an ideal of royalty which

was utterly repugnant to those aspirations for liberty that had now become all pervasive and irresistible. The Stuarts, he maintained, should have submitted to the inevitable, should have allowed themselves to be led in the same manner as the monarchs of England are led at the present time. Bonaparte, however, arrived at a far different conclusion. While he recognized the failure of the Stuarts, he saw that they could have succeeded only by adopting a method very different from that suggested by Guizot. They should have put themselves at the head of the ideas of their age. It was the part of monarchy to lead, not to be led. The English Revolution should have resulted in the establishment of royalty upon a firmer basis, not chiefly through the efforts of the people dragging on the monarchs, but through the exertions of the monarchs supported and encouraged by the people. "Revolutions conducted by a chief," said he, "generally turn exclusively to the advantage of the people; for to insure success, the chief is obliged to give himself up to the national spirit; and to support himself he must remain faithful to the interests which secured his triumph; while, on the contrary, revolutions made by a multitude often turn to the profit of the chief only, for the reason that the people think on the morrow of victory that their wish is accomplished, and it is in their nature to discontinue for a long period all the efforts which were requisite to obtain that victory." It was in accordance with this general law, argued Bonaparte, that the Stuarts failed utterly and that William succeeded. The former made war simply to support their tottering power, the latter solely to increase the influence of England. "The Stuarts ruled by means of the crowd, and beheld only confusion around them; William saw the object at once, rushed forward, and drew the crowd after him." Finally the Prince sums up and concludes his essay in this *ad-captandum* manner.

"The history of England calls loudly to monarchs: —

"MARCH AT THE HEAD OF THE IDEAS OF YOUR AGE, AND THEN THOSE IDEAS WILL FOLLOW AND SUPPORT YOU.

"IF YOU MARCH BEHIND THEM THEY WILL DRAG YOU ON.

"IF YOU MARCH AGAINST THEM THEY WILL CERTAINLY CAUSE YOUR DOWNFALL."

Thus in the early writings of Napoleon III. we find three dominant political ideas. He maintains, first, that all political power dwells in the people and emanates from the people; secondly, that the official to be at the head of the French people should be, not a president, but an emperor; and, thirdly, that the initiative of all political innovations should be taken, not by the people or by their legislative representatives, but by the monarch.

Now in these three propositions are there not bound up all the evils that came upon France during the public career of Napoleon III.? They do not, perhaps, embody the possibility of his first acquiring power, — that depended in large measure upon the character of the government already existing, — but when once the power was in his hands, did they not open to him every possibility of usurpation? It may be answered that, according to his "Ideas of a Constitution," the people were to have the reserved power of a negative upon his acts, and that therefore they were always to have in their own hands the means of restraining him. This answer is specious, and yet it is fraught with error. In every nation where the government alone has the right of initiative according to the Napoleonic idea, the sole power of the people is to choose whether to the appeal of the government for support it will say "yes" or whether it will say "no." All the provisions of a constitution, be that constitution ever so complicated or ever so simple, can do nothing more for the nation than to provide a means whereby the people may give a categorical answer to such questions as the emperor may see fit to propound. Under circumstances ideally favorable, an honest expression of public opinion on a question so proposed might be secured; but under ordinary circumstances such an expression would always be impossible. The question would often take the form of a choice between two evils, when it would be decided in the affirmative by that universal disposition of human nature that

> . . . . makes us rather bear those ills we have,
> Than fly to others that we know not of.

It is readily admitted that such a method of voting may, for certain purposes, be quite legitimate, and entirely unobjectionable. Such would generally be the fact in all cases where it

would be equally easy to foresee the results of a negative and of an affirmative vote. But in a nation where the government alone has the initiative, the result of a negative vote can never be foretold with any degree of certainty. In a land, too, like that of France, where to a large extent the peasantry own their homes, such uncertainty is especially intolerable. The consequence is that whenever the French people have been appealed to by *plébiscite*, they have not only in every case answered in the affirmative, but their majority has amounted often almost to unanimity.*

These facts were perfectly understood by Louis Napoleon. In his "Napoleonic Ideas" he placed these figures in array, not, indeed, for the purpose of showing the only thing which they are capable of showing, but in order to convince the people of the extraordinary popularity of his uncle's political ideas. It is at least apparent that he was familiar with the results of the appeals that had been made, and it is impossible to suppose that he had not interpreted their true meaning. It is fair to say that he could not but have seen that the French people, if asked to give either their assent to *un fait accompli* or their dissent from it, would, in all probability, support it with an overwhelming majority. History and human nature both pointed to the same result. He must have seen, therefore, that he needed only to secure a position from which he could appeal to the nation. With the sole right of initiative once in his possession, and with that almost absolute certainty of support which the situation necessarily secured, there could be no further obstacle in his way.

We have thus seen that the political sovereignty of the country would practically pass into the hands of Napoleon in case

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* The following figures will serve to show the force of the circumstances to which we have alluded: —

	Oui.	Non.
Constitution of 1791 (not submitted to the people).		
" "1793	1,801,018	11,600
" "the year III.	1,057,390	49,977
Temporary Consulate	3,011,007	1,562
Consulate for life	3,568,888	8,374
Hereditary Empire (1804)	3,521,675	2,579
Presidency of ten years	7,439,216	646,737

of his elevation to power. This, however, does not prove that such a change would be disadvantageous to the nation. Whether it would or would not depends upon the character of the ruler and the political condition of the people. If the masses of the people are so devoid of political ability as to take no serious interest in political affairs, or if, indeed, for any reason, they are unable to govern themselves as well as they would be likely to be governed, the only practical question then is, Who should govern them? Shall it be a person upon whom are imposed certain practicable constitutional restraints? or shall it be one who takes the power into his own hands, leaving with the people only so much as they can never use? There would appear to be no doubt that the choice of the former would always be the safer; and yet it must be admitted that, under conceivable circumstances, the latter might be deliberately chosen as the only possible cure for anarchy. Did such circumstances exist in France? Whatever others may think, it is certain that every Frenchman would answer the question with an emphatic negative. It would not for a moment be admitted that Louis Napoleon was chosen because the nation despaired of governing itself; on the contrary, it is maintained that he was accepted as the best *means* of governing itself. He was chosen as President for no other reason than because he had captivated the people with his name, his ideas, and his promises.

We have glanced at the fundamental character of his political ideas; it may be well to look for a moment at the nature of his promises.

The necessity of assurances of more than ordinary force were doubtless apparent to the mind of Napoleon. He must have seen that the nation would never consent to deliver itself over into the hands of a master until it was at least convinced that the proposed master would not abuse his power. Accordingly, not only in his essays, but also in his letters, we have the most emphatic declarations which it would be possible to make. In the essay on the "Extinction of Pauperism," which he wrote when imprisoned at Ham, a plausible appeal was made to the masses of the nation. The author draws a vivid picture of the deplorable condition of the working classes: —

"Industry has now neither rule, nor organization, nor aim. It is an

engine which works without a regulator. It cares nothing for the human force it employs, crushing men and materials equally under its wheels. It depopulates the country; conglomerates the people into small spaces without room to breathe; weakens the mind as well as the body, and afterwards throws these men on the world, when she no longer requires them, — men who have sacrificed their strength, their youth, and their existence to her service. Industry devours her children and lives only by their destruction; she is the true Saturn of labor. Must we, then, to remedy these defects, place her under a yoke of iron, rob her of this liberty which is her sole existence; in a word kill her because she is a murderess, without profiting by the immense benefits which she confers? We think it is sufficient to cure those she has wounded, and to protect her from wounds."

Having thus stated the case, the essayist proceeds to show how all the benefits of good society might be disseminated among the working classes. There is a great array of figures to demonstrate how large a part of the lands of France remain uncultivated, how on a sort of joint-stock principle the unemployed laborers might be formed by the government into affluent communities, and how in this manner "pauperism might be extirpated, if not entirely, at least in a great measure." The plan proposed was a kind of socialism, exactly fitted to captivate that large class of people in France which is ever waiting for some new phantasm, — the same class which, a generation before, had gone into ecstasies over the dreams of Mably and Saint-Just. From this presentation of Bonaparte's views, the common people had a right to regard him as pledged to the rapid amelioration of their condition in case of his elevation to power.

But other and more definite assurances were not wanting. The numerous letters with which he regaled his friends were filled with articles of political faith, all teaching and enforcing the same doctrine. In public and in private he apparently neglected no opportunity to make his views known. In September of 1840, when he was brought to trial for the affair of Boulogne, he founded his defence exclusively on the fact that the people in the nation were sovereign, and that in their sovereign capacity they had elevated his family to supreme political power. That sovereignty, he assured his judges, had been consecrated by the most powerful revolution in history. It had

expressed itself in favor of the Constitution of the Empire with suffrages almost unanimous. That grand act of sovereignty the nation had never revoked; and, as the Emperor had declared, "Whatever has been done without its authority is illegal."

Here, it will be seen, was an open defiance of the authority of Louis Philippe. The declaration clearly meant, if it meant anything, that the Empire was at that moment the legally established government in France. To his assertions on that point he added these words: —

"At the same time, do not allow yourselves to believe that, led away by the impulses of a personal ambition, I have wished by these acts to attempt in France a restoration of the Empire. I have been taught too noble lessons, and have lived with too noble examples before me, to do so. I was born the son of a king who descended without regret from a throne on the day when he had reason to believe that it was no longer possible to conciliate with the interests of France those of the people whom he had been called to govern. The Emperor, my uncle, preferred to abdicate the Empire rather than accept by treaty the restricted frontier, while he could not but expose France to the insults and the menaces in which foreign nations to this day permit themselves to indulge. I have not lived a single day forgetful of these lessons. In 1830, when the people recognized their sovereignty, I expected that the policy of the following days would be as loyal as the conquest itself, and that the destinies of France would be established forever. Instead of this the country has undergone the melancholy experiences of the past ten years. Under such circumstances, I considered that the vote of four millions of my countrymen, which had elevated my family to supreme power, imposed upon me the duty, at least, of making an appeal to the nation, in order to ascertain its will."

This address, cleverly compounded of truth and falsehood, and spoken in the ears of all Frenchmen, when stripped of its conventional circumlocution proclaimed these political doctrines. The people of France are sovereign. In their sovereign capacity they chose the hereditary empire of Napoleon as their government, and they have never revoked that choice. That empire, therefore, is now *de jure* the government of France, and I am *de jure* the Emperor. That I abstain from claiming the imperial throne is not because I have no right to it, but because I have learned from the examples of my father and

my uncle to practise self-denial when the welfare of the nation requires it.

Now it is difficult to conceive how any more dangerous doctrine could have been enunciated. There was embodied in it the perpetual right to wage war upon the government for the recovery of lost possessions. Under ordinary circumstances such a declaration would, of course, be of no importance; but in view of the dissatisfied condition of the nation, in view of that great stress which Bonaparte had laid upon the sovereignty and welfare of the people, by which he had already secured great popularity with the masses, and, above all, in view of the powerful spell which the name of Napoleon continued to work upon the nation, it is strange beyond measure that the danger was not more fully comprehended. It would seem that ordinary intelligence must have perceived that there was needed only the factor of unscrupulousness to make the conditions of every evil possibility complete. In case an opportunity should come within reach, everything would depend upon the integrity of a man who had as yet given no proof of political virtue, and whose ideal, furthermore, was the hero of the 18th Brumaire.

Bonaparte did not fail to guard against the fears which would be naturally aroused by these various circumstances. His writings abound in expressions calculated to allay them. He gives a sufficient amount of assurance, and expresses a becoming horror of political dishonesty. To the editor of the *Journal du Loiret* he wrote from Ham in October of 1843: —

"I have never claimed any other rights than those of a French citizen, and I never shall have any other desire than to see the whole people, legally convened, choosing fully the form of government which they might think it best to have. As a member of a family which owes its elevation to the suffrages of the nation (*sic!*) I should belie my origin, my nature, and, what is more, I should do violence to common-sense, if I did not admit the sovereignty of the people as the fundamental basis of all political organization."

In commenting upon this letter the editor of the *Journal du Loiret* used these words: —

"It is an evidence of the all-powerful virtue of the democratic principle, and it is also an evidence of high-mindedness, to see a man of

royal blood, heir to a throne, a young prince, intelligent and proud, popular for the name he bears and the glorious souvenirs which that name recalls, thus ridding himself of monarchial prejudices, abdicating the privileges of his race, and paying a solemn homage to the sovereignty of the people. We highly compliment Prince Louis for the noble sentiments expressed in this letter."

Such expressions as these, though rather too suggestive of Sir Peter Teazle, are of some value as showing how the Prince's professions were regarded. Strictly speaking, there was at that moment no Napoleonic party in France; and for that reason, perhaps, the comments of the journals should be regarded as reflecting all the more correctly the sentiments of the public.

Again, in 1848, when the Prince learned that it was proposed in the Assembly to retain the law of exile as regarding him alone, he wrote to the House of Delegates an appeal, which concluded as follows: —

"The same reasons which made me take up arms against the government of Louis Philippe would lead me, if my services were required, to devote myself to the defence of the Assembly, the result of universal suffrage. In the presence of a king elected by two hundred deputies, I might have recollected that I was heir to an empire founded on the consent of four millions of Frenchmen. In the presence of the national sovereignty, I can and I will claim no more than my rights as a French citizen; but these I will demand with that energy which an honest heart derives from the knowledge of never having done anything unworthy of its country."

These words would seem to be sufficiently assuring, but others were more so. In July of the same year, the Prince, then at London, received word that he had been elected to the National Assembly by the people of Corsica. It is evident that he was hoping for something better, and he therefore wrote to the President of the Assembly a letter which is a curious mixture of arrogance and humility. After declaring that the same reasons which had compelled him to refuse other demands imposed upon him the necessity of another sacrifice, he added: —

"Without renouncing the idea of the honor of being one day a representative of the people, I consider it to be my duty to wait before re-

turning to the bosom of my country, till my presence in France may not in any way serve as a pretext for the enemies of the Republic. *I wish that my disinterestedness should prove the sincerity of my patriotism; I wish that those who charge me with ambition should be convinced of their error.*

"Have the goodness, Monsieur le Président, to inform the Assembly of my resignation, and of my regret at not being able yet to participate in its labors, and of my ardent wishes for the happiness of the Republic."

The "disinterestedness" by which he wished to "prove the sincerity of his patriotism" appears in a strong light when we find that only a few days later he wrote to his friend, General Piat, at Paris, that, if he were again elected, he should accept. This declaration was duly accepted, and, consequently, in September he was chosen by the electors of four different departments. He determined to sit for the capital; and thus the "sacrifice" by which he wished to "prove the sincerity of his patriotism," while it deprived him of Corsica, gave him Paris.

On the 26th of September, the nephew of the Emperor took his seat in the Assembly in the midst of a scene of considerable agitation. He at once mounted the tribune and read a short but carefully prepared speech. It was the first official act of his life, and was a most solemn profession of devotion to the Republic.

"I feel it incumbent on me," said he, "to declare openly, on the first day I am allowed to sit in this hall, the real sentiments which animate, and have always animated me. After being proscribed during thirty-three years, I have at last recovered a country and the rights of citizenship. The Republic has conferred on me that happiness. *I offer it now my oath of gratitude and devotion, and the generous fellow-countrymen who sent me to this hall may rest certain that they will find me devoted to the double task which is common to us all, namely, to assure order and tranquillity, the first want of the country, and to develop the democratical institutions which the people have a right to claim.* During a long period I could only devote to my country the meditations of exile and captivity. To-day a new career opens to me. Admit me to your ranks, dear colleagues, with the sentiment of affectionate sympathy which animates me. *My conduct, you may be certain, shall ever be guided by a respectful devotion to law. It will prove, to the confusion of those who have attempted to slander me, that no man is more devoted than I am, I repeat, to the defence of order and the consolidation of the Republic.*"

This address was heard with every mark of approbation and satisfaction. It was almost universally accepted as a sufficient pledge of good faith. In the course of the ensuing discussions on the Constitution, it was only at rare intervals that a word indicative of suspicion or distrust was uttered; and even then assurance was restored by the unfailing tact of the Prince. In the course of the discussion of that portion of the Constitution which pertains to the Presidency, M. Thouret proposed the insertion of a proviso to the effect that no member of the families which had reigned over France should be elected President or Vice-President of the French Republic. The amendment was opposed by M. Lacaze and others, who urged that it proposed a law of proscription unworthy of a great people, and that the chief of the imperial family, against whom the amendment was particularly directed, had come forward, and from the tribune protested his devotion to the Republic. This opened the way to the Prince himself, who said "that he was too grateful to the nation for restoring him to his rights as a citizen to have any other ambition. It was not in his own name, but in the name of three hundred thousand electors, that he protested against the appellation of 'Pretender,' which was continually flung in his face."

"These words," says the report, "were followed by the greatest agitation." Finally, M. Thouret arose and said: "*In consequence of what has been said by Monsieur Louis Bonaparte, I withdraw the amendment.*"

While these discussions were going on, Socialist banquets were taking place in various parts of the realm, and the name of Louis Napoleon was beginning to be talked of in connection with the Presidency. This fact introduced into the Assembly an instantaneous element of discord. It was evident that there were some, at least, who were not altogether satisfied with the Prince's fair promises as to his future. M. Clement Thomas inveighed against him in the most violent terms. In the course of his speech he did not hesitate to charge him with covering the country with emissaries recommending his candidature to the peasantry. Finally, he startled the Assembly by declaring: "Louis Napoleon is not a candidate for the Presidency, *but for the Imperial Dignity.*" The instantaneous effect

of this prophetic outburst was the suspension of the session, and a challenge from M. Pierre Bonaparte; the less immediate, but more important, result was another speech from the Prince, containing other "satisfactory assurances." In the mean time his candidacy for the position of President was declared, and it was necessary that he should attend to his interests with the people. Accordingly he lost no time in publishing an address to his fellow-citizens. He reiterated his doctrines concerning the sovereignty of the people, the rights of labor, and the relief of poverty. Then, for the purpose of allaying any doubts which might be entertained concerning himself and his future, he crowned all his assurances by using these words: —

"I am not an ambitious man, who dreams at one time of the empire and of war, at another of the adoption of subversive theories. Educated in free countries, and in the school of misfortune, I shall always remain faithful to the duties which your suffrages and the will of the Assembly may impose upon me. If I am elected President, I shall not shrink from any danger or from any sacrifice to defend society which has been so audaciously attacked. *I shall devote myself wholly, without mental reservation, to the confirming of a Republic which has shown itself wise by its laws, honest in its intentions, great and powerful by its acts. I pledge my honor to leave to my successor at the end of four years the executive power strengthened, liberty intact, and a real progress accomplished.*"

Such were the assurances which Louis Napoleon gave to the French people. We have dwelt upon the subject thus at length for the purpose of showing not only that the nation had every means of making themselves familiar with his political doctrines, but also that he was pledged in the most formal and definite manner to a given line of policy. Early in life he perceived the spell with which the name of his uncle bound the mass of Frenchmen, who had forgotten the disasters of 1815, and he saw how that spell might be turned to his own advantage. He comprehended how, under a system of universal suffrage, the peasantry would be the governing body, and how, if secured in their prosperity, they would always be ready to adhere to a strong executive. He saw, also, that once in possession of an opportunity, with the sole right of the initiative in his hand, there would open before him every possibility of

power. Finally, he had not hesitated to give every possible assurance, and to hold out every possible inducement, in order that the opportunity might be conferred upon him.

It is not our purpose to comment on the events which transferred Louis Napoleon from the president's chair to the imperial throne. That they were the natural outgrowth of Napoleon's political creed, in no way detracts from the perfidious villany of an act to which it would be difficult to find a parallel since the days of Louis XI. It should, however, be borne in mind, that the acceptance by the French nation of Louis Napoleon and his political creed was the practical acceptance of a personal in distinction from a constitutional government. No matter what the details of a plan of government may be, if it gives the sole power of initiative into the hand of a single man, then hedges the people about with executive restraints so that they can never know what the result of a negative vote would be; it is not only a personal government, but a personal government of the worst form. It is of the worst form, because, in addition to all the evils which characterize the general species, it is a deception and a fraud. It is commonplace to say that an evil which is known to be such may be avoided or guarded against, while one that arrays itself in the garb of virtue carries with it a weapon which it is always difficult and sometimes impossible to avoid. It might be said that even political poisons are not very dangerous if they are properly labelled. Perhaps the worst feature of Napoleonism was the very fact, that, while it carried in its essential nature the ready means of violating any law with impunity, it professed that reverence for law as a fixed rule of action, both for governments and for individuals, without which there can be neither liberty nor order. It is probable that neither of the Napoleons would have hesitated to adopt in theory even that ideal devotion to legal authority which the genius of Plato has so beautifully illustrated in his account of the last conversations and death of Socrates; and yet it would be easy to show that in all essential characteristics the Second Empire was a government of men and not of laws, of will and not of reason, of arbitrary and not of limited and legal power.

The favorite argument of the adherents of Napoleon has

been, that, under a system of universal suffrage, it would be impossible for the Emperor to impose upon the nation a system of government that was repugnant to the majority of the people. It has often been asserted that, even admitting what is said about the servility of France in obeying the head of the State, she has done it all with her own free will. After a solemn appeal made to the whole population, she chose Napoleon as her ruler; and "she possesses in the *Corps Législatif* an organ through which her voice may be heard with less chance of being mistaken than even the public voice in the Parliament of England; for there the right of suffrage is restricted to a few, whereas in France it belongs to the whole adult male population." In a word, whenever it has been asserted that the power of Napoleon rested on the bayonet, the reply has been an appeal to the testimony of the ballot-box.

Now the strength of this argument, it will be universally admitted, can be understood only when the character of the ballot-box in France is known. Is the ballot-box, then, a truthful witness? Is the testimony which it gives a reality or a sham? These questions can be answered only by an inspection of such facts as come within reach. If it can be demonstrated that the people have absolute freedom of choice at the elections, the force of the argument will have to be admitted; if, on the contrary, it becomes manifest that the French executive exercises such an influence over the elections as to make a free choice impossible, the position will readily be conceded to have no strength whatever. For our own part, we have no hesitation in declaring it as our belief that the process of elections in France under the Second Empire was nothing less than a gigantic swindle. We believe it to have been a mere device with which to entrap a people into giving their assent to propositions which would not be assented to either by lawful representatives or by electors in the exercise of absolute freedom of choice. We believe it to have been a palpable cheat, which, but for the gravity of its results, would become a laughing-stock in proportion as the facts concerning it came to be known and understood. We believe, moreover, that we could bring before our readers an array of facts which would amply show that the result obtained by the ballot-box under the Second Empire no

more represented the wishes of the people of France than it would if they had been marched up to the poll under military escort, and compelled at the point of the bayonet to vote in accordance with the dictates of the Emperor. A few of these facts, gathered from such works as have recently been published on the Second Empire, it is now our purpose to present.

It will aid us in our estimation of these facts, if we bear in mind one of the important characteristics of government in France as distinguished from government in England or America. In our own country we have of late heard something of executive interference in affairs of a local nature, and yet it must be admitted that the distinctive feature of that liberty of which we boast is entire freedom from such interference, in other words, is self-government. Our numerous municipal and local corporations manage a vast amount of public business with as little interference of the executive as would be possible if that executive did not exist. But the very reverse of this is the case in France. There is a passage in Forsyth's "History of Trial by Jury" which admirably describes the characteristic to which we refer.

"The government there, under whatever form, whether that of Directory, Consulship, Empire, Restoration, Monarchy of the Barricades, Republic, or the Army, which is its present phase, has always been essentially despotic in its character. It has ruled by a system of paid *employés* in immediate dependence upon itself. The provincial functionaries, such as prefects and sub-prefects and mayors of arrondissements, are mere puppets, whose strings are pulled by the executive in Paris. In no country is the system of police surveillance and espionage more thoroughly understood or constantly practised. No public meetings are convened, as in England, to take into consideration the measures of government, and, if necessary, organize a peaceful opposition to them. The people are not, except in the solitary instance of dropping their individual votes into the ballot-box when the period of an election comes round, made parties to the management of their own interests. Hence there is, properly speaking, no public opinion in France, the influence of which can be felt by statesmen, and enable them to forecast the measures which will be best suited for the wants, and most in accordance with the real wishes, of the nation. Hence also results the startling paradox that the French, of all people in the world, are the most impatient of constitutional control, and the most servilely submissive to despotic power." — p. 143.

From the characteristics of the French government so well described, it will be seen that the executive has at hand the means of exerting an influence on the elections such as would be impossible in a country with a government like our own.

We shall now proceed to show the manner in which this influence was exerted, and the extent to which it made itself felt. We shall not speak of the *plébiscite* for the reason that its true character is well enough understood already. Only as an example of irony can that be called an election by which the people are merely asked to say *Yea* or *Nay* to something which has already been established by military force. We shall select examples of a nature calculated to afford absolute freedom of choice, examples which under any free government would present to the people a fair alternative between two or more proposals or between two or more candidates. Our examples will be the vote on the annexation of Nice and Savoy, and the vote at the general election in 1863.

By the treaty of the 24th of March, 1860, it was agreed between France and Italy that Savoy and Nice, "after the population had been consulted," should be ceded to France, and that Tuscany and the Romagna should also, after a similar "consultation," be annexed to Sardinia. By the terms of the treaty the annexation of these respective territories was made no less advantageous to Victor Emmanuel than to Napoleon. With Austria vindictive and powerful, and in a threatening strategical position; with the Pope outraged and desperate, and in control of an army which attached to itself a large share of the fanaticism of Europe,— there was no hope for struggling Italy but in a firmer alliance with France. In this fact alone is to be found an explanation of the willingness of the Sardinian government to part with so considerable a portion of its territory. Reasons enough existed why King and Emperor were equally anxious that the people should vote for annexation.

The fifth article of the Sardinian Constitution provides that "treaties which shall make any alteration in the territories of the State shall not take effect until after they have obtained the consent of the Chamber." In view of this provision, it was manifestly the duty of the government to submit the treaty to the Chamber for ratification before the popular vote should be

taken, inasmuch as it was only by virtue of the treaty that the people would be entitled to vote at all. But there were dangers in this method of procedure which the Sardinian government did not fail to foresee. The project of annexation was not popular in Parliament, — indeed, it was likely to fail. Garibaldi did not hesitate to raise his voice, in season and out of season, against it; and, what was of the greatest importance, as showing the untrammelled desires of the people most affected, *every one of the delegates from Nice and Savoy to Parliament had been elected with the express understanding that they were to protest against such a transfer to another power.* In the short time that allowed of effort, thirteen thousand signatures were obtained to a protest against annexation. In view of these inconvenient facts, it was determined to postpone a ratification by Parliament until a popular vote, unanimous or nearly unanimous, had been secured. It seems to have been of no consequence that the treaty, according to which the vote was to be taken, really had no existence until it was ratified by the Chamber; it was determined to proceed as though it had been ratified, and then to use the advantage gained by this procedure to secure its ratification.

Accordingly, measures were instituted to secure such a popular vote as was desired. First of all, the Sardinian troops were withdrawn, and their places were filled by French garrisons. The opposition of the inhabitants of Nice to becoming French was indicated by the fact that the troops, on first entering the city, were received so roughly that they were obliged to resort to the use of the bayonet. The municipal junta sent a vote of thanks to those members of the English Parliament who had spoken in opposition to French annexation. The French Consul wrote to his government, that, if a French man-of-war did not come to Villa Franca, his own life and that of his family would not be secure. After the said ship arrived, the editor of the newly established French organ, *L'Avenir de Nice*, was besieged in his house, and obliged to rush down to Villa Franca for refuge.

Such were some of the indications of public sentiment at the time when the French garrisons were taking their places. It was evident that the people were not to be easily overawed.

But the efforts of the government had only just begun. Immediately after the occupation of the country by French troops, there was published an order transferring the civil government of the provinces to France. The French provisional governor, Lubonis, made haste to use the power thus placed in his hands for the advantage of his imperial master, and his example was speedily followed by Lachinal. Many of the mayors and local authorities were utterly opposed to the idea of French annexation, and without their co-operation it was felt that a vote of the people in favor of the measure could not be insured. Accordingly the following circular, filled out as might in each case be required, was issued: —

"THE GOVERNOR OF ANNECY.

"Considering that Monsieur ——, mayor of the commune of ——, seems not to have accepted favorably the consequences of the Treaty of the 24th of March last; considering that it is important, under the present circumstances, to have at the head of the administration of each commune men devoted to the new order of things;

"It is decreed, —

"1. Monsieur ——, present mayor of the commune of ——, is dismissed from his functions.

"2. The municipal counsellor —— is charged, until a new order, with the administration of said commune.

"3. The above will be transmitted to Messieurs —— and ——, for their guidance.

(Signed) "LACHINAL, *Governor-Regent.*

"Annecy, April, 1860."

In commenting upon this transfer of civil authority to the sole interests of the Emperor, the French journals gave evidence of abundant zeal. One of them, *Le Bon Sens*, remarked: —

"A very important thing for the success of the great votation to which Savoy is about to be called is to have at the head of each commune a mayor thoroughly devoted to the French annexation, for it is he who should give the impulse and preside at the electoral operations. A mayor who is devoted to Piedmont, or having a Swiss leaning, will be altogether out of place on such an occasion. We learn with pleasure that a great purgation has already taken place in the province of Chambery, of mayors, either hostile or suspected. We ask all sincere

friends of France to keep a sharp look-out upon their communal administration. We do not doubt that the governor of the province of Annecy will be ready, if such is the case, to make use of the full powers with which he is clothed, to replace in each commune all the mayors who will not loyally co-operate in the great cause of our national regeneration."

The military and civil machinery thus in order, the authorities now devoted themselves to the more immediate work of manufacturing the requisite majority. First of all, the public was informed not only that it was prohibited to hold any meetings to discuss the affairs of Nice, but also that no canvassing on the part of those opposed to French annexation would be permitted, and that no placards or circulars would be allowed to be issued by the Italian party. At the same time, documents of various kinds were issued by the officers in authority, appealing to their subordinates and to the people. The provisional governor, Lubonis, issued a proclamation, of which the following is the most important portion: —

"CITIZENS, — All uncertainty with reference to our future has ceased. By the Treaty of the 24th of March, the gallant King Victor Emmanuel has ceded to France Savoy and the arrondissement of Nice. The most powerful motives of political necessity, the exigencies of the future of Italy, the sentiment of gratitude toward his powerful ally, and, finally, the exceptional circumstances of our country, have decided, although with regret, our beloved sovereign to separate the provinces which have been for so many centuries intimately bound up with his dynasty. But the fate of a people does not rest exclusively with the desire of princes. Therefore the magnanimous Emperor Napoleon the Third and the loyal Victor Emmanuel have desired that this Treaty of Cession should be strengthened by the popular adhesion. . . . . All opposition should fall powerless before the interests of the country and the sentiment of duty. Besides, it will find an insurmountable obstacle in the wishes themselves of Victor Emmanuel. . . . . Fellow-citizens, the mission which the King has confided to me is transitory but important. In order to fulfil my task at this extraordinary juncture, I count upon the support of your co-operation, upon your respect for law, and upon the high degree of civilization to which you have raised yourselves. Hasten, therefore, to confirm by your suffrages the reunion of your country to France. In making ourselves the echo of the intentions of the King, let us unfurl the banner of that noble and great nation which

has always excited our lively sympathies. Let us rally round the throne of the glorious Emperor Napoleon the Third. Let us surround it with the same fidelity, so especial to our country, which we have always preserved to this day to Victor Emmanuel. As for this august Prince, let us retain among us the worship of bygone memories, and let us raise earnest prayers for his new and brilliant destiny. To the great Napoleon the Third, whose powerful and firm will is to open a new era of prosperity for our country, our inflexible fidelity, as well as our respectful devotion, will now commence.

"Vive la France!

"Vive L'Empereur Napoleon III.!

"*Le Gouverneur Provisionnel*, LUBONIS."

A proclamation similar to this of Lubonis was issued by Malaussena, Mayor of Nice; and finally, as if to crown all, the Bishop came forward in the same interest, appealing to all loyal members of the Church to vote for annexation. Nor, indeed, was this all. The French Committee sent to all the officials a circular bearing the government seal, and appealing for support to all the authorities in town and country. Referring to the advantages to be derived from annexation, the Committee used these words: —

"We are convinced that the imperial government will recompense the people for the unanimity of their vote, and will proportion the reward according to the good disposition manifested by them. Without enumerating here the immense and incontestable advantages of every kind which our country would derive from its annexation to the great French Empire, we consider it our duty to address ourselves to all our friends and correspondents, not only to stimulate their zeal in favor of the common cause, and to engage them to use all their influence in order to insure the success of the vote in the French interest, but also that they may carefully watch and point out to us the steps that have been taken in a contrary interest by those in opposition, in order that the necessary measures may be taken to neutralize the influences which are hostile to the interests of the country. Will you have the goodness, M. ——, to acknowledge the receipt of this, and to make known to us the spirit of your population, and that of the local authorities?"

The "necessary measures" to which the committee alluded were amply provided for. A sum of money had been placed at their disposal by the French government; and of this it is

stated on good authority that 3,000,000 francs were used in the direct work of bribery, exclusive of the expenses of the government on the day of voting. Drinking booths and *cafés* were erected especially for the purpose by the officials, and a tri-colored cockade or a voting ticket with "*oui*" upon it entitled the bearer to the gratuitous enjoyment of all their privileges.

Another device which appealed to the religious zeal of the people was that of blessing the standards of the imperial party. This official blessing of the French flags was calculated to work an immense effect upon the ignorant and somewhat superstitious population. The authorization ran in this way: —

"MM. les Commissaires will distribute the flags which MM. les Curés are authorized, and indeed invited, to bless. These standards will be in this case presented by the Commune, at the head of the inhabitants, to MM. les Curés, who will receive them at the entry of the church. Finally, you will understand the importance which I attach to this last recommendation. You will take care that official proclamations, manifestoes, and notices are preserved intact. All appeals to the passions — any notice whatever affixed without the required authorization — will be immediately torn down."

Side by side with this was posted the following official manifesto: —

"The Mayor of Bonneville notifies that the Communal Council will assist at the benediction of the flags which the Imperial Government has presented to the Commune; that this religious ceremony will take place on Sunday, the 22nd, at seven o'clock, A. M.; that the *cortège* will leave the Hotel de Ville to go to the church. All electors are invited to this ceremony, which will immediately precede the opening of the voting-urns. In the morning the Hotel de Ville will be decorated with the French flags and the national colors. All the inhabitants are invited to decorate their houses with flags of the same colors.

"The Imperial Government has made its *début* by a signal benefit in giving us the customs *zone*, which has hitherto been refused. It assures to us the prosperity of the country. Its generosity will not end here. French engineers have explored the province, have begun to study the banks of the rivers, the state of the roads, and the public works most useful to the country. The numerous mines of Faucigny will be worked, the condition of our *collége* will be improved. Let us

show our gratitude to the Emperor. Let us give a free course to our sympathies, so long restrained, and prove by a compact and unanimous vote that we are as much French as our fathers were.

"Vive l'Empereur!

"Vive la France!

(Signed) "DUFOUR, *Mayor*."

As the day of voting approached, the Central Committee issued the following circular: —

"SIR, — The Central Annexationist Committee, upon whose proceedings no restrictions were placed, has named you member of the Special Committee for the parish of ——. You will have the goodness, sir, to concert with your colleagues, Messrs. ——, measures which may unite and bring to the poll on Sunday next the greatest possible number of electors, and take any steps which appear expedient, *in order that the vote of the population may be at the same time a striking manifestation of its sentiments towards France and towards the Emperor*."

In addition to all the other pressure, the local police authorities openly declared that lists of the *proscrits* would be made out, and that those who abstained from voting would be punished as soon as they became French subjects. The same authorities received orders from head-quarters at Nice to collect the peasants on the day of voting and march them into town, with drums beating, and French flags floating at their head. An Englishman, who was at Nice at the time of the election, thus describes what he saw: —

"The first object which met my view, as I entered Nice on the morning of the 15th, was a procession of country people marching into town. At the head of the procession was a fat *curé*, arm-in-arm with the village syndic and another functionary; behind were thirty or forty rustics, some of them extremely drunk, although early in the morning, carrying flags, beating drums, and cheering in a maudlin, irregular manner. The streets were crowded with persons wearing tri-colored cockades and carrying the *oui* voting-ticket in their hats. French soldiers, of whom there was a plentiful sprinkling, mingled freely with the crowd, although one battalion had been marched to Villa Franca, to give the authorities an opportunity of saying that, in order not to influence the vote, part of the French troops had left the town. The urns were placed in the National College, and thither I repaired to

watch the process of voting. The people crowded in and voted with scarcely a challenge; lists of those registered were posted up outside; but at first the votes were given too rapidly to enable the scrutineers to exercise any check. The *oui* ticket was distributed freely in the streets; men stood at the corners as if they were advertising quack medicines, and gave you any number of "*ouis*," but I endeavored both in the shops and in the streets to procure a "*non*" without success. One boor I saw just about to vote two tickets. I asked him if such was his intention, and he naively answered, 'Why not?' 'O,' I said, 'it won't be fair; give me one,' — which he most good-naturedly did at once. Another man to whom I spoke told me that he was strongly opposed to becoming French, — that he had two sons in the Sardinian service, one in the army and the other in the navy, that he himself was a poor boatman, and that he had voted *oui* against his inclination, because the police had told him that if he did not he would be imprisoned, — that the King whom he loved wanted it, — that England and all the powers wanted it, — and that as for his voting in the opposite sense he would simply get himself into a scrape and do no good. But he said promptly, 'I have neither cheered, nor will I wear a cockade.' As all the scrutineers were the nominees of Pietri (the French Agent of Police), and as they held the keys of the urns, there was, of course, no security against any number of *oui* tickets being put into them in private."

The same witness wrote subsequently from Bonneville, where he happened to be on the day of the voting in Savoy: —

"On the morning of the 22d I found myself once more at Bonneville in Faucigny; but a considerable change had taken place in the aspect of affairs since I had left it less than a month before. From every house, and almost every window of every house, waved French flags. The hotel, which had formerly been the head-quarters of the anti-French party, and where I had dined with the members of the Committee, was tricked out in all the splendors of red, white, and blue. The bookseller's shop, where I had heard sentiments strongly hostile to France, now displayed a gigantic banner; but, more remarkable than all, the house of the candidate who had contested Bonneville three weeks before on the Swiss interest, as opposed to the French, was now decorated with French flags. My old friends were nowhere to be found; the Committee had evaporated, and throughout the town where party feeling had recently run so high, and anti-French annexation was rampant and openly expressed, there was not a syllable to be heard against it. A little shopkeeper, whom I knew formerly as a

furious anti-Frenchman, was now with difficulty dug out of his back-shop, and owned to having just voted in favor of France as an act of self-preservation. 'What could I do?' said he; 'the concierge de la ville brought me two tickets this morning, with a message from the intendant that if I did n't vote them it would be the worse for me. He also asked where my French flag was, and advised me, if I valued my liberty, to show one without delay. There is the flag, and here is the other voting-ticket; a similar one I have just voted, but this I present to you.'

'BULLETIN DE VOTATION.

La Savoie veut-elle être réunie à la France?

Oui et Zone.'

"My informant went on to tell me that every voter had received his ticket from the police authorities, and he smiled when I asked him where I could procure a *non* ticket. 'No printing-house here would venture to print one,' he said; 'you would have to get them from Geneva.' The addition of the word '*Zone*' struck me as curious, and I asked the object of its insertion in the voting-ticket. The device was ingenious. The authorities, fearing that though the people had not the courage to vote *non* they might be bold enough to abstain from voting at all, gave it to be understood that such a course would not prevent their being annexed, but that they would thereby lose their commercial zone or free frontier with Switzerland, upon which their future prosperity would depend; in other words, by voting they would be annexed and get their zone, — by abstaining they would be equally annexed, but ruined. By a recent French circular I perceive it stated that the desire of the Emperor to carry out the conditions of neutrality, as laid down in the ninety-second article of the Treaty, has induced him to grant the Zone. It was originally invented as an election 'dodge,' and served its purpose admirably, being used either as a bribe or as a threat."

Such were the means by which the hostility of Nice and Savoy to French annexation was converted into an almost unanimous declaration in its favor. Under any circumstances whatever such a spectacle of organized trickery would be a painful thing to contemplate. It is possible to imagine a situation in which the ruler of the nation, for political reasons, might submit a question that had already been decided to the ratification of his people with no other evil result than that which might chance to be inflicted upon the people themselves. But in the case of Savoy and Nice there was an element in the transaction which made it an outrage upon the liberal senti-

ment of Europe and of the world. We refer to the repeated declarations that the votation would be perfectly *free*. The first article of the treaty declared that "it is understood between their Majesties that this re-union shall be effected without any constraint upon the will of the people, and that the government of the King of Sardinia and that of the Emperor of the French will agree as soon as possible upon the best means of arriving at and of confirming the manifestation of this will." Not long after the Treaty was formed, a deputation from Nice waited upon Victor Emmanuel, when he assured them "that he had stipulated as a condition of this cession a votation free from any external pressure, and promised that, if a military occupation took place, or if the condition was violated in any manner, he would protest"; and again, in the proclamation by which he released his subjects in Nice and Savoy from their allegiance, he gave them this assurance: "Under no circumstances will this great change in your destiny be imposed upon you; it must be the result of your free consent. Such is my firm determination; such also is the intention of the Emperor of the French." Finally, in the Chamber of Deputies, when the vigorous protest of Garibaldi seemed likely to put an end to the whole transaction, confidence was restored only when Count Cavour assured the deputies that "the vote should be absolutely free" (pienamente libero). And yet, in view of all these most solemn assurances, what have we seen? Italian troops removed and French troops put in their places; all the important civil offices filled with Frenchmen, or men committed to the support of the French cause; official circulars and placards advocating annexation scattered everywhere, while no publication of an opposing sentiment was anywhere allowed; ballot-boxes in exclusive control of French officers; ballots in favor of annexation distributed everywhere by the police, while ballots opposed to annexation could be procured only by sending to Geneva; priests blessing the flags presented by the Emperor, and appealing to the consciences of their people in behalf of France; money, as well as general free living and drinking, furnished by the imperial agents; and, finally, the people, with French music sounding and French banners flying, marched up *en masse* to the ballot-box, with priest and mayor arm-in-arm at their head.

Such was the boasted *free vote* with the sanction and help of which Nice and Savoy were annexed to France.

We come now to the consideration of our second example.

Under the *régime* of the Second Empire there was no way of imposing any restraint upon the will of the Emperor, excepting by means of the *Corps Legislatif*. As the senators and the counsellors of State were appointed by the crown, they could in no way be regarded as in any sense representatives of the people, — they were rather representatives of the Emperor himself. The possibility of frustrating the imperial will, that is to say, the possibility of preventing a pure absolutism, depended solely, therefore, upon the character of the representative body; the character of that body depended upon the political intelligence of the people and the freedom of the election. If it can be shown that the elections were not substantially free, it will be unnecessary to ask whether the masses of the people do or do not possess an unusual amount of political intelligence. If there is no opportunity on the part of the people for a free exercise of the political intelligence they may possess, it is not too much to say that, for political purposes, such intelligence is of no consequence whatever. We think it will not be difficult to convince our readers that the general elections in France were no more free than was the election in Nice and Savoy; no question, therefore, concerning the intelligence of the electors is relevant, excepting, perhaps, so far as is necessary to show how the farce of the elections was continuously possible.

It is difficult for us in America to comprehend the ignorance of a large portion of the rural population. To get an adequate notion of it, one should read the "Madame Bovary" of M. Flaubert. On the same subject there is ample food for meditation in the small work of M. Taine, the title of which is at the head of this article. We must be content to make a few extracts.

"En France, sur cent personnes du sexe masculin, il y a trente-neuf illettrées, c'est à dire ne sachant pas lire ou ne sachant pas écrire. Comme ces illettrées appartiennent presque tous à la population rurale, cela fait dans cette population trente-neuf illettrées sur soixante-dix. Ainsi, l'on ne se trompe pas de beaucoup si l'on estime à sept sur quatorze, à la moitié du total, le nombre des électeurs ruraux

qui n'ont pas les premiers rudiments de l' instruction la plus élémentaire. Voila déjà un indice d'après lequel on peut apprécier leur intelligence politique. Il m'est souvent arrivé de causer avec eux sur les affaires publiques. À quinze lieues de Paris, tel, cultivateur et petit propriétaire, ne savait pas ce que c'est le budget; quand je lui disais que l'argent versé chez le percepteur entre dans une caisse à Paris pour payer l'armée, les juges, et le reste, qu'on tient registre de tous les recettes et dépenses, il ouvrait de grands yeux; il avait l'air de faire une découverte. Après les premiers emprunts du second Empire, un fermier normand disait à un de mes amis, orléaniste: 'Ce n'est pas votre *gueux de Louis-Philippe* qui nous aurait donné de la rente à soixante-sept francs.' Après le coup-d'État, des cultivateurs me répétaient dans les Ardennes: '*Louis-Napoléon est très-riche, c'est lui qui va payer le gouvernement; il n'y aura plus d'impôts.*' Je viens de lire la correspondance de vingt-cinq à trente préfets de 1814 à 1830; l'ignorance et la crédulité des populations rurales sont étonnantes. Au moment de l'expédition d'Espagne, des maires viennent demander au préfet du Loiret s'il est vrai que les alliés vont traverser le pays pour aller en Espagne et laisser en France une nouvelle armée d'occupation. *Pendant plusieurs années, dans plusieurs départements, au mois de mars, on croit fermement que Napoléon arrive à Brest avec quatre-cent-mille Américains, ou à Toulon avec quatre-cent-mille Turcs.*" — (p. 16 *et seq.*)

In regard to the intelligence of the people concerning the matters on which they are voting, the same author relates the following: —

"Là-dessus, dans les deux ou trois élections qui ont précédé la chute du second Empire, nous avons eu par les enquêtes des révélations étranges. Un témoin disait: 'J'avais les deux billets dans ma poche; mais, ma foi! bonnet blanc, blanc bonnet, c'était pour moi la même chose, et j'ai pris le premier venu.' Un autre, à peu de distance de Paris, répondait à un de mes amis: 'Je ne connaissais ni l'un ni l'autre; alors, des deux, j'ai pris le bulletin qui m'allait le mieux à l'œil.' C'était la forme des lettres qui l'avait décidé. *Un troisième veut savoir quel est le bon bulletin; on le lui dit, il va le mettre dans l'urne; le lendemain, on lui demande ce qu'il a fait de l'autre.* 'Oh! je l'ai donné à Pierre, qui est un mauvais gars; il a voté avec. C'est bien fait, il le mérite.'" — (p. 33.)

If it is difficult for an American to understand the political ignorance of the masses of the French peasantry, it is scarcely less so for him to comprehend the extreme centralization of

the government. M. Delord has compared it with a polyp having a countless number of tentacles: —

"The administrative tentacle," says he, "begins with the prefect and ends with the cantonnier; the judicial tentacle extends from the attorney-general and the chief-justice to the village constable and the justice of the peace; the financial tentacle reaches from the secretary of the treasury to the collector of fines. Without mentioning a host of other similitudes, there are without number licenses, customs, imposts, commissioners of roads and bridges, with which the polyp enlaces the candidate, strangles him, and suffocates him; centralization is also an intelligent machine, complicated, and marvellously obedient to the hand that directs it. There is not a single function pertaining to government, even most remotely, which cannot be included within its gearing: notaries, attorneys, bailiffs, clerks, are all embraced. Centralization, if it cannot obtain from all these a formal and hearty support, imposes upon them at least neutrality."

In other words, if, in our own country, the governors of the States, the judges of all the courts, the sheriffs, the police officers, the county commissioners, the mayors of the cities, the appraisers, the collectors of taxes and tolls, the officers and conductors of railroads, were all appointed by the government at Washington, and were responsible to that government alone, we should have in form, if not in spirit, something like the centralization which prevailed in France. Nor, indeed, was this all. M. Delord assures his readers that the police officers, as the more immediate agents of the executive, were specially "charged to stimulate the zeal of the local authorities. They were not content to enter into the house of the peasant; they penetrated into the deliberative assembly of the municipal council, and openly reproached its members if their zeal appeared to decline. The commissioner of police acted upon the people by a kind of terror. An elector of the opposition was traversing a village on the Gironde between two gendarmes, and the commissioner of police cried out: 'There is a partisan of M. Decazes; that is the way we treat them.'"

The illustrations which we are about to present are all furnished by the general election in 1863. We have chosen this, not because it differed in any essential feature from the other contests of a kindred nature which took place under the Second

Empire, but for the reason that the campaign was conducted on the part of the opposition with more spirit than any other, and that consequently it reveals the electoral system of the country in the strongest and clearest light. Our facts are chiefly gathered from the third volume of Delord's *Histoire du Second Empire*, and from *La Lutte Électorale en* 1863, par M. Jules Ferry.

As usual, the imperial manifesto which announced the coming election declared that it would be *free*. The prefects were called upon to address themselves only to the reason of the electors. In addressing these functionaries, M. De Persigny said: "Designate publicly, as in the preceding elections, the candidates which inspire the government with the most confidence. Let the people know who are the friends and who the enemies of the Empire; and let them have full liberty to decide as they choose, but with a full understanding of the cause."

For a government which itself presents and supports a list of candidates, such an announcement would not seem to be unnatural or illogical; but the objectionable features of the method become glaringly apparent when we learn that the government not only gave to the people what it called "a full understanding of the cause," but also that it threatened to withdraw all patronage from those who did not accept its conclusions. It was officially announced by Persigny himself that his Majesty "could not allow about the electors any but men devoted actively, and without mental reservation, to the imperial dynasty." * Thus in the very beginning of the campaign every official was publicly informed that his continuance in office depended upon his devotion to the interests of the official candidates. In view of these announcements, and in view of that system of centralization which brought everything within imperial reach, the people did not fail to see that it was of the greatest importance to have candidates nominated by the government who should be the least unacceptable to themselves. Accordingly, in some instances peti-

* "Il ne peut appuyer auprès des électeurs que des hommes dévoués sans réserve et sans arrière-pensée à la dynastie impériale et à nos institutions."

tions were sent to the government, asking for the nomination of certain persons, a method of procedure which in itself was a complete abdication of all the principles of a free election. As early as August, 1862, *L'Echo de Vesoul* contained a petition, in which the electors of that district prayed the Minister of the Interior to have the goodness to designate for their suffrages the candidature of M. De la Valette. In any country where elections are free, the natural method, of course, would have been for the electors to have nominated their favorite, and then to have elected him; but in France the people know well that if the administration should not approve of their choice, they would have to enter into a struggle which promised nothing but defeat.

At the same time, when the candidates were announced by the prefects of the various departments, it was declared that no public discussion of the merits of the respective candidates would be allowed. The following extract from a discourse addressed to the electors of the *Haute-Loire* by the prefect of that department will serve as an example of the way in which all free choice of candidates and all discussion of their merits were prevented: —

"Under the last government, the electors, to supply the place of a general direction, which then they did not have, contrived preliminary meetings, where the candidates declared their principles and submitted themselves to the choice of the people for nomination or rejection. The administration to-day fills, so to speak, the office of the preliminary meetings. We, the administrators, disinterested in the question, and representing only your collective interests, examine, appreciate, and judge of the candidates who are presented. After a full investigation (*mûr examen*), with the sanction of the government, we present to you the one who unites in himself the most sympathies, not as the result of our will, and still less of a caprice, but as the proper expression of your suffrages, and the result of your sympathies."

Numerous citations like this might be given to show how completely the official candidates were the representatives of the Emperor. In all cases the Emperor chose the prefect, and the prefect, after conferring with the Emperor, nominated the candidate. To call the deputies who reached the *Corps Législatif* by such means representatives of the people is sheer

absurdity. It is not so difficult to understand how Napoleon was willing to resort to such a system of duplicity, as it is to comprehend how an enlightened nation failed to be shocked and outraged by its application.

No sooner were the candidates in the field than the contest began. The overwhelming odds in favor of the official candidates now began to be seen. With free speech and a free press, the candidates of the people could at least have made a vigorous struggle; but with both of these agents taken away they are literally bound and gagged. Writing of this very election, M. Delord assures us that "the journals of the opposition had been killed almost everywhere, and there remained (in each prefecture) only such as were sustained by the government by means of secret subsidies and the judicial announcements." * As has been already shown, the general government at the very outset had prohibited meetings for the discussion of political topics. There remained, therefore, for the non-official candidates, none of the ordinary methods of publishing their views. They had sole recourse to the mails and to placards; and even these methods were constantly interfered with. The prefect, if he deemed it necessary, did not shrink from interfering with the ordinary functions of the post in order to rob it of any hostile material. Just before the election, the suburbs of Grenoble, containing twenty-five thousand inhabitants, were deprived of all postal communication during twenty-four hours, for the sole purpose of allowing a vigorous and concerted attack to be made upon the opposition candidate at a moment when it was impossible for him to defend himself. Scarcely was an opposition candidate an-

* "The *Événement* appeared yesterday before the court of assize of the Seine presided over by M. Perrot de Chezelles. The *Événement* was suspended. The responsible editor was condemned to nine months' imprisonment, and 3,000 francs fine. The author of the article, M. F. Victor Hugo, was condemned to 2,000 francs fine, and nine months' imprisonment. The *Événement* will have four of its editors in prison. Where will the government stop in this path? It will not stop, — it cannot. The *Réforme* has been condemned; the *Peuple* has been condemned; the *Vote Universel* has been condemned; the *Presse* has been condemned; the *Siècle* has been condemned; the *République* has been condemned; the *Assemblée National* only escaped condemnation by submission. And then came the turn of the *National*, of the *Ordre*, of the *Gazette de France*, of the *Journal des Débats*, and of the *Union*." Quoted from the *Presse* by Forsyth, "History of Trial by Jury," p. 361.

nounced when the attacks of the official organs began. If he happened to reside in the district which he hoped to represent, both he and his family were placed under a surveillance which made their sojourn sometimes impossible. They were attacked with a bitter ferocity by the official journals of the locality. The candidate naturally felt the need of replying, and accordingly sought for a printer. If there happened to be two presses in the place, one of them was generally under the patronage of the prefect, and the other under that of the bishop. If by a rare chance one was found who claimed to be independent of these functionaries, he was still obliged to acknowledge his subordination to the laws for the control of the press, — laws by which his office could be closed at any moment. But suppose, as it sometimes happened, that the candidate, by dint of management and the free use of money, surmounted all these obstacles. Three methods of distributing his documents were open to him. They could be committed to the mails; they could be distributed by hand in the street and at the places of resort; they could be put up as placards. Suppose that the candidate intrusts his fortunes to the post-office. One of two things was likely to happen. Either the mass of his circulars found their way into the sewers, or, if they reached their destination, each one was accompanied with an official rejoinder.* But suppose the candidate determines to rely chiefly or solely upon placards. In every French village the bill-poster is an official who depends upon the authorities for his position; it therefore requires more than ordinary courage in an *afficheur* to lead him to post the *affiche* of the independent candidate by the side of that of his opponent. Both in 1859 and 1863 it happened that candidates were reduced to the actual necessity of arming themselves with pincers and paste-pot, and putting up their own placards.

M. Clapier, a candidate in les Bouches-du-Rhone, with

* That this is no exaggeration will appear from the following: "On n'entendait parler de tous côtés dans les temps d'élection que de bulletins en retard, de circulaires égarées, voire, même d'écrits électoraux jetés dans les égouts. Les paquets arrivaient quelquefois, mais, par un prodige singulier, entre chaque circulaire du candidat indépendent s'était glissée une circulaire du candidat officiel, et entre chaque bulletin libre une bulletin estampillé." — Delord, III. 407.

some faithful adherents, spent the greater part of a night in flitting along the walls and dark corners of the city, and sticking up posters with their own hands. Imagine his estimate of the *freedom* of elections in France, when the next morning he found his bills covered with those of the Emperor. One candidate, M. Aristide Dumont, of Noyen, more bold than the others, ventured to complain to the authorities when he found that his posters were destroyed as fast as he could put them up. His zeal subsided, however, when he was informed that, although there was indeed a law against the mutilation of posters, all complaints for violation of that law must be made by the administration. Thus it turned out that whether a man could be punished for destroying a placard depended upon the action of an imperial officer, and whether that officer would act depended upon the nature of the placard destroyed.

But there was one other method open to the candidate, namely, the distribution of documents at the hands of his personal friends. This service, however, required something of the spirit of a hero and a martyr. The distributers were constantly assailed by the jeers and the threats, and sometimes even by the blows, of the officials. Commissioners, mayors, gendarmes, *gardes champêtres*, and *gardes des cantonni res* beset them at all points, and any considerable success was impossible. There are a number of authenticated instances where persons caught in this service were seized, and deprived of their liberty until after the election.

While these difficulties were besetting the non-official candidates, the candidates of the government held undisturbed possession of the field. Their posters everywhere decorated the walls of buildings, the trunks of trees, and the sign-posts at the cross-roads. The mails did for them faithful service, and the telegraph, which could never with safety be used by the opposition, was their ready and faithful messenger. The candidates themselves travelled from place to place in state, supported and protected by a retinue of officials. These latter never hesitated to take any advantage of their peculiar positions in order to accomplish their purposes. Even the inspectors of schools required of teachers not simply a passive but an active

support of the official candidates.* So much for what may be called the machinery of the campaign; let us now look at the means by which it was operated.

Under the system of centralization of which we have already spoken, all the public authority of a given district was under the control and direction of the prefect. M. Delord assures us that even the justice of the peace was his docile servant. If an elector originated or circulated any report injurious to the official candidate, the commissioner of police was directed to cause his arrest, and he was at once imprisoned. In such cases it was not even claimed that false charges were made; it was enough that they were injurious, — *une propagande gênante* being the usual expression. In vain did the non-official candidate offer bail for the good conduct and the appearance at trial of the accused; the prisoner was held until after the election, when he was generally dismissed without trial. In one instance, where the accused was no less a person than the municipal counsellor of Sainte-Foix, the prisoner was released on satisfactory assurance that he would leave the commune and would not return until after the result of the election should have been declared.

The mayors of the cities were no less zealous than the justices of the peace. The manner in which they were expected to perform their duties may be judged of by the mandate of the prefect of La Manche, which is given merely as a sample of its kind. "Gentlemen," said he to the mayors of his province, "if you do not expect to vote for the official candidate, resign your scarf the day before the election, in order that it may not be taken away from you the day after." Perhaps the threat was hardly needed; at any rate there was no hesitation on the part of the mayors in making themselves the most

* Numerous examples in support of this statement might be given. The Inspector of the Académie de la Côte d'Or wrote to the teachers: "Combattre les candidatures administratives, c'est combattre l'Empereur lui-même. En adopter et en patronier d'autres, c'est également servir et recruiter contre lui. *Ne pas les combattre, mais aussi ne pas les soutenir, c'est l'abandonner, c'est rester l'arme au pied dans la bataille. Votre indifférence me causerait de la surprise et du regret, votre hostilité serait à mes yeux une lâcheté coupable et sans excuse.*" The Inspector of the Académie des Vosges wrote to the teachers under his supervision in a similar strain. *Vide* Delord, II. p. 409.

active agents of the official candidates. The mayor of Ouistreham appealed to his people in these terms: "Inhabitants of Ouistreham, agents more or less paid boast of being able to make you vote against the candidate of the government. I know your spirit too well to believe that you will allow yourselves to be influenced by any means whatever. Here you have only one sincere friend, and that is I! And when I say to you: Vote for M. Bertrand, it is because this vote is in your dearest interests!!!" The mayor of Jonvelle warned the electors of his precinct that the opposition candidate, M. D'Andelarre was "the protector of the party of the nobility and the clergy; the party which wished to see again such times as those seen when our grandfathers were obliged in turn to beat the water and impose silence upon the frogs in order that the sleep of this or that marquis, or this or that prior, might not be disturbed." "Electors, know that in voting for M. Galmiche you vote for yourselves, for your honor, for progress, for the Emperor who loves you; love him also. Vive la France régénérée! Vive l'Empereur!" The mayor of Kermaria even mounted the pulpit on Sunday, in the place of the *curé*, and preached in favor of the official candidate. Illustrations might be multiplied, but it is perhaps unnecessary. In all parts of France, as might be shown by examples in abundance, the mayors brought the full weight of their official position to bear upon the result. The full significance of this interference with the free expression of the will of the people will be understood only as it is remembered that the mayors in France were not elected by the people, but were appointed by the Emperor. Moreover, it must be kept in mind that the authority of the mayor over the voters of his district was in many respects similar to the authority of a custom-house officer in the United States over his subordinates. Both are officers of the general government, and both have the power to make the interests of their official inferiors depend upon the nature of their votes. If this comparison should seem to any one to be unjust to the French, we have only, in reply to any accusation of such a nature, to refer to the array of threats and promises given in the pages of MM. Ferry and Delord.

But the work of the mayors did not stop with threats and

promises. They betook themselves everywhere to the polling-booths, in order to exercise an active *surveillance* over the work of voting. To a foreigner who simply reads the law it would seem that ample provision had been made for the protection of the voter. It was specifically required that the election should be by *secret* ballot, — a fact which would seem to be sufficient guaranty that the elector would be insured in the privilege of voting as he wished; and yet it was found to be not difficult to evade the provisions of the statute. It was necessary that those who had promised and threatened should have some means of knowing positively whether a given elector would be entitled to the promised reward, or whether, on the contrary, he would be deserving of the threatened punishment. To accomplish this end, various devices were resorted to, any one of which would raise an irresistible outcry of indignation in any free country. A common method was to post along the approach to the ballot-box a double line of military and civil officers, each one of whom was commissioned to examine the ballot, and in case of need to exchange the non-official for the official.* In other places the official ballots were printed upon paper which was easily recognized.† The law that the voting should be secret was interpreted to mean that the ballot should not be opened or scrutinized by those in official charge of the election; accordingly there was no protection for the elector against the interference of the mayor and those other dignitaries who had no such official connection. Even when those in charge of the boxes performed their duty faithfully, of what consequence was it after the elector had already been robbed of his non-official vote,

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* "Les électeurs de la campagne, pour se rendre dans la salle du scrutin, sont obligés de traverser une sorte de couloir où secrétaire de la mairie, officiers de pompiers, brigadiers de gendarmerie, fourriers de ville, gardes champêtres, cantonniers, sont en permanence et demandent à chaque électeur son bulletin, qu'ils remplacent par le bulletin du candidat officiel si celui qu'ils ont porte le nom du candidat de l'opposition." — Delord, III. 416.

† "Quelques-uns auraient bien envie de voter pour l'opposition en s'en rapportant au secret du vote guaranti par la loi, mais le candidat du gouvernement a écrit son nom sur du papier transparent, et pour plus de précaution, le maire a envoyé aux électeurs dont il se méfie le bulletin officiel piqué ou collé sur leur carte d'électeur." — Delord, III. 416.

and forced to appear before them with the government ballot only? There is the best of authority for affirming that in many instances the mayors not only seized and destroyed non-official ballots, but that they also declared that whatever the number of votes procured by the candidate of the opposition, the government candidate would be elected.* It is further to be said that the law requires the ballot-boxes to be sealed, a requirement which it would not seem very difficult to fulfil; and yet we are gravely assured that the means for carrying out this law were in many of the communes so incomplete that the votes were actually cast sometimes into a hat, sometimes into a soup or salad bowl, and sometimes even into the mayor's pocket, held open for that purpose by the mayor himself and by an assistant.†

It would be easy to multiply examples similar to those which we have already given, but out of consideration for the patience of our readers we desist. We should not, indeed, have prolonged the subject so far as we have already done but for the necessity of bringing forward actual proofs of the pressure which was so constantly and so successfully used. Nothing but a presentation of facts is a sufficient answer to the arguments of those who found their approval of Napoleon III. on the belief that from first to last he enjoyed the unswerving support of his people. It is our unalterable belief that a support gained in the manner which we have attempted to show is far worse for a nation than any open and honest opposition to its government can be. It is making use of popular institutions as a mask behind which to hide a system of oppression

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* "Un grand nombre de maires ouvrent les bulletins et déchirent ceux de l'opposition, affirmant, d'ailleurs, que quelque soit le nombre de suffrages obtenu par le candidat de l'opposition, le candidat du gouvernement sera élu, et, comme pour donner plus de poids à leur affirmation, ils offrent de parier cent contre un que les choses se passeront ainsi." — Delord, III. 417.

† The statement of M. Delord (III. 417) on this subject is so curious that we cannot but quote it. He says: "L'apposition des scellés sur la bôite du scrutin ne préoccupait guère ces fonctionnaires. Ils laissaient au brigadier de gendarmerie ou un maître d'école le soin de se conformer à cette prescription de la loi, assez difficile, du reste, à remplir avec un matériel électoral tellement incomplet que *dans un grand nombre de communes on votait soit dans un chapeau, soit dans un saladier, soit dans une soupière, et, à défaut de ces récipients, dans la poche du maire tenue entrebâillée* par lui et par l'adjoint ou par le garde champêtre."

and tyranny; it is prostituting the cause of freedom, and making it subordinate to the ends of despotism. If a people are to be made political slaves, let them at least be spared the mockery of sham liberty, lest they bring all liberty into discredit, and all free institutions into contempt. It may be that an imperial government is the best government for France (though we do not believe that such is the case); it is certain that so long as moral principles apply to the welfare of nations as they do to the welfare of men, any government founded and sustained by such a system of *duperie*, to use the forcible word of Taine, as was that of Napoléon III. will end in weakness and ruin. What Shelley said of men as a possibility may be said of governments as a certainty; and for the reason that with governments the end of all things is in this life:—

> . . . . He who gains by base and armed wrong,
> Or guilty fraud, or base compliances,
> May be despoiled; even as a stolen dress
> Is stript from a convicted thief, and he
> Left in the nakedness of infamy.

But even this is not all. Not only is the government overthrown, but the political life of the nation is paralyzed. "Nous n'avons pas de vie publique en France," wrote M. Taine, two years after the fall of Paris; and the explanation of the truth is in the fact that the public has been so often duped and deceived by the government that it no longer cares what the government is. That the nation is not yet cured of its political ills the world had startling evidence the other day, when M. Gambetta produced in the Assembly the circular of the Minister of the Interior, asking the *préfets* for the names of such political journals as were capable of becoming friendly to the government. The incident affords new proof of the truth of Virgil's declaration:—

> Facilis descensus Averni;
> Noctes atque dies patet atri janua Ditis,
> Sed revocare gradum superasque evadere ad auras
> Hoc opus, hic labor est.

CHARLES KENDALL ADAMS.

Art. IV. — Our Electoral Machinery.

It is a curiosity of our electoral machinery, that while it still continues in active operation, and is working apparently as well as ever, it yet gauges the total departure that has been made from the political conditions for which it was originally devised. In nearly every respect its use is different from that which was intended. The framers of the Constitution thought that in the electoral college they had provided a carefully selected deliberative body, near enough to the people to feel public sentiment, and yet sufficiently removed to express with entire independence the national judgment, and who should thus choose the President and Vice-President of the United States "without fear, favor, or affection," to use Jefferson's words in another relation. Instead of this, we merely have the electors as so many expressions of the Presidential votes cast by their respective States, of no more personal independence, of no more political vitality, in fact, than the paper upon which their names are written; for eighty years' experience has not furnished a single instance of a Presidential elector casting his vote otherwise than as the organ of the party which procured his nomination. Here is a case, certainly, where the Fathers of the Republic, so accurate in their perceptions of the national wants in most respects, and so almost prophetic in their discernment of the national future in its essential drift, missed the mark entirely. Their mistake, however, has fared in practice not unlike "Lord Timothy Dexter's" venture of sending a cargo of warming-pans to the West Indies, where, with the covers wrenched off, those Northern utensils were found to work admirably as scoops for use at the sugar-mills. Still better scoops could undoubtedly have been made expressly for the business; and so in regard to our electoral machinery, time and again, — indeed, after every Presidential election, — agitation has sprung up in favor of substituting some other arrangement which shall be both more simple and safe, and at the same time more equitable and effectual, — a problem which, like so many others, it has been found easier to state than to solve.

The first point of consideration relates to the real objections resting against the present mode of choosing Presidents and Vice-Presidents. Generally, whenever this subject comes under consideration, there is pointed out a formidable list of faults, each one of which is assumed to be sufficient, if abetted by suitable and not improbable circumstances, to plunge the country into all the horrors of civil war. Forty-five years ago the Hon. Mr. McDuffie, of South Carolina, in the course of that speech in favor of the district system of choosing Presidential electors which was luridly lighted up by the celebrated passage on political corruption, so well known to our school-boys on declamation days, said to his Congressional hearers: "The destiny, not only of the rising millions that are to come after us here, but that of the whole civilized world, hangs trembling on *the issue of our deliberations!*" And yet nothing was then and there done, while the whole package of the perils of inaction was left to be unrolled afresh by Senator Morton at the last session of Congress. The truth is, the institutions of the United States repose on no such ticklish basis as to be upset by one imperfect or even fraudulent election, especially if the trouble is seen to come through defects of law. We have already had minority Presidents more than once chosen by the people, and we have had a President chosen by Congress when one of the defeated contestants was unmistakably the popular favorite; while there never has been an election exempt from charges, and, what is worse, some evidences, of fraud. It is precisely the same in the working of other parts of our political and governmental machinery, — rogues slip through the courts, bad judges may get on the bench, defalcations too frequently signalize unfit civil appointments, Congressmen, as we have seen, may prove far from immaculate, laws are sometimes passed which have to be speedily repealed, and even Presidents, duly installed, have been threatened with impeachment. All this, of course, affords no reason why any evil or defect attaching to our electoral system that can be remedied should be tolerated any longer; but it does warrant the assurance that, in the treatment of this question, there is no occasion for panic or for hurrying into any change which shall not prove a reform.

The objection to the present system which is more frequently

urged than any other is, that it throws the whole electoral vote of a State solidly on one side or the other, thus, as it were, annihilating the voice of a minority, of perhaps hundreds of thousands in a great State like New York, where a bare majority of votes may elect thirty-five Presidential electors, and so possibly neutralize the will of, say, five of the New England States, pronounced by heavy aggregate majorities the other way. It is an objection so valid that there is great danger of its being exaggerated. We will therefore copy the most cogent defence of the general system, as contrasted with the district system, that we remember to have met with, namely, the following passage in the speech of Edward Everett, delivered in the House of Representatives in 1826.

"I conceive the practical operation of the two systems to come nearly to the same thing. I say this on grounds of reasoning, and I am not aware that there is anything in experience to bring us to a different conclusion. On the general ticket system, supposing it to be generally adopted throughout the United States, the unrepresented majorities would be balanced by each other; or, in other words, the minority, whose voice is not heard in one State, on one side of the question, would be balanced by the minority, whose voice is not heard, in another State, on another side of the question. On the district system, the same result would take place. The minority *represented* in the electoral colleges, on one side of the question, in one State, would be balanced, and, being balanced, would be neutralized, by the minority represented in another State, on the other side of the question; and therefore, in their practical operation, there would be very little to choose between the two systems."

It is really a question of the degree to which the political community shall be divided up, in voting for President and Vice-President. In the one case the States are units for choosing a body, larger or smaller, of Presidential electors; in the other, the districts are units for choosing one elector each. Precisely the same process which is now gone through with by Pennsylvania, for instance, in choosing its twenty-nine electors, would, under the district system, characterize the choice of its one elector by each district, — that is, the majority does and would elect, the minority is and would be absorbed; only, the whole minority of a State would be silenced in the

one case, while local sections of it might triumph in the other. Thus, owing to the greater minuteness of the division of the voting community under the district system, the sentiment of the country would be more accurately collected. If a State geologist were restricted to the exploration of but little more than half of the area of a State, in order to get the best idea he could of the whole of it, and if he could choose between making his inspection by counties and making it by towns, of course he would prefer the latter; for though the half of the counties selected for the purpose might give the average distribution of upland, meadow, and marsh, and of the different soils, formations, and other data required, yet half of the towns could be designated which would be much more certain to do so. In like manner, by the district system, as compared with the other, there is, so to speak, a closer fit, the points of contact with the voting mass are multiplied and more evenly distributed, and the risks of error are correspondingly diminished; the units are more and the fractions are less. Even where the aggregate results of the two systems would be about the same, — as probably they would be in most cases, — the *distribution* of the electoral votes would, in general, be more satisfactory under the district system. The Democratic minority in Massachusetts now may have its Presidential voting done by its kindred majority in Kentucky, but probably it would prefer to have the chance of doing its own voting by districts, — a preference equally shared by the Republican minority of Kentucky, now stifled. In short, it is perfectly clear that, in point of accurate expression of the voting sentiment of the country, the district system is decidedly to be preferred to the general ticket system.

And yet it is to be observed that, with the growth of the country, this disadvantage of the general system is practically becoming less and less. The States are more numerous, and the districts are growing numerically larger, so that the disparity between the two constantly lessens. The political tradition for more than half a century was that no man could be elected President without the vote of New York; but General Grant was so elected in 1868; and under the new census the vote of New York, or of any other large State, is less impor-

tant now than it was then. In fact, when our electoral system was first applied, in the Presidential election of 1792, the then largest State, Virginia, threw over fifteen per cent of the entire electoral vote; in the election of 1812, New York, having then become the largest State, cast thirteen per cent of the total vote, while she now casts but nine per cent thereof. The change will appear still more marked if we look at it from another point of view. In the election of 1792, the combined vote of the four largest States very nearly equalled one half of the total electoral vote of the Union, while Virginia, Massachusetts, Pennsylvania, New York, and North Carolina — then the largest States in the order here mentioned — might, if united, have carried the Presidential election, with several votes to spare. In 1812, a majority of the electoral votes could still have been obtained from the five States of New York, Pennsylvania, Virginia, Massachusetts, and Kentucky. Now, however, a President cannot be elected by less than *eleven* of the largest States of the Union combined, viz.: New York, Pennsylvania, Ohio, Illinois, Indiana, Missouri, Kentucky, Tennessee, Virginia, Georgia, and Iowa. These facts go to show merely that the disadvantages of the general ticket system, as a method of collecting the sentiment of the people, and the dangers of local injustice arising therefrom, are steadily lessening with the growth of the country.

We ought also to remark that we consider the time as worse than thrown away which is spent in conjecturing the evils of any combination in politics between the large States against the small. There is only one issue that can ever thus divide the States of the Union, and that would be the proposition to take away the equality of powers (as in the representation in the United States Senate, and, based upon that, the equal fraction of representation in the electoral college) now guaranteed by the Constitution. As to all other questions, the large States have usually been found, and probably always will be, pretty equally divided between the opposing parties and the different sections of the country, so that they practically offset one another.

Connected with this consideration of the size of States, however, is the question of the relative exposure to frauds, — un-

happily coming to be of primary importance. A fraudulent ballot cast at a Presidential election in New York affects thirty-five electors, or nearly one fifth of the whole number requisite to the choice of a President. In Rhode Island such a ballot affects only three electors, or less than one sixtieth of a majority of the whole electoral college. Here is a direct bounty on the concentration of fraudulent efforts of all kinds in the large States, whereby not only a vicious influence of fearful intensity is thrown into the scale of a national election, but all the local elements of corruption, ever sufficiently formidable in our most populous States, are powerfully reinforced: The evidences of this mischief may be conceded as having already become sufficiently obvious in States like New York and Pennsylvania, and yet there is an occasional qualification here that ought not to be entirely overlooked. Pennsylvania, for instance, in the last Presidential election, threw 134,000 popular majority for Grant. Suppose that there was, and was only, a valid Republican majority in the State of not much over thirty thousand; then upwards of one hundred thousand fraudulent votes would have been absorbed and shelved where they could do no harm to the result of the election; whereas, if that or a similar amount of fraud had been distributed among smaller and closer States, it might have irresistibly controlled the national decision. If, then, the great States magnify the power of the individual ballot up to a certain point, beyond that they may nullify it to a corresponding extent. Practically, however, fraudulent attempts at the polls will always be made upon the supposition that they are to tell; so that if a given large State is regarded as sure, either on one side or the other, the current of corruption will be directed elsewhere. Now, under the district system, on the other hand, a fraud upon the ballot-box can affect but one elector, unless two electors at large should be chosen by each State, in which case but three electors, at the most, could be affected by a given fraud. This would at once relieve the large States from the extraordinary pressure of corruption now weighing upon them; and it would also relieve every Presidential election from the danger of being unduly vitiated, and perhaps controlled, by fraudulent votes turning the scale in one or more of the large States. In

this connection — as to the bearings of fraud — let us also inquire what would be the effect of an election of President and Vice-President directly by the people. We have seen that under the present system a fraudulent vote may carry all the Presidential electors of a State, with the contingency of being without effect when thrown in aid of a valid majority already existing in such State; that under the district system the power of fraudulent votes throughout the Union would be made uniform, and cut down to its present minimum (that is, of affecting three electoral votes); now under the direct popular system of voting, with its practical obliteration of State lines, every fraud, wherever perpetrated, — whether in the large or the small States, in the metropolitan centres or on the frontier, — would be sure to tell on the result, would never be thrown away, unless it proved afterwards — and too late — that it was not needed. In other words, to sum up this branch of the matter, the district system localizes fraud and equalizes its power at a minimum; the general ticket system magnifies it according to the varying size of States, subject to corresponding failure when a valid majority needs no such aids; while the popular system nationalizes fraud and utilizes every fraction of it that can be made available.

While it is apparent that the working of our electoral machinery is wholly different from the theories and the intentions of the framers of the Constitution, that fact alone might not necessitate a change. Nothing is more curious in the history of governments than the occasional instances in which the genius of a people subdues to itself the institutions which were designed to direct it; and we believe Dr. Paley argues in favor of having a certain latitude of laws, or an extra stock on hand, in order that the popular will may suit itself easily. At all events, it has come to pass that the electoral colleges of the States, which were meant to act independently, above the people and in disregard of parties, have never been anything but the passive and complete instruments of party. What was constructed as the brake on the coach of state has become only the lever for effecting the periodical oiling of the wheels. The fiction of the form, therefore, is of no account in comparison with the inefficiency in fact; so that the only objections to

the present system worth considering are those which relate to points wherein its working is defective or is beset with possible dangers.

In this respect our electoral machinery deserves the greater part of the condemnation passed upon it by Senator Morton, in his speech in the Senate. To begin with it on election day, it does not allow the names of the two persons who are to be really voted for to appear on the tickets; but in their stead is a long list of names, so that it requires some degree of political training in the voter to know what he is about, while the liability to mistakes in the mere spelling of the names of so many candidates is an item of serious importance. Secondly, there are no means provided for settling contests arising between different sets of electors, so that, in such cases, Congress is compelled to choose between them, under circumstances seldom favorable for reaching a just decision. Thirdly, contingencies may prevent the electors from complying with the terms of the law in regard to the casting of their votes, — as was the case with the electors of Wisconsin in 1857, when they were prevented by a snow-storm from meeting at the time required. Fourthly, although the danger of the electors proving recreant to their trust, so that they shall not vote as designed by their nominators, has never yet been practically illustrated, yet it still exists; and as, under the changes to which our political condition is manifestly subject, it may become real, and as it can be removed, it is properly to be taken into account. Contingencies may arise which shall expose the electors to a dangerous test, as, for instance, the death of the successful candidate for the Presidency happening between the day of election and the meeting of the electors. Had General Grant died when Mr. Greeley did, the strain to which the Republican electors might have been subjected can be readily imagined. Fifthly, the constitutional directions in regard to opening and counting the votes in Congress are so vague that they are in danger of leading to grave abuses, as they have actually led to one, namely, "the twenty-second joint rule," whereby the vote of either House serves to prevent the electoral vote of a State from being counted. Had the rule required the concurrent action of both branches of Congress,

in order to effect the suppression of the voice of a State in the exercise of so important a function, it would have been more in accordance with the regard due to the people of the United States when acting in discharge of their constitutional duties. As it is, there is nothing to excuse the arrogant pretensions of such a rule but the fact of its origin in an exceptional emergency, when the relations of several States to the Federal government were partially suspended, so that their electoral votes had need of extraordinary scrutiny, — which excuse, of course, ceased to be valid some time previous to the last Presidential election. The truth is, moreover, that the power to reject the electoral vote of a State ought never to be given to Congress; because, first, no State, except in the midst of rebellion or other abnormal exigency, should be subjected to the risk, in any form, of losing its vote for President and Vice-President; and, secondly, Congress is not the proper tribunal to decide such a question. Its definite constitutional power in the premises is confined to the *counting* of the electoral votes. The verification of the votes, the putting them in countable shape, should have been accomplished before this function of Congress begins. The folly of the existing mode of procedure is sufficiently seen in such a fact as this, namely, to determine the election of one of its own members, either branch of Congress may consume months of committee hearing, sending in the mean time for persons and papers, and may discuss the matter to the fullest extent; while, if the counting of the electoral vote of a State be objected to, the question, under the twenty-second joint rule, must be settled — and the action of *either* House will suffice to settle it — at once and without a word of debate, and therefore, practically, without any adequate examination! Sixthly, although the method of choosing Presidential electors in the several States has come to be quite uniform, we must remember that the Constitution still provides that each State may appoint its electors "in such manner as the Legislature thereof may direct,"— that is, they may be chosen as a body by the whole body of voters in the State, or separately by districts, or by the Legislature itself, or they may be appointed by the Governor or other designated agent (as the Supreme Court) of the State, or even, like jurors, they

may be selected by lot. As the causes which have of late years tended toward uniformity may yet lose their force and give way to those producing variety, and with variety unequal and unjust results, this prerogative should not be left with the State Legislatures.

With regard to that part of the constitutional machinery which, in the event of a failure to elect a President and Vice-President by the people, devolves the choice upon the House of Representatives, we think it needs no argument to pronounce it indefensible by any reasons founded in justice or equity, in consistency, feasibility, or safety. It is, in fact, the clumsiest clause in the Constitution. It makes the vote of Nebraska or Florida of the same weight as that of New York or Pennsylvania; and if the delegation of a State, chosen two years before, happens to be politically divided, the voice of their constituents is extinguished, unless it is rescued by the terrible temptation to bribery. Rarely could any satisfactory result accrue from such an artificial, anti-republican arrangement, while all the probabilities point to crises productive of bitter excitement among the people and of a serious strain upon the government.

Such in outline are the main defects of our electoral machinery. We should not make any progress in attempting to cure them without first getting a clear idea of the political changes which have brought these defects so glaringly to light. One reason why our fathers made this part of the Constitution so different from what we should do, if we had to do it anew, was, that their expectations of the average character of the Presidents to be chosen by it were so unlike ours. General Hamilton in the "Federalist," reviewing the electoral provisions, says with great solemnity: "This process of election affords a moral certainty that the office of President will seldom fall to the lot of any man who is not in an eminent degree endowed with the requisite qualifications." Indeed, he continues: "It will not be too strong to say, that there will be a constant probability of seeing the station filled by characters *pre-eminent for ability and virtue.*" It *is* too strong to say that. We may still hope, indeed, that Presidents of the United States positively unworthy will rarely, if ever, be seen; but we

are forced to conclude that the prospect of the choice falling upon our best statesmen, our *élite* of ability and virtue, is nearly as exceptional. The processes calculated to produce this conviction have been in operation during at least a third of a century, — long enough to stifle in defeat the honorable aspirations of a Clay, a Webster, and a Cass, — and the war period gave them an irresistible impulse. Power has been transferred from the executive to the legislative branch of the government, so diminishing the importance and prestige of incumbency in the former that a candidate for the Presidency has come to be selected mainly on the ground of availability, that is, as affording a good watchword and rallying cry for an electioneering campaign. The paramount object is generally party success, and the Presidential nomination is made with a view to that rather than to the highest efficiency in office. First-class statesmanship, with the boldness, vigor, and long service which the term implies, hardly accords with such a limited *rôle;* and, indeed, would hardly find room for its exercise in discharging the ordinary duties of the office, should its possessor happen to be elected. We are not to expect, then, to see another Jefferson, Madison, or John Quincy Adams in the Presidential chair; and if we ever see another Abraham Lincoln, it will be due to some such misapprehension as that which masked, in the person of a successful stump speaker of good sense and popular qualities, the grand, providential requisites for an unseen crisis. Hence it may be doubted whether, so far as the Presidency alone is concerned, it would be worth while to go to the trouble of changing, through Constitutional amendment, the provisions we have been considering. The anticipation, so often expressed, that a change of machinery will give us a higher order of Presidents, is not warranted, because no change is possible which will not facilitate the tendencies of the times toward complete party ascendency. In short, precisely what the framers of the Constitution sought to avoid by their method of choosing Presidents, — namely, the domination of party, — we must seek to bring about fairly and equitably by the improvement of their method.

It would seem that by this time the prevailing tone of publicists — our own as well as those of other countries — respect-

ing parties as something which may be and certainly ought to be discarded from all respectable political communities, should be laid aside. Not to dwell upon the inferences to be drawn from the ancient nations, the varied and instructive political history of England and our own constant experience as a free people leave no room whatever to doubt that parties — and normally but two coexistent parties — are among the inevitable conditions for the conduct of constitutional government. They are not, therefore, to be called "necessary evils" in any other sense than that in which the phrase may be applied to the government itself; for what are they but the people in the broadest and simplest classification in which we are accustomed to find them? In themselves, being of purely instrumental nature, they are destitute of moral quality. While it is obvious that a good cause may suffer somewhat in its ideal purity before it can be realized and applied through party machinery, it is equally obvious that the party action of a great many individuals is far better than we should be warranted in expecting from their personal characters. In the long run, and as a general rule, parties are neither better nor worse than the people who compose them, — that is, the whole people of the country. They arise from the fact that in no other way can movements which are to end in needed laws take form, get consistency and organization, and adapt themselves to the times, in the midst of what would otherwise be a mere mass of individuals, with as many notions and shades of notions as there would be minds to entertain them; and the same law that calls parties into existence as clearly limits them ordinarily to two, since more destroy their value as sifting and decisive agencies of public opinion. They are the upper and nether millstones, the two blades of the scissors, the plaintiff and defendant sides in court; and usually in practice they are the progressive and conservative principles of society, distinctively organized and brought to bear upon the questions of the times. A third party is either an outgrown one on the way to extinction or a new one coming to displace that which lags superfluous on the stage. In short, it is impossible to conceive of the American people except as arrayed in antagonistic political organizations. The folly of attempting to recast our electoral

machinery with the hope of ignoring, evading, or counteracting the power of parties, ought to be sufficiently evident from the mere recollection how completely the working of the present system has been wrenched from the intentions of its devisers who cherished that same hope. Any reform must start with the assumption, not only that parties will always exist in the Republic, but that their highest energy will be exerted in the choice of President and Vice-President, and that their efficiency therein is to be facilitated rather than frustrated. This consideration will save intelligent reformers from wasting their ingenuity in efforts to remedy certain alleged defects of our electoral system, as, for instance, that it does not allow a voter to discriminate between candidates for President and for Vice-President, so that he may select one from one ticket and the other from another; or that it does not give a person a chance to vote as he wishes, unless there are enough persons of his opinion in the same State to get up an electoral ticket. If the rule is to be that every voter is a member of a national party, then he will choose to vote for none but his two candidates; and if his party is not strong enough to have local tickets everywhere, it is of no use for its members to enter into a Presidential contest. The exceptional cases which have been cited under this head were owing to the terrorism of slavery, and can never be repeated.

Of the numerous plans which have been proposed to supersede the present electoral system, a few of a representative character will suffice for consideration. The idea of choosing the President and Vice-President directly by the people has been carefully embodied in a proposed amendment of the Constitution, drawn up and submitted to the United States Senate by Hon. Charles Sumner. Its main points are as follows: The regular Presidential election is to be held on the first Monday of April, and the result in each State and Territory is to be certified and forwarded to the seat of government as Congress by law may direct. On the Tuesday next succeeding the third Monday in May, the returns shall be opened in joint convention of the two Houses of Congress, and the person having a majority of the votes cast shall be President. If no person have such majority, or the person having it decline the

office or die before the counting of the vote, then the President of the Senate shall so proclaim, and the proceedings shall be officially published, and another election shall be held on the following second Tuesday of October, at which the three persons having the highest number of votes at the preceding April election shall be voted for by the people. These votes shall be counted in Congress on the third Tuesday in December following, and the result proclaimed. In case of a vacancy occurring in the office of the President, the members of Congress in joint convention shall proceed to elect by *viva voce* vote a President to fill such vacancy, each member having one vote, and a majority being requisite for election. The President shall not be eligible for re-election; and the office of Vice-President shall be abolished.

In the preamble to this plan, Senator Sumner states that he is moved by a desire "to supersede the caucus or convention, so that it shall no longer be the engine for the nomination of the President," or the instrument of his will after he is elected. But how the proposed change is going to effect that object he does not explain, and no one, probably, will be able to see. Does Senator Sumner imagine that, under his plan, the people of the United States would go to the polls and vote according to their individual preferences, without previous party or other consultation? Parties, certainly, would continue to exist precisely as under the present system; partisan concert of action would be equally necessary to success; and caucuses, or something similar, would be just as indispensable to such concert of action. The chief motive, therefore, of Mr. Sumner's plan fails. The objections to it on the score of fraud we have already presented in contrasting the risks of the three main systems in this respect, and they seem to us insurmountable. Secondly, in basing Presidential elections entirely upon the popular vote, without regard to State lines, and in rejecting that equal element of Senatorial representation which now forms a part of the electoral vote of every State, the harmony of our governmental system is materially impaired. It was meant that the President, as the head of the Federal Union, should be elected by the States as well as by the people; and since the principle has worked well in practice, there is no rea-

son for sanctioning an innovation which would probably next be extended to the representation in the United States Senate, and might not stop till the balance of the government was destroyed. But, thirdly, whatever may be the inherent force of the last-mentioned consideration, there is not the slightest doubt that its practical influence will always be sufficient, with a sufficient number of the smaller States, to make the agitation of this or any other plan of electing the President directly by popular vote utterly useless. Ten States, as the Union is now, can defeat any proposed Constitutional amendment. It so happens that ten States can be indicated which have all together but twenty members of the House of Representatives, but which, under the Constitution, have *forty* Presidential electors, while New York, with thirty-three Representatives, has but thirty-five Presidential electors. That is, those States have their power in a Presidential election increased one hundred per cent, while the power of New York is increased only about six per cent. Will those States — and the same question might equally well be asked of half a dozen other States — ever be induced to relinquish such advantages? There is no prospect of reform in this direction.

Another plan which may be fairly put at the head of the many propositions to substitute the district system for the general ticket system, without impairing the federative principle of the equality of the States, now secured by the Constitution to the people in voting for President and Vice-President, is the following, which was presented to Congress some years ago, but never acted upon.

ARTICLE.

The electors of President and Vice-President shall be chosen as follows: —

Two electors of President and Vice-President shall be chosen at large, from each State, by the qualified voters therein.

A number of electors in each State equal to the whole number of Representatives to which such State may be entitled in Congress shall be chosen in single districts of contiguous and compact territory, each containing, as near as practicable, an equal amount of population.

Congress shall prescribe the mode of determining the validity of the choice of electors, and of contesting the right to the office of President and Vice-President.

The merits of this plan are obvious. It allows the voice of the States, as States, its just, or constitutional, force and expression, while it collects the will of the people by as close a local division as the nature of the case will permit. It reduces the effect of frauds to a minimum, and correspondingly removes the temptation to commit them. These are great advantages. The most obvious objection to the plan will be found in the necessity it involves of marking off the electoral districts of a State, which may open the door to the heinous fraud of "gerrymandering," — an objection, indeed, which attaches to any form of the district system yet proposed, and which might practically neutralize all its advantages. The above scheme does not specify whether the apportionment should be made by State or by national authority; but, clearly, it should not be by the latter, for then the whole electoral machinery of the Union might receive a partisan distortion on one side, whereas the States, even if acting in the matter under a strong partisan bias, might in a measure offset one another; besides, the power, according to the principles of our system, would seem to belong to the States. Or if any national requirement should be made in the premises, it might be to the effect that the electoral districts should correspond in all cases with the Congressional districts, — two electors-at-large being chosen by the voters of the whole State, — which would still leave the apportionment in the control of the States, but, by blending it with an apportionment for other purposes, would diminish the temptations to unfairness. The plan, also, as forming a part of the Constitution, should clearly specify — and not leave to Congress to prescribe — "the mode of determining the validity of the choice of electors," which is one of the most vital needs of the present system. We should naturally say that the right of counting and declaring the votes thrown for Presidential electors could not be more safely deposited than with the Governor and Council of a State, if it had not been for the experience of Louisiana at the last Presidential election, when there were rival Governors, to neither of whom could such a function have been safely committed. Although such an instance may never occur again, it might be advisable to require that this determination of the validity of electors should be exercised

by the Supreme Court of each State, or by the United States circuit or district court having jurisdiction within it. Another omission of the plan is its silence with regard to non-election by the people, — a point which we will consider hereafter. It will have been noticed that the plan, if adopted, would still leave the Presidential electors untouched, together with many of the disadvantages attaching to such an intermediate body, as, for instance, the inability of the voter to use the names of the persons he is actually voting for, thus keeping up the old roundabout, confusing, and apparently useless process; the danger of the electors finally casting their votes in defiance of the people who had chosen them; and their liability to accidents, which might prevent them from depositing their votes according to the requirements of law.

When, therefore, we have got so far in schemes of reform, why not take a step farther and abolish the electoral college altogether? The only difficulty, of course, is in providing a satisfactory substitute, having reference not only to existing evils, but to "those we know not of." It has been proposed that, the electoral college having been dispensed with, each State should be declared entitled, as now, to a number of Presidential votes equal to the number of its Senators and Representatives in Congress. These votes, gathered from the result at the polls,— where the ballots should bear the names of the candidates for President and Vice-President voted for, — should be certified to by the Governor, or the Supreme Court, as the Constitution should require, and forwarded to Congress; the certification being final, and leaving Congress no discretion in regard to counting the votes. Such a plan, while preserving to the States their Constitutional measure of power over the Presidency, would efface all the evils and liabilities to abuse belonging to the electoral bodies; but it would retain the vote by States, with its imperfect collection of the popular will, occasional injustice, and the excessive influence of frauds in the larger States. If the latter drawbacks could be removed, the plan would seem to be at least in the right direction. One method of doing this — that is, of dividing the Presidential vote of a State according to the popular division manifested at the polls — might be accomplished through the principle of

minority representation. The footings of the votes of the two parties on election day would show what proportion of the Presidential votes of the State each party would be entitled to. Thus if the State should have twelve Presidential votes, and there should be 60,000 ballots cast by one party and 84,000 by the other, then the candidates of the latter should be declared to have received seven of the electoral votes to the rival candidates' five. The difficulty of making an accurate fractional division of the electoral votes need not be regarded as serious, for any general arrangement for that purpose would bear equally upon the opposing parties in the great majority of cases, and would be no more severe than the ordinary hardships of the apportionment system, while wholly exempt from the fraudulent element too often adhering to that system in practice. Or, perhaps, the same object might be attained in this way: Two of the Presidential or electoral votes should be credited to the State at large, the others belonging to the several Congressional districts. All the ballots at a Presidential election should be marked according to the district in which they were cast, — as "Maine, First Congressional District," etc. The counting by districts, therefore, would determine the electoral vote of each district, while the footing up of the whole would give the result as to the two electoral votes at large. This method would be entirely in harmony with the Constitutional theory of the Presidency, and, joined to some safe plan of certification and the other desirable reforms indicated above, would seem to afford as good a framework as any other for bringing this problem to a practical solution.

There remains the contingency of non-election by the people, not often to be encountered under the modern tendency of parties, but still possible, and too important to be unprovided for. In such an event we believe it is by all means advisable that the people should be called upon to do their work over again, as Mr. Sumner's plan provides. At the first thought it appears something like a hardship to subject the country to a second Presidential election in a single season; but an election is an election, and it is no more trouble to go to the polls to elect a President of the United States than to choose the humblest local officer. The decision would be reached as

quickly in this way as if it were left to Congress, with far less, and less deleterious, excitement, and infinitely more satisfaction over the result. If, then, the Presidential election should be held as now in November, or, still better, in October, the completely certified votes of all the States, — even if some one or more of them should have been compelled to remedy the defects of a first election, — would be ready for Congress at its meeting in December, in season to have the result proclaimed by the President, and, if necessary, another election appointed in January, under the condition that the voting should be confined to the two highest candidates at the first election.

If, however, it should be deemed best, in the event of a failure to elect a President and Vice-President by the people, to throw the election into Congress, then the present method of taking the vote there should be done away, root and branch. The true mode of procedure would be for both Houses of Congress to meet in joint convention, each Senator and Representative having one vote. This plan has met the approval of both Senator Sumner and Senator Morton, the latter saying of it: "This would be in exact harmony with the principles upon which the election is now to be made by the people of the several States." With regard to this measure of electoral reform, at least, we do not think there can be diversity of opinion enough among reflecting men to call for any argument.

ART. V. — *On Intelligence.* By H. TAINE, D. C. L., Oxon. Translated from the French by T. D. HAYE, and revised with Additions by the Author. New York: Holt and Williams. 1872.

As an historian of art and literature, M. Taine is known to all the world. His lucid and sparkling expositions of the characteristics of Italian and Flemish painting, and his brilliant delineations of the distinctive traits of English authors, are familiar to every intelligent reader. As a metaphysician, however, we fear that he has yet been hardly noticed. We

doubt if the work whose title we cite for our text has had already more than a handful of readers. And yet it is a book eminently worthy of study, exceedingly interesting, even to him who reads merely for entertainment. It is destitute of none of the charms of diction which lend such fascination to his more familiar works. His views come before us with an admirable order, whose perfect sequence seems almost a demonstration. Every idea is clear-cut. Every expression is a transparent medium through which the thought is seen as easily and surely as pebbles in a pure mountain pool. No technical, eccentric, or too abstract phraseology necessitates, as with so many philosophical writers, a continual process of translation into common language before we can understand what is meant. Curious examples and striking illustrations clothe the argument with captivating draperies. In short, M. Taine in this, as in his other works, shows everywhere the genuine French *esprit*. His Gallic blood is the sufficient guaranty that, however solid and forbidding be the title and the subject of the work, the contents will not fail to furnish appetizing food, even to those who can relish nothing that is not light and well spiced.

And to the serious student it is of great importance. M. Taine calls it himself "the work that he has most fully meditated." In the determination of his rank as a thinker, he would doubtless prefer to be judged by it rather than by any of his more popular volumes. He looks, we imagine, to this, rather than to those, to establish his claim to a permanent and high place in standard literature. For it contains in full and reasoned form the principles that all his other works variously illustrate. Many critics seem to have no settled standards. They praise or blame as they happen to fancy. Many historians appear to have no suspicion of any order in their department. They are content to trace down the line of events as a mere capricious succession, without grasping any underlying principles. They sketch epochs and their leaders, and pronounce their judgments without mistrusting any connection between the individual and his time. This was once thought entirely sufficient. But the demand at the present time is for the discovery of the laws of things. The modern critic or historian

must be a philosopher. He must tell us the *rationale* of every change. He must find some familiar law hid under every odd aspect. The reader of Hippolyte Taine knows him as emphatically a writer of this latter stamp. He has most evidently definite theories, and he is uneasy till he finds each phenomenon that he takes up conform to some of his established rules or favorite hypotheses. History, in his view, is but applied psychology. "The historian," he says, "notes and traces the total transformation presented by a particular human molecule or group of human molecules, and, to explain these transformations, writes the psychology of the molecule or group. Carlyle has written that of Cromwell; Sainte-Beuve, that of Port Royal; Stendhal has made twenty attempts on that of the Italians. M. Renan has given us that of the Semitic race. . . . The task is invariably the description of a human mind or of the characteristics common to a group of human minds."

For fifteen years, as M. Taine says, he had labored at these special and concrete psychologies. In the present work he attempts general and abstract psychology.

The principles which in his other works are hinted at and illustrated — which, when unexhibited, nevertheless guide his criticisms, mould his thought, supply the mental fibre for those ties which he believes he sees running up and down and out and in — are here formally stated, supported, and defended. He who would know their strength or their weakness — the strength or the weakness of his whole literary work — may best determine it by an examination of this his fullest exposition of them.

There are two great ways of studying the human mind, quite opposite to each other. One is to observe man from the inside; the other, to observe him from the outside. The first method employs consciousness as its chief instrument. It fixes the attention upon the various operations of the mind as they take place within, and endeavors by a direct sight, as it were, to see what it is that actually occurs when we feel, or perceive, or recollect, or imagine. It seeks to discriminate between the nature of various mental processes and between the various steps of these processes. From the various mental states it derives the faculties in which they originate. From properties it deduces substances; from effects, causes.

The facts of which it thus finds the mind directly conscious, and the deductions it makes from them, it takes as entirely trustworthy, and uses them to cut at a blow every troublesome knot. Reaching its results thus from the inside, it believes that it penetrates to the very ultimate sources and hidden essences of things. This is the most natural and easy way of studying man. It opens at once a grand mine and a rich one. At first, apparently, it is the most fruitful one that could be worked. In it Socrates and Plato and Descartes found the precious jewels of knowledge which shine as diamond circlets about their names. While physical science was still indulging in the crudest fancies, entirely without organization or solid basis of laws, mental science, thanks to this direct view of the interior of the mind which consciousness gave, had already made discoveries so great that it has since been able to add comparatively little to them. Until the time of Bacon this method of psychological observation enjoyed almost a monopoly. But when the inductive method had shown in the fields of physical research what great conquests it was capable of making, it was natural that it should be applied to the investigation of the mind also. The nature of the soul now came to be studied in its effects. Ethnographers noted the characteristics of races; philologists, the manifestations of intelligence in language; political writers, its play in civil construction. Anatomists patiently searched into the structure of the physical organism. Physicians watched the variations in human conduct produced by abnormal conditions of mind and body. By comparison and statistics, these results are generalized. By subtle analysis their results are disengaged. Passing by the profounder inquiries as to the essences and causes of things, it addresses itself directly to observing the succession of emotions and ideas, — remarking the constant association among them, and learning the outward conditions of mental phenomena, and the formation of the more complex from the more simple.

This method of studying the mind as a distinct and valuable process may be traced back, as we have already hinted, to the grand reformation in investigation which Bacon worked. In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, Locke and Hume, Berkeley and Condillac, used it with great effect. At the present

day, it is the method by which Buckle and Bain, Maudsley and John Stuart Mill, have reached, or pretend to have reached, such astonishing results, laying the axe to the root of the most accepted beliefs, and establishing as facts, so it is claimed, the most paradoxical of theories.

Now in France, since the close of the Middle Ages and the decease of scholasticism, these two fundamental methods have been two opposite poles between which philosophical thought has swung to and fro.

The metaphysical needle, vibrating from the theories of Descartes to those of Malebranche, then to those of Arnault, and next to those of Condillac, was found in the eighteenth century pointing strongly to a pronounced sensationalism, and even to an undisguised materialism. The eighteenth century, therefore, naturally commenced with a reaction. Philosophy, having lived for three quarters of a century with no other food than matter, motion, and what the senses had to give, thirsted by this time for more solid food. It was weary of Condillac and the Encyclopedists, and welcomed with enthusiasm the doctrines which Laromiguière, Roger Collard, and Maine de Biran proclaimed in opposition to them. These returned to the older method of studying the mind, — the internal. They replaced consciousness and common-sense on the seats of authority. They asserted for the mind an independent power or source of knowledge. Some first principles, some fundamental laws of belief, are necessary, they asserted, to give a basis to knowledge. These are discovered and established by the inward sense, especially by reflection. The mind knows itself directly, not only as a cause, but as a permanent cause. It has independent activity and durable unity. The mind recognizes a distinction between the affections of its causative energy and of its organism, and thus recognizes its organism as something different from itself. The muscular efforts of the organism meet resistance from without, and by induction, combined with the intuition of the principle of causality, the mind knows an external material world as the cause of the resistance. The ideas of cause, substance, space, time, are not mere signs or extracts from sensation or derivations from experience, but are fundamental notions, of which the intelligence

cannot divest itself, — ideas which must be regarded as universal and absolute.

These views, boldly and eloquently advocated, turned quite round again the current of French philosophy. Where not accepted and reasserted in their detail, they were in their principles and most important results. Jouffroy did little more than apply their results in the sharp and well-sustained distinctions which he drew between physiology and psychology. Cousin, starting forth under their impulsion, explored ancient and modern philosophy, culling whatever he thought would support or harmonize with them, and formed his famous Eclectic system, which, for a time, was popular. Philosophy had been living in a profound ignorance of the past, and with ardent enthusiasm betook itself to the newly opened door through which it was given such curious pictures of ancient schools and foreign systems. Cousin had perfect command of a rich and beautiful style, — a style full of rhetorical effects and poetic images as well as of formulas borrowed from all the schools, and with the art of the great writer could mould all the forms of ancient and modern thought into a harmonious unity. He came before his scholars, not so much as an investigator or a teacher, as in the *rôle* of a magnificent orator, a commanding and inspiring preacher. Vague, incoherent, and superficial as was his system, improvised hastily out of elements borrowed from the Greek, German, Scottish, and French schools, and as intolerant in his conclusions as he was uncertain in his methods, he yet found it easy to win over the public. The great truths which he brought back to notice they were eager to embrace, no matter how crudely they were presented. In the absorbing taste for the novel revelations of history, erudition seemed to make science unnecessary. It was enough to give Eclecticism authority at that time, that it profoundly moved the feelings, whether or not it enlarged or purified the realm of ideas. If it could not maintain its positions before the analysis of severe judges, it possessed, nevertheless, that magical charm of style and eloquence that for a time turned its judges into admirers, and made stern criticism an impertinence.

But in the last few years the needle of French thought has shifted back once more to the opposite point of the compass.

The inevitable reaction has set in. The younger minds have felt the need of new solutions and surer methods. They have become tired, in their turn, of the continual intervention of consciousness, as a *Deus ex machina*, to solve every troublesome question, and have become sceptical as to its legitimacy and its value. They are irritated at finding their exploring feet ever stopped by the same eternal blind walls, — self, substance, power, time, space, — beyond which they are denied further advance. They are unwilling to yield these up as belonging to the impenetrable arcana of faith. They will some way find out what is inside of them, or they will prove them to be but illusions. They are no longer willing to take the dicta of unlearned common-sense as decisive. They bring everything to the test of analysis and experience. They have revived the critical spirit, — the criticism that judges not by prejudice and personal taste and varying moods, however fine, but by well-established laws and a clear discrimination of what conforms to them. Especially they have not believed that all scientific observation lay in the study of the past, as was imagined in the antiquarian fervor of Cousin's day. They have devoted themselves with an ardor, oppositely directed, but similar in intensity, to contemporary science and exact observations of nature. They have introduced scientific methods and theories into all parts of philosophical speculation, — into metaphysics, psychology, logic, and even morality. Philosophy no longer looks for its allies to history, literature, or religion. Its destiny lies no longer in their hands. It is rather to science that the looks of the various schools are directed, here with fear, there with hope, as exhausted armies look to a newly arrived column as the arbiter of the contest.

Theories of mental processes, if they would receive favor, must be based upon disclosures of physiology and natural history. No solution of an intellectual process is considered satisfactory that cannot claim corroboration by physical facts and hypotheses.

This scientific current is moving more or less all schools of thought. Spiritualists as well as materialists bear testimony to its influence. Even men like Janet, Lévêque, Ravaisson, seem to be possessed with one constant idea, — that of finding,

if possible, in scientific theories and authorities auxiliaries for a spiritual philosophy which may harmonize itself with the progress of the positive sciences.*

Such is the changed phase which of late psychology in France has assumed. It is to this new school, full of what many would call the most revolutionary ideas, that Taine unmistakably belongs. He has a thorough contempt for orthodoxy. Educated in the École Normale, — a school whose professional object is to train instructors for the University, — instructed strictly to respect the accustomed masters, the theories of the great French idealogists only aroused in him the greater repugnance. He turned, instead, to the school of the English Cerebralists, and the older sensationalism which France herself had seen. It would be hardly just to call him a disciple of either Bain, Spencer, or Mill. His system has been worked out independently, from a basis of its own. Mr. Mill, from whom he seems to have studied and learned the most, he distinctly opposes in several important points. Nor would it be quite fair, either, to call him a follower of Condillac. His work is too broad and too original to be set down as an imitation of any one else's. And yet the powerful influence of those great English thinkers is very noticeable in M. Taine's system; and the theories of the famous treatise on Sensations, which for a century had lain dormant for want of satisfactory evidence, are plainly the quickening suggestions which have produced this so much more highly developed and more firmly knit work, strengthened by abundant proofs from the discoveries of modern physiology.

In this last lies the most prominent trait of M. Taine's work, — the assistance that it continually derives from the investigations of natural science. Of the two great methods of studying the mind which we have spoken of, the second, i. e. observation from the outside, especially by scrutiny of the structure and working of the physical organism, is the only one that he trusts.

In psychological inquiries he says that "consciousness is

* For this sketch of contemporary philosophy in France, we are happy to acknowledge our indebtedness to an article of M. Vacherot's in the *Revue des Deux Mondes* for July, 1870.

not sufficient in its ordinary state. It is no more sufficient than the naked eye is in optical inquiries. It is necessary continually to beware of it; to test and correct its evidence; nearly always to assist it; to present objects to it in a brighter light; to magnify them and construct for its use a kind of microscope or telescope." Taine finds this means of correcting or magnifying consciousness in the discoveries of anatomists as to the mechanism which the mind employs, and in the abnormal cases given us by the illusions of sickness, dreams, somnambulism, hypnotism, and lunacy. Having enjoyed several years of study in some of the famous Parisian schools of medicine, he has become fascinated with their marvels, and believes that in them lie the keys which will unlock all mental problems. He has studied diligently the great physiologists, the chief medical authorities, the records of hallucinations, and all kinds of mental eccentricities. He quotes profusely from such writers as Müller, Helmholtz, Baillarger, Brierre de Boismont, Maury, Longet, Gratiolet, Vulpian. These supply him with the materials for his system; nay, we may say that these are the masters who have determined its character.

The work is divided into two parts; one analytical, the other synthetical. In the first, the elements of knowledge are determined. By successive reductions the simplest forms are reached, and the physiological changes which are the condition of their origin are considered. In the second part, the mechanism and general effect of the combination are described. Then the law that has been discovered is applied, and the formation, certitude, and range of the principal kinds of knowledge are examined.

M. Taine commences with an examination of words and the mental process connected with them. The old nominalist controversy is not to him either foolish or antiquated. In the solution of the question it raised, — What is the import of an abstract word? — is the basis of the philosophy, which shall not be misled by empty illusions. Taine maintains that the word is a mere sign, — a substitute for sensations or images which are too complex to be conveniently reproduced. He disbelieves entirely in the existence, even the mental existence, of any gen-

eral idea. All that passes within, when from several perceptions we disengage what we call a general notion, is simply the experience of a *tendency which urges an expression*. To imagine the abstract conception something apart from the word, to suppose that we can conceive ideal objects, is a singular illusion. We overlook the name which is the whole substance of the operation.

The abstract name denotes, he admits, a common character, an extract of the essential qualities of the given class of objects. But of this extract, the detached and isolated fragment common to all the members of the class, we cannot have either experience, perception, or sensible representation. Even the imagination can command only a varying and shifting image of it. The precise and fixed thing which we call an idea is therefore but a verbal sign, which suggests itself to the mind at the stimulus of the slightest observed point of resemblance, and enables us to carry on rapidly courses of reasoning and processes of communication.

Having swept away the whole class of general ideas into the realm of nonentity, and having thus attached the abstract name directly to the sensible image or affection of sense as a mere sign, he has at one blow cleared the way to the pure sensationalism which he would establish. The further reduction goes on now naturally and easily. Taking up the image, he finds that to be but the echo or the revivification of a sensation, of the same nature in every important respect as the sensation itself. It is distinguished from the sensation only by being excited internally, by an antecedent sensation or a disturbance of the nervous centres; while the sensation proper arises directly from a disturbance of a nerve extremity. The image is generally fragmentary, fugitive, and weak; but sometimes, by exclusive attention or through strong emotion, it may acquire the energy and distinctness of the sensation. This excess may be corrected by the simultaneous feeling of an antagonist sensation. In short, as the word is the more convenient substitute which acts for the image, so the image, in the same way, is the substitute which replaces the sensation.

By reduction upon reduction, Taine thus reaches the primitive fact, sensation, of which all the rest, whether images or ideas, are but repetitions more or less disguised.

This element appears irreducible. It is so to consciousness. But science, however, can separate many of these apparently indivisible sensations into their elements. For example, in sensations of hearing, the physical experimenter, by such instruments as Lavart's wheel or Latour's siren, can demonstrate that sensations that seem wholes are really composed of parts. Small separate sensations, repeated in quick and regular succession, unite in a continuous musical note. Noises are composed of a number of similar separate and small but irregular sensations. When isolated, these small sensations are not perceived by the inner sense. They must be added together so as to make a certain bulk, and to occupy a certain time, but they still exist. A similar, though less complete, reduction M. Taine makes with sensations of the other senses.

The same law, that every apparent whole of sensation is composed of smaller parts, and each of these parts of more infinitesimal sensations, imperceptible to consciousness, is true of them all. And the antecedents of these larger or smaller sensations are always certain molecular movements in the nerves, equally infinitesimal and imperceptible to the senses, known only by processes of reasoning. Of this physical, external fact the sensation is the internal substitute.

Having come here to the end of the psychological analysis, he changes his route and turns to physiological examination. He considers the organism of intelligence. He finds the immediate condition of sensations in molecular disturbances of the sensitive centres, i. e. the encephalon. Images are occasioned by repetitions of these molecular motions in the cerebral lobes, on entering which they become capable of persisting and of indefinite revivals and interactions. Reflex actions are occasioned by nerve currents transmitted, not to the sensitive centres, but only to the spinal marrow, and exciting fragmentary actions analogous to those which excite elementary sensations imperceptible to consciousness.

We find, then, that every mental event is accompanied by some physical change. What then is the relation of the mental and physical world? Inseparably connected as they are, yet the two series have nothing apparently in common. And however closely we study the two, we find them no

more reducible the one to the other. The physiologist, relying on the constant connection of mental events with motions of the nervous centres, says that the first are but a function of the second. The philosopher, resting on the irreducibility of the two, says that mental events belong to a separate mental being. Cautious on-lookers interpose and conclude: Here is an insurmountable difficulty, let us be content to remain in ignorance. M. Taine, however, is not content to pause here. He believes that he can press further into the mystery. He says that the incompatibility of mental and physical events is on our side, — not on theirs. It is due to the different channels by which we gain knowledge of them.

One and the same electric shock, acting on the optic nerve, appears as a flash of light, on the acoustic nerve as a sound, on a nerve of touch as a blow. The different psychological appearances are due to the different routes by which the same event enters the mind. So when we examine the idea of a sensation and of a molecular movement, we find that they enter the mind by routes directly opposite, — one from within, without any intermediate; the other from without, through many intermediates. Being known in these two opposite ways, one and the same single event will appear double. The sensation and the molecular movement of the nervous system may be regarded, then, as at bottom one and the same event, — opposite aspects of the same thing. The difficulty of two separate things occurring always simultaneously and in mutual dependence, to account for which the philosophers of the seventeenth century, Leibnitz and Malebranche, had to call in the hypothesis of a pre-established harmony, is entirely removed.

Nature, then, has two faces. In the one the object is presented as it appears within, as it is known directly. In the other it is presented as it appears without, indirectly, by its effects, through its physical signs. Seen from the one side, nature has as elements events which we can know nothing of except when in extreme complication, and which in this state we call sensations. In the brain these are compounded into images and ideas. Beneath consciousness, they exist in lower and lower, simpler and simpler, forms. They are indicated by all reflex actions; they may be traced down in rudimentary

form, the lowest point of the animal scale, nay, into the vegetable kingdom. There is no radical difference between animals and vegetables when looked at in this light. By pursuing analogies we may descend in the scale of beings. For the inorganic world is but a special case of the organic world, differing in degree, but identical in nature.

When seen from the other side, — the physical, — nature has as elements events which we can conceive clearly only when in a state of extreme simplicity, and which in this state we term molecular movements. As from the level of sensation mental events descend, decreasing in complexity; so from the level of molecular motion physical events ascend, constantly increasing in complexity, as we pass from the most elementary phenomena of physics to the highest operations of the cerebral lobes. Through the whole scale there occur, looked at from this side, only mechanical movements of atoms. What we term life is but a more delicate chemical action of more complex chemical elements. From base to summit the correspondence on either side is perfect. Phrase for phrase the physical event, as we represent it to ourselves, translates the mental event. (Book IV. ch. 2.)

And now that our events have been considered, what is the being they pertain to, which each calls himself. Philosophers usually conceive it as a subject or substance different from the various sensations, images, perceptions, recollections, etc., which correspond to it, and having for its distinctive qualities certain faculties or powers.

Every part of this conception Taine would throw overboard without ceremony. Power, force, faculty, substance, self, matter, — these are all metaphysical entities, pure phantoms begotten of words, and vanishing as soon as we examine rigorously the meanings of the words. Power and force and faculty denote no occult essence, but simply the perpetual connection between one fact which is antecedent and another which is consequent. When I say that a stream has power to move a wheel, I mean only that when the stream falls on the wheel the wheel moves. This property of the one fact to be followed by another is, however, set apart by abstraction and kept in a distinct state by a separate name till the mind, forgetting its

origin, believes it to be independent and becomes the dupe of its own illusion.

With the fall of this illusion falls also that of self. For the powers of the self are what constitute it. The self, the one permanent substance, distinct from events, is seen to vanish and re-enter the region of words. All that remains of us are our events, sensations, recollections, images, ideas, resolutions. These are what constitute our being. Each of them is an element, fragment, extract of the Ego. Our successive events, then, are successive components of ourselves. The Ego is in turn each of these events. At one moment it is nothing more than the sensation of taste, at another nothing more than the sensation of suffering. These divisions, however, into different mental events, are purely fictitious, for the convenience of observation. They actually form a continuous web. We cannot say that it is the series of its events placed in succession, since it is not divided into events, except to observation. But still it is equivalent to that series. For if they were taken away nothing would remain; they constitute it. (Book IV. ch. 3.)

Having upset this entity at the summit of nature, there remains at the foot another entity, matter, which falls by the same blow. When analyzed there remain but movements, present, future, or possible, connected with certain conditions and determined with relation to certain points. Thus in the physical and in the moral world nothing remains of what is commonly understood by substance or force. *The notion of fact or event alone corresponds to real things.* Chemical body, material atom, self, that which we term a being, is always a distinct series of events, each event being the condition of another and having another as its condition.

We have no difficulty, then, in comprehending the connection between the human and the physiological individual. All we have now before our eyes is a series of events termed self, connected with other events forming its conditions. The web of facts which make up our being is a distinct district in the aggregate constituted by the nervous functions, this aggregate itself being a distinct province in the entire living animal. This series is to our senses a series of molecular movements,

to our consciousness a series of sensations. In proportion as we descend the animal scale, we see it lose its domination and complexity and become reduced to the level of the others, while these in turn loosen their mutual connections and become insensibly degraded. To external perception, *they have all for condition of existence the integrity and renewal of the nervous system*, whose special activity they are; and the beings more or less strictly bound together, which they constitute, whatever they may be to consciousness, with whatever names metaphysical or literary illusion may clothe them, *are subject to the same condition*. (Book IV. ch. 3.)

Having thus disengaged and determined the primordial elements, the task is now, with their combinations, to construct the rest. We perceive, we recollect, we foresee, we reason, we form abstractions and ideals. How can we accomplish these things? Philosophers commonly say that we do these things because we have such and such faculties, memory, imagination, reason, etc. These are but verbal explanations, inherited from the schoolmen. These various actions are properly to be explained as transformations, by association or conflict of these mental elements, signs, images, sensations. Two principal processes are employed by nature to produce the operations we term cognitions; the one consisting in the creation of illusions within us, the other consisting in their rectification. As in his "History of English Literature," treating of Hamlet's madness, he maintains that all men are more or less insane; so here, in his philosophical analysis of the actions and knowledge of the mind, with the same itching after paradox he devotes himself to proving that the whole staple of the actions and knowledge of the mind is delusion. External perception, firstly, is essentially hallucination, — an hallucination generally resulting in truth, but still an hallucination. In every act of perception there are three steps: first, the antecedent, usually some external object; second, by the sensation, an internal semblance or phantom of the object; third, the affirmation or judgment. Now, for the third step, nothing is required beyond the presence of the second. Though usually excited by an external object, this intermediate element, sensation, may be excited by an image in the cerebral lobe, or

by some molecular disturbance in the nervous centres due to disease. The affirmative judgment — what we call the perception — none the less follows. We call it then a case of hallucination. But as in all cases the presence of this internal semblance is the immediate antecedent, as it is only this internal phantom which is taken for an internal object, all perceptions are really hallucinations. The objects that we touch, see, or perceive are really nothing more than inward phantoms, precisely similar to those which arise in the mind of the dreamer. The only difference is, that in the case of the dreamer the phantoms do not correspond to external objects then present; in the case of perception, they do.

Again, every sensation that we experience we assign to a certain place, — in the foot, the hand, the cheek. But this is but an illusion, as is abundantly proved by surgical operations. When a foot has been amputated, tinglings will be felt for many years as if in the foot no longer there, clearly referred to distinct parts, the second or third toe, the sole of the foot, etc. Disease of the marrow excites tinglings in the extremities. When a new nose is formed by turning down a flap of skin from the forehead, and the nose is touched, it seems still for a long time to be the forehead that is touched.

Or again, when we hear a sound, we say that is outside of us, say a dozen yards to the right. When we see the red of a cloth, we situate that also externally to us. But science shows us that neither are outside of us. There are only three certain molecular movements which act as antecedents. By disturbing the acoustic nerve by a blow on the head, a ringing sound is heard; by setting the retina in action by pressure on the eyeball, or agitating the optic nerve by disease or by a cut, luminous figures, patches, or sparks may be seen. The real situation of every sensation, whether of sound, of color, of pressure, of pain, is never outside of us, nor even at the nervous extremity, but is always in the sensory centres in the encephalon. The localizing judgment that situates them in this or that spot of the surface, or even outside of us, is an hallucination, although it generally is practically correct, inasmuch as the molecular disturbance that is the antecedent condition is usually found to be there.

In the same way, the image, the second great element of intelligence, is hallucinatory in its nature. The image is the echo or revival of the sensation. The more complete it is, the more does it seem a veritable present sensation. In sleep, natural or artificial, when the rivalry and correction of true sensations are removed, the image develops a perfect hallucination. When we are awake there is a similar tendency of the image to excite an hallucination, but it is repressed by simultaneous sensations. As in every representation, conception, or idea, there is an image or images, and as it matters little whether the hallucinatory process be commenced or completed, the state of our mind when we are awake and in health may be defined as a *series of hallucinations which do not become developed*. "The hallucination which seems a monstrosity is the very fabric of our mental life." (Part II. Book I. ch. 1.)

M. Taine next considers the processes of rectification by which these hallucinations are corrected and reduced to proper order. Perceptions of one sense are corrected by contradictory ones of another. Images are repressed either by antagonistic sensations or by other images and convictions incompatible with them. Thus an hallucination by a stronger contradictory hallucination is repressed, and is made to constitute sometimes a recollection, sometimes a prevision, now an imagination, and again a perception corresponding to real things and events, and thus constituting cognitions. Thus by experience our senses are educated. Our sensations, originally simple states of excitation, telling nothing of place, gradually are referred to different localities, according to the places where the nervous disturbance which starts them is found to be situated. By the muscular sensations of the arm, foot, eye, we learn distance. By combinations of the idea of distance, and through simultaneous sensations of the hand or eye, which sensations by education of the senses seem to be situated in distinct and continuous points, we derive the idea of extension, attributing to the object the continuity of our own sensation. From these ideas of distance and extension, combined with the sensation of resistance, are easily derived all the other properties of bodies, — solidity, figure, surface, mobility, divisibility. External objects are thus, when analyzed, only internal phantoms,

fragments of the Ego, detached from it in appearance and opposed to it by an illusion. This illusion, however, is not, as Kant taught, the effect of the innate and inexplicable structure of the mind, but of an acquired disposition instituted in us by experience.

But with so many illusions, is there anything real corresponding to them? What is left us in bodies when we have pushed our analysis to its farthest?

In the first place, we find that, though there is no sensation in the nervous extremity, still less any color or sound outside of us, yet that there are situated the starting-points of the molecular displacements which occasion the sensations. There are certain disturbances of the nerves, and certain variations and differences of the objects, which *correspond* to the sensations felt. The latter have an almost constant connection with the former. What we call a body, when examined, reduces itself to a collection of certain powers of exciting sensations within us, — sensations of heat, sweetness, figure, resistance, extension, etc. And when we say that a body has the power to excite a certain sensation in us, we mean simply that such a sensation is possible or necessary under certain conditions. The powers, consequently the properties, consequently the substance of bodies, Taine thus resolves, as Mill has done, into "certain permanent possibilities of sensations for ourselves or other sentient beings," but he adds to this the element that these possibilities become necessities whenever the sensitive organism is brought into all the needed conditions for receiving such a sensation.

But a body exists independently of our observation; it precedes and survives us. It remains unchanged when we change, and changes when we do not. Certain of its events excite certain changes in other bodies. The marble in motion displaces another marble. The heated stone evaporates water. Bodies come thus to be defined and considered, not in reference to our sensitive events, but in reference to their own, and in reference to those that they occasion in other bodies. But in these respects, also, bodies are still groups of possibilities or necessities of sensations, more or less permanent. All these properties exist in relation to events, of ourselves, the body in

question, or other bodies; and all these events are defined in final analysis by our own events: they are more or less elaborated extracts from sensation.

Among these is there any one, Taine next inquires, which we may legitimately ascribe to bodies? Is there nothing intrinsic in bodies? Or are bodies indeed nothing more than a simple collection of permanent powers or possibilities, of which we can affirm nothing except the effects that they excite in us? Or indeed, as Bain and Mill, following Berkeley, think, are they pure nonentity, erected by an illusion of the human mind into substances and external things?

Having followed the idealistic path so unhesitatingly thus far, — having found nothing but hallucination in every process and result of the intelligence thus far, — the reader fully expects him to take the grand idealistic plunge through the empty shell of matter into the void inane beneath it. But here he suddenly and strangely pauses. He fears apparently to deprive science and physical knowledge of all solid foothold; and out of the vast field of phantoms and semblances to which he has reduced the world, he would, therefore, save a little tract which he may declare to be real and permanent. Though every other quality may be stripped from bodies, we are justified, he maintains, in believing that one quality, motion, still remains, and that it constitutes bodies independent existences. If all sentient beings were suppressed, bodies such as a stone, for example, would still exist. "And this does not merely mean that the possibility of certain visual, tactile, and other sensations would still subsist; it also means that the unknown things which we term molecules, and which make up the stone, would still subsist; in other words, that the movable motive-powers of which the stone is the aggregate would continue to weigh on the ground proportionately to their mass, and would go through the same internal oscillations as they do at present." (Part II. Book II. ch. 1.)

Thus do we gain our knowledge of body, and such is its reality. It is the same with the mind. Its unity and permanence is an appearance only. It seems to be fixed only because a certain common character, its inwardness, is constantly repeated. What we call self is but an extract from our

various successive events, isolated to the mind by the oblivion of its connection with them, but actually nothing apart from them. Illusory in the metaphysical sense, it is not, however, in the ordinary sense. There is something corresponding to it, — something very analogous to that which, according to our analysis, constitutes the substance of bodies. This something is the permanent possibility of certain events under certain conditions, and the permanent necessity of the same events under the same conditions, with the addition of a complementary one, — all these events having a common and distinctive character, that of appearing as internal. (Part II. Book III. ch. 1.)

Our author next advances to the consideration, a second time and more fully, of general ideas and the process by which they are formed. They pass, he shows, through two stages. In the first the idea rises with the sign; it is as yet incomplete and vague. In the second it is rectified, and, by addition and subtraction, is made to correspond to its object.

There are other general ideas which correspond, not so much to actual things as to possible things, — the ideas which compose arithmetic, geometry, mechanics. These ideas we construct without having in view any real thing to which we seek to make them conform. These serve in arithmetic as preliminary outlines; in geometry, as models to which nature seems to strive to conform.

Next Taine considers how we form laws, general judgments, or propositions. They are formed by coupling together two general characters or ideas. Sometimes the two connected characters are simultaneous; sometimes one, termed the antecedent, precedes; the other, the consequent, follows. Laws concerning real things we learn by the various modes of induction, supplemented often by deduction. The laws of possible things are discovered by the deductive road. The propositions concerning them are not merely probable, but certain beyond our little world; at least, we are unable to believe or conceive that it is otherwise. The axioms and theorems of geometry, for example, are necessarily true always and everywhere. The contraries of them are not only incredible but inconceivable.

Here we have, then, the only kinds of propositions which are applicable to all cases, without exception. On their value depends the reach of human knowledge. What is their validity then? This depends on their origin. There are two principal answers. Kant and his school say that these propositions reveal to us, not a necessary connection of things, but simply a certain structure of the mind which does not allow us to conceive the ideas of these things except as so connected. Stuart Mill, starting from an opposite stand-point, arrives at a similar conclusion. These propositions are but truths of experience, — the summed-up impression left on our minds by things. Like all truths of experience, these laws then reach only to the establishment of a constant fact in the past, within the field of observation. Whether there is a connection between the things themselves, we are incapable of knowing. Taine differs, however, from both of these views. He shows that in axioms, and the consequences deduced from them, there must be a connection of facts as well as of ideas, because the two data are such that the first includes the second. The deduction is simply an analysis, which reveals parts and identities not expressly stated or clearly perceived, but which tacitly were included. Thus is established the necessity of the junction, not merely of the two ideas or hypotheses, but of the two facts or sets of facts, because the first, wherever it will be, will involve the second, since the second is a part of itself. Their connection, then, is not limited to the range of past or present experience, but is absolute and universal. (Part II. Book IV. ch. 2.)

From these considerations we may learn finally the nature of reasoning, the essence of laws, and the structure of things. When we have learned that a connection exists between two things, we are naturally led to ask, Why are they connected? What link or intermediate unites them or explains their union? In the discovery of this intermediate lies the secret of all demonstration, the key-stone of every law of nature.

Now this intermediate may be of many kinds. Sometimes it is composed of but a single element, sometimes of many; sometimes its components are successive; sometimes simultaneous; sometimes the component intermediates are similar in

kind, sometimes different. But however these minor qualities may vary, the essential nature of the explanatory intermediate remains the same, i. e. that it is always shown to us as a character or a sum of characters included in the first datum of the couple; more general than that datum when they are considered apart, and accessible to our grasp from being comprised in it, and separable from it by our ordinary processes of isolation and extraction.

Take any law requiring demonstration. It is composed of two data. The first datum is more complex than the intermediate, and contains it; the intermediate, again, is more complex than the last datum, and contains it. Thus the mind is carried on from the first to the last datum, and the two are coupled by means of the quality found to be common to them both. In the sciences of construction, of pure thought, we can discern easily this essential nature of demonstration. Every theorem is an analytical proposition. The proof consists in a process of analysis by which in the first datum, a collection of primitive factors or elements, there is found included a character which, either directly or through the mediation of more intermediates, includes the other datum and couples them. In the sciences of experience it is the same, though the difficulties of the process are much greater. It is not sufficient here to consult simply our conception of the first datum of a couple, and by reflection analyze the group into its elements. We are obliged to go outward into nature, and by laborious and lengthy processes of nature learn what are the elements or factors of our first group, before we can find the intermediate character by which it is attached to the other group. But when induction has discovered the properties of the factors, we can go on with the work of demonstration as in the constructive sciences. Whenever we are able thus to isolate and observe the elements of a compound, we can from the properties of the elements explain the properties of the compound, and from a few general laws deduce a host of particular laws. At a certain limit, to be sure, explanation is brought to a full stop. When, in this progressive decomposition, we arrive at compounds in which our consciousness, senses, and instruments are unable to discover simpler elements, explanation is at a stand-

still and is reduced to conjecture. Every science meets these limits. Such are the elementary sensation, the living cell, the chemical molecule, the ethereal atom. But though the explanatory intermediate is too minute or obscure for us, with our present means of observation, to detect it, we yet believe that it exists. There is, we are persuaded, a reason for every connection of facts, a reason for every law, — for the laws concerning mental compounds, as for the laws concerning real compounds; for the formation as well as for the properties of a planet or of a species. Questions of origin are but questions of what combination of properties will produce a certain effect. Besides indicating the existence, we can indicate beforehand the position and principal characteristics of the intermediate which still escapes us. It is a simpler and more general character than the first datum of the couple; it is included in that datum and appertains to its elements, and the properties of that datum, as well as its origin, have as their ultimate reason of existence the characters and previous state of its ultimate elements.

On these indications the thought flies off to extend this structure of things beyond our world and history, throughout the two gulfs of space and time, beyond all the distances to which imagination can attain, beyond all the confines which numbers or quantities fruitlessly swollen and heaped together can denote to the pure reason. Are we justified in acting thus? Taine boldly declares that we are. The further our extended experience drives back our horizon in space and time, the more explanatory reasons do we add to our store. Constantly we are filling up. Added to the probabilities afforded by these considerations is the positive proof given by the very nature of the relation of a subject to its attribute. The subject always includes the attribute, as a fragment, extract, or abstract of it. Hence, whenever two things are connected together, there must be an explanatory intermediate more general in character than the first member of the couple and included in it.

From this follows the proof of the principle on which induction rests, and also the axiom of causality. From this many other consequences flow, leading us, if we will pursue them, up

to the idea of existence itself and its elements and conditions. But as this would pass beyond the field of cognitions into that of metaphysics, M. Taine here ends his inquiries.

Such is the substance of M. Taine's philosophy. We have not been able, of course, to give any idea of the abundant illustrations and examples which at once enliven his exposition and sustain his argument. We have not been able to exhibit the width of his researches, or the polish of his style. We have been compelled to give in abstract terms a brief summary, which, despite the rigor with which we have compressed it, is still perhaps too long.

But thanks to M. Taine's admirable method of summing up at the close of each chapter the results therein reached, we are able to say that our account is given almost entirely in M. Taine's own statements.

Our readers can now see for themselves how subtle are his analyses, how bold, original, and ingenious is his system; how logically his conclusions flow on from one fundamental assumption to another. In these respects and many others, it is admirable.

His chapters on the nature of the reduction, revival, and obliteration of images; on illusions and their rectification; on the abstract ideas of geometry, arithmetic, and mechanics; and on the laws of possible things, — are highly to be commended. We can but commend, also, his design of securing aid for psychology in her perplexities from that rich quarry of natural science where so many treasures of knowledge have already been found, and more still, we believe, are to be found. But having gladly said thus much of praise, candor compels us to say more of blame.

His originality has been purchased, in great measure, by the sacrifice of what we deem the most precious truths. His boldness seems not seldom like the mental escapades of one who has thrown off regard for soberness of statement and the fundamental laws of thought. The assiduous attention which he has given to the observation of bodily conditions and external facts seems to have disqualified him from realizing fully pure mental or spiritual phenomena, as they exist in their simplicity, falling under the eye of consciousness. In his favorite École

de Médecine he has studied mental disease till he finds nothing but hallucination anywhere.

Perception, imagination, memory, extension, — each of these is an hallucination. Abstract ideas, personality, force, faculty, — these are but illusions of the intellect, mental fictions which everybody foolishly constructs.

Instead of M. Taine's treatise being designated "On Intelligence," it should be entitled "On the Illusions of Intelligence." It is not so much a system of psychology that he gives us, as one of mental pathology.

The fact seems to be that M. Taine has a most palpable and dangerous penchant for paradox. Whatever will astonish, he longs to prove to be true. Whatever belief common-sense trustfully rests upon, he is filled with the most ardent longing to knock from under it. That a notion is repugnant to the general opinion of mankind or condemned by current authorities is enough to make him embrace it with open arms.

This passion for paradox it is, more than any other one thing, which accounts for the various peculiarities of his system. This it is that renders every one of those ancient and fundamental ideas, self, matter, substance, cause, power, a *bête noire* to him. This it is that makes him labor to detect some delusion or mental phantom at the bottom of every intellectual process. This it is that, on the other hand, excites in him the ambition to restore to the external world that reality, to deduction that actual truth, and to the reign of law and reasons that universal empire, that the most eminent masters in contemporary philosophy had agreed must be stripped from them.

The reader is strongly tempted to believe that, if M. Taine had happened to live in an age or a country in which his own views had long ruled, he would have attacked them as rigorously as he now does the opposite doctrines.

It is easy for us to say in general that M. Taine's views are unsatisfactory to us. The reader will desire that we show in particular where and why they are so.

Let us take up, briefly, some half-dozen of his principal positions, and it will not be difficult to show that they are as objectionable to sound logic as to common-sense.

In the first place, let us consider M. Taine's views of abstract ideas. He maintains that properly there are none, but merely abstract *names*, which present themselves at the stimulus of the slightest individual likeness. There is in the mind at most but a general tendency urging an expression.

If this be so, we are at loss to see how an abstract name can be intelligently and consistently used. An abstract name, as Taine himself says, represents a precise and fixed character. There must be in the mind, then, something more than a general, vague tendency to expression; there must be a precise and fixed idea, the inward counterpart of the outward character.

M. Taine objects that of such a precise and fixed character, common to all various individuals of a class, we cannot have either perception, experience, or sensible representation. We grant this. But though this general character cannot be perceived or imaged as a separate thing, yet it can be *conceived*. The intellect can construct and determine it in thought through the various attributes, properties, or relations which are its elements.

The name, it is true, is very important in rendering the idea permanent and helpful. After we have become familiar with the name, we may, to be sure, often use it without referring back to the idea which formed it. Without language it is difficult to reason either exactly or rapidly or lengthily. But the abstract idea as necessarily preceded the formation of the word and established its use as the nerve-current the motion of the tongue. If there was no mental operation to separate and fix the elements which the word stands for, the word would symbolize nothing, and hence be as meaningless as the chatter of a parrot. M. Taine's position implies that there can be no thought without words. The fact is, however, that there can be. Experience with deaf-mutes who have acquired little even of the language of signs proves this. These show by their actions that they generalize, i. e. form concepts, to a limited extent. They classify and arrange observations; they analyze and compare attributes; they apply principles in deduction, infer them from data. Even infants, too young to talk, manifest the possession of general ideas. We have repeatedly seen one picking out

from a heterogeneous heap similar objects and placing them together. Once noticing a cat holding a mouse in its mouth, the child was asked where the cat had the mouse, and she pointed at once to *her own* mouth. Even many brutes, such as the dog and the horse, must have, it seems to us, general notions. How can we conceive, as a writer in the Spectator once asked, that a sheep-dog which did not know the species as well as the individual could get along at all in his professional life?

Secondly, in regard to sensation, we cannot consider M. Taine's analysis of the unit of sensation into minuter unconscious sensations as at all a logical deduction from the phenomena that he instances.

We are aware that there is unconscious cerebration, that there is unconscious reflex action, but it was left for M. Taine to discover unconscious *sensation*. It seems to us a contradiction in terms. A sensation is essentially something felt. When it is not felt, it does not exist. There may exist the physical condition of a sensation, there may exist the nervous vibration which ought to excite a sensation; but if these do not excite any conscious experience, there is then no sensation, properly speaking. When small separate vibrations, which given slowly are either not perceived at all or produce only noises, give rise, on being repeated in very quick succession, to a continuous musical note, it is not necessary to infer, it seems to us, that these were unconscious sensations which were fused together into a larger whole capable of conscious experience. It is much more likely that the fusion took place among the nervous *vibrations* anterior to any excitation of sensation. M. Taine insists that sensation does not take place until the vibration has travelled along the nerve clear to the nervous centre. Here is place and time amply sufficient for such fusion, — place and time where it is more likely than not that it would take place.

Thirdly, we fail to see the justice of characterizing the fabric of our mind as essentially *hallucination*. We do not deny that images often develop into hallucinations. We do not deny that there is more than one illusion connected with the process of perception. But M. Taine himself shows how images are

always prevented when awake and in health from developing into delusions. He admits that the practical results which perception attains are in almost all cases correct. It fails, indeed, only when its action is distorted by loss of limb or by some physical or mental disease. M. Taine admits also that these illusions which attend perception are nothing innate, but are instituted in us by experience. They proceed from the education of the senses. Moreover, the erroneous localizing of the sensation in the nervous extremity, instead of in the nervous centres, is not a thing properly to be laid to the charge of the much-abused perceptive faculty, the sphere of which is the knowledge of the non-ego, but it is due rather to M. Taine's pet faculty, — sensation itself. Making the subtractions required by these considerations, there is little left, it seems to us, to justify M. Taine in calling perception *fundamentally an illusion*, at best an honest illusion, or in designating the image and all the rest of our mental operations as *undeveloped hallucination*. Such a characterization is defining the rule by the exception, — the result by a single step, — the essence of a thing, not by its original characteristics, but by its acquired properties. If we imitated it, we might, with equal justice, call man fundamentally an undeveloped idiot, a calf an immature monstrosity, a saint essentially an honest sinner.

We are comparatively willing, however, to surrender the perceptive and imaginative faculties to the yoke of illusion which M. Taine would hang round their necks. But when he proceeds to banish the substance both of mind and matter to the same limbo of unsubstantial ghosts and lying delusions, we must vigorously protest. The doctrine of substance is the keystone of every system which gives genuine reality to the inward and the outward world. Hence M. Taine hurls it down with contempt as a baseless fiction of the mind. Having pulled out the centre stone of the arch, it is very easy to demolish the rest. Power, cause, self, and matter, as they are each of them but substance of various kind or acting in equally various ways, are equally devoid of real existence; air-castles which every mind, by some strange Nemesis, invariably builds up, and then becomes the dupe of that which it itself created.

Now we would ungrudgingly grant that substance is not a

thing perceived by the senses. It is a mental apprehension. But it is not a fiction. It is an honest intuition. The fact that it is instinctively and universally believed in bespeaks its truth.

On perceiving the various relations, properties, attributes, of an object, especially when perceiving these constantly repeated, the mind necessarily conceives a substance, a permanent being possessed of power, which holds these relations, to which these properties belong, in which these attributes inhere. For these qualities imply such a substance. We cannot separate length from something which is long, nor color from something which is colored, nor thought from a thinking being. And the substance of an object does not signify merely an assemblage of certain attributes, a series of certain events, a group of certain relations, but it is that permanent being which is the cause and the bond of these various attributes, events, and relations.

If there be no substance to mind or external body, but the one is a mere series of simple or transformed sensations, the other a loose group of possibilities or necessities exciting sensation, how are to be explained the constant connection and repetition of the same sensations; the persistent association and endurance of the same possibilities of sensation? Especially how is to be explained the fact that even when change in these takes place the permanence of certain elements is maintained amidst the greatest diversity?

We assert that this constant connection requires a constant bond; that the permanence of these effects demands the presence of a permanent cause, an enduring being possessed of power, — in other words, a substance.

If it be said that this necessary implication of thought does not imply a necessary implication in fact, we answer that, whether or not this last plea is itself sound, it is not open to M. Taine, because, in his chapter upon deductive reasoning, he expressly maintains that invincible connections of ideas imply a necessary connection in actual fact. If it be said that this substance is necessarily a thing unknowable apart from its attributes, we answer, that, though in fact the substance is indivisible from its attributes, in thought it must be distinguished. Though it is not known apart from its attributes, it is known *through* its

attributes; and the attributes and the substance stand in such a fixed and indissoluble relation that the knowledge of the one enables us to know the other.

If the real existence of substance must be maintained, as we believe it must, that of mind, matter, force, and cause necessarily follow. For mind is spiritual substance; matter, material substance; force, the energy of substance; cause, this energy producing effects.

For the existence of the self as a permanent, indivisible, identical being, we have the direct testimony of consciousness. It is a travesty upon the nature of the Ego to call it nothing but a series of sensations, images, and thoughts, the special activities of the nervous centres.

The mind is conscious of itself, not as a sensation or series of sensations, but as an existence present with every sensation, the being who *experiences* the sensation. The experience of the soul is not that at one moment it is an act, at another a pain, but that it is a being who acts and who suffers pain. Moreover, the fact is not merely that the soul, at the second moment, experiences a repetition of a similar effect, i. e. the inwardness of the state, but that the soul knows itself as still continuing one and the same being. Our states of course change, but the very conception of change implies the conception of an unchanged permanent element; otherwise it would be no change, but the annihilation of one thing and the substitution of another. M. Taine, indeed, does not hesitate to advance to this conclusion. He unequivocally declares that when the series of our mental events ceases to exist, nothing remains of the mind or Ego. After profound slumber, then the awakening to consciousness would actually be a new mental birth or creation. What makes us imagine, says Taine, that it is the one and the same soul that still endures through the variations or interruptions of our mental states, is the constant repetition of a similar mental quality or qualities, owing to the constant renewal of the same physical conditions. In answer to such an astonishing assertion, we can only declare flatly that this is not a true analysis of our mental experience.

The testimony of consciousness is that after sleep we are no new existence, however similar, but the same identical exist-

ence. If it be not, how can we rely at all upon the veracity of memory?

If there is no continuity between the self of to-day and the self of yesterday, how can I reason from the present recollections of the second self to the experiences of the first self, or from the past experiences of the first to the present experiences that the second would now receive?

And as we maintain the existence of spiritual substance as an enduring operative being, directly known by the mind, so we would maintain the existence of material substance and of force. The mind directly knows material substance, as a permanent existence occupying space and causative of specific sensations in the sentient soul. The mind must know something more of matter than certain sensations excited in us, from which we assume the existence of certain possibilities or necessities of sensation. We should separate its agency from the agency of the mind, and assign to it its attributes of extension, solidity, action on the senses, etc.

So also do we know force as a something more than a mere particularity of one fact to follow another. We are conscious, in our own exercises and receptions of it, that there is effort in it, causal efficiency; that there is not merely an observed sequence of two events, but that there is an activity or energy, in the first of which the second is a necessary consequence, provided there is no preventive condition. We were quite surprised to see one so full of the spirit of physical science reject an idea so fundamental to it, and of late so fruitful in its rewards to the physical investigator, as the idea of force. While Herbert Spencer would find no real existence behind phenomena but force, and Tyndall does not conceive he had reached an adequate explanation of phenomena until he has arrived at some permanent force; while Büchner and his compeers on the other side of the Rhine are crying out that force and matter constitute the only infinite and suffice to explain the universe; — Taine maintains that it is but a mental fiction. Perhaps we may leave to one party the task of answering the other.

It is with a feeling of relief that the reader, having been led down and down, finding every foundation on which he would

rest his foot an empty bubble, is at last allowed to stop just as he is within a hair's breadth of the abyss of total unreality and nothingness, and his footsteps are thenceforth directed upward. This latter part of M. Taine's work, in which he turns from the picking to pieces of what others have believed in, to try his own hand at establishing some realities, is much more satisfactory to the sober-minded thinker than the progressive iconoclasticism which constitutes the first part. But, unfortunately, the two portions fit ill together.

The consciousness of the ruin which his analysis has already wrought among the fundamental ideas with which synthetic philosophy usually builds, prevents him from giving the best support to the positive reality and knowledge that he would vindicate; and even the foundations on which he does lay them can be regarded as sound, only on condition that much of the destructive work which preceded it be pronounced unsuccessful. M. Taine seems to take great pride in this second part of his work, in his establishment, against John Stuart Mill, of the reality of bodies and the universal validity of deduction and the explanatory reason. He has seen, what Mill either did not see or did not regard, that scepticism of these things takes from physical science all its certainty and value. But Mr. Mill is plainly the more logical of the two. If Taine had followed out his premises with the same rigor that the English metaphysician did his, he would have ended in the same sceptical idealism. For instance, consider the objective reality which Taine vindicates for bodies. In addition, he says, to the possibilities or necessities of sensation for sentient beings, there exists in bodies such as a stone, and there would still exist if all sentient beings were destroyed, the *molecules* which make up the stone. But what does M. Taine mean here by molecule? In the ordinary scientific conception of the word, it implies a minute quantity of matter and of force. But we may conceive it by either one of these attributes without the other. We may say that force is a mere quality or mode of action of matter, and hence a molecule is essentially matter; or, on the other hand, we may say that the conception of a centre of force is entirely sufficient to explain all the phenomena of the molecule, and that to clothe it with matter also is superfluous. But one of

these two attributes, either that of matter or that of force, is essential to enable us to conceive a molecule. Yet M. Taine has rejected them both. What then is left to constitute this molecule which is the ultimate reality of the universe?

Taine explains it first by saying that he means by the molecules of a body "the movable motor powers which weigh on the ground, and which continue to go through with the same internal oscillations"; and a little further on he designates as the ultimate objective realities "the motions of the body," "the series of events which tend to accomplish themselves." Power, weight, tendency, motion, — these, then, are what constitute the real world. But the first three of these, — power, weight, tendency, — are not these the old nonentity, force, under very thin disguises? Finally ridding ourselves of him, let us see what we have left. Plainly motion, and motion alone. Motion, with nothing to be moved, no force to start it or sustain it, no space in which it may occur.

Surely, here is the most spectral and unsubstantial foundation on which philosopher ever attempted to base a world of real existence.

Moreover, with what legitimacy or consistency does M. Taine refrain from driving the axe of his analysis through this last straw of the common-sense belief in objective reality, and showing it to be but illusion, as he has through all the rest? He has already branded all the sensible properties of bodies, such as color, extension, form, solidity, as mere phantoms, extracts of the Ego more or less elaborated, altogether subjective in their character, and known only by a process whose essence is hallucination.

But is not the idea of motion equally an extract from our subjective experience, an idea derived solely from our sensations and by that same hallucinatory process, — perception? M. Taine admits it. Why then is this to be credited with objective reality, while the former are not? The only reason that Taine seems to have, is the necessity that he feels there is for some solid foundation for knowledge, and the very slight degree of subjectiveness and illusion that alone is left in the idea of motion. But logically the slightest tincture is as fatal as the fullest dose, and Taine ought no more to have granted objec-

tive existence to motion any more than to matter, force, figure, or space. Indeed, the first implies the rest. Where there is motion there must be something to be moved, something to start the motion, some space or extended thing between two separate points of which the motion can take place, and finally some line or figure described by the motion.

Logically, M. Taine ought to have gone on, and, with Mill and Bain, denied us any knowledge of an external world independent of us, or he should have halted while he still had something satisfactory to stand upon.

A similar inconsistency M. Taine is betrayed into in his exposition of the explanatory reason and of induction. He essays to establish for them, as we have said already, universal validity. When two objects are connected, there is always a character included in the one which includes the other.

Every subject includes its attributes. Therefore the presence of one general attribute which is known involves the presence of another as yet unknown one. Hence there is a reason, a law for everything, universal and invariable.

Now, this proof seems to us valid only on one condition, i. e. that the various attributes of bodies have some real connection. If they are bound together by their inherence in a common substance, if they are united by their origin as common effects of a common cause, if event is linked necessarily to event by some compulsive force, then it will of course follow that the presence of one attribute of a group or a series is a sufficient guaranty of the presence of the other. But if the ideas of substance and force be rejected as mental fictions, and cause be regarded merely as antecedent condition, as they have been by M. Taine, then the attributes of a body become only a loose bundle of facts, its successive states a mere unconnected series of possibilities. There remains no longer the slightest reason why the presence of one of these discrete phenomena should at all involve the other.

Possessing no deeper common being or inherent link to keep them together, but grouped by some chance, there is no reason why in another solar system, as Mill supposes, nay, in this present world at our very next observation, the qualities of bodies may not present a radically different association.

The fact is that there is no adequate foundation for the process of induction and the universal reign of law, except in the intuition of the principle of causality. Induction assumes the reality of causative power as necessary to explain the origin of all phenomena, and it implies that the various properties and events of bodies are necessarily connected together by underlying substances and forces. The process of deduction may perhaps be explained by resolving the relations of content into those of extent, and taking as our guide the maxim, "whatever is a part of a part is a part of the whole." Sir William Hamilton preceded M. Taine by many years in proposing this. But when it is sought to extend this method of proof to induction, it manifestly is unequal to sustaining the load laid upon it. Even deductive reasoning is not fully explained until the relations of quality and the distinctions of attribute and substance, cause and effect, are taken into consideration. As an acute thinker of our own country has remarked in a work which ought always to keep his name high on the roll of philosophical authorities, "We are able to give reasons and to support our knowledge by reasons, because we believe the various objects and phenomena of the universe exist and are produced in dependence upon one another. In cases of reasoning where actually existing things with their causes and laws are not concerned, it will be found that their relations, whether mathematical or logical, are treated or regarded as causal agents, constituting elements or operative laws, and as in this way involving necessitated or logical relations." (Porter's Human Intellect, p. 449.)

To sum up our criticism of M. Taine, we should say that his great faults as a psychologist were these three: He slashes too freely with his undoubtedly keen analytic knife; he relies too exclusively upon the external observation of physical science; he distrusts too much the simple testimony of consciousness and universal spontaneous belief.

The lancet of the mental dissector may often discover many unsuspected elements, but for the most part dissecting consciousness is like dissecting the material brain. The most characteristic and vital qualities change and disappear before the bungling knife reaches them; and often, while the operator

is cutting away, or thinks he is cutting away, some diseased or abnormal part, he destroys the most essential structures.

We regard the discoveries of the anatomist and the physiologist as of great value to the psychologist. The mental philosophy which at the present day despises and ignores science marks itself as bigoted and absurd. The immense revolution which has taken place in the prevalent theories of sense-perception since the application of physical investigation to the solution of its problems is sufficient to vindicate a place for it in mental inquiries. But its proper place is a subordinate one. He who takes it as his sole or chief guide will fall into many errors. It is a general truth never to be ignored, that phenomena of one order can never be correctly interpreted by laws of an essentially different order. The physical inquirer, moreover, has this special disadvantage, that he can approach mental phenomena only from the outside. If our eyes could pierce everything, it would matter little at what point of view we took our station. But we have only a limited view; we walk in the world as between opaque walls. And when with the microscope and the scalpel we seek to study the mind, we can reach only its dwelling or instruments, the nerves and brain. We may trace the course of afferent and efferent nerves, and time the vibrations as they pass along; we may learn the varied structure of sensitive centres; we may behold the cerebral lobes contract and expand; we may mark the effect upon their action of nutriment and exercise, lesion and disease,— but still we are far from having entered at all the arcana of the mind. Even if, by some new optical instrument, we could gaze into the very centre of the brain, and instead of the inductions and probabilities, which are all that we now possess, we could behold every minutest part and the phases of its daily history, the passage of every nerve current and the spinning of every molecule, we should still be on the outside of the mind, we should still have, not sensation but motion, not mind but matter. None of these physical facts are mental processes. They do not constitute them. They cannot be found in them by analysis. There is no evidence sufficient to show that they even produce them. They are but their usual concomitants or conditions. The

physical antecedents might all be supposed to exist and act without the occurrence of a single conscious experience. The material and the mental events usually, indeed, stand in relation; but there is nothing in this usual relation that involves its necessity, still less the identity or equivalence of the two orders of events.

Now, if this chasm which always separates the physical from the mental, and allows physiological observation only a view of the soul's dress or tool-box, — never of the soul itself, — be borne in mind, much profit may be derived from such studies. But the tendency always is towards forgetting, or towards a bold push, such as M. Taine has made, to bridge the gulf. The higher ideas and faculties of the soul are traced down into the lower; ideas into images, images into sensations. Able to perceive from the outside only the succession of events or their relation to their physical conditions, they are naturally led to regard these as constituting their whole character. The bond of personal unity will next be united by some analytical legerdemain, and the mind left a surface series unsupported by anything. The pillars of substance, force, extension, etc., are next taken from under bodies, and the material world becomes a realm of shadowy oscillations performed and originated and taking place in nothing. Having thoroughly disorganized both the realm of matter and of mind, and having made the reader's brain dizzy with contemplation of the universal motion which is all that is left of the solid globe, it is not difficult to slip him over the chasm before he perceives it, and persuade him that a motion and a sensation, an idea and a molecule, are only two faces of one and the same thing. Henceforth all is smooth sailing, inasmuch as the whole of psychology becomes now properly what Auguste Comte called it in his "Positive Philosophy," "a simple subdivision of animal physiology."

If the one step, the identifying of motion with sensation, be legitimate, all the rest is sufficiently so. But if that step cannot properly be taken, the chasm remains, the whole process must be condemned. And we must say that M. Taine has failed in this one essential step. The only proofs that he offers are the analogy of the difference of sensations according to

the route that they enter the mind, and the existence of unconscious, rudimentary sensations which he had before essayed to establish. The latter we have already shown the illogicalness of; the former merely suggests, but proves nothing. The words "mental" and "physical" mark the widest distinction known to us in nature. Phenomena of the one order are entirely unlike phenomena of the other.

Though constantly related in all human beings, they stand as constantly in sharp antithesis, as well in their simplest as in their most complex forms, at their nearest points of contact as at their most remote divergences. "Between the idea of a motion and the idea of a sensation," says Tyndall, "there is nothing in common." "No exertion of thought," says Herbert Spencer, "can enable us to conceive either of these ultimate elements as convertible the one into the other." But if, as Taine tells us, thought is but vibration seen from within instead of from without, why does it thus vigorously repudiate any identity with its other side?

The fact is, that we cannot study the mind successfully unless we take consciousness as our chief instrument. That alone gives us the inside view, the immediate vision. In its crude, unrefined form, as the ignorant, unreflecting mind apprehends it, its testimony may perhaps mislead. It may need to be sifted. It may need to be tested, assisted, magnified, as Taine says; but when its strict and pure deliverances are ascertained, we can never have too much of them; we can find no source of information which can give us a more direct and more intimate knowledge of the mind. If consciousness needs the assistance and connection of physiology to attain a true knowledge of the mind, still more does the physiologist need the help of consciousness, and a firm trust in it. To find the very problems to be explained or the simpler mental elements which he would resolve them into, he must resort to the interspection of consciousness. No unconscious action or connection of actions can, of themselves, tell us anything of the conscious states of the soul. A true philosophy must not only start with consciousness, but will consult her at every turn; and whenever it finds itself offending her deepest instincts, it will know that somehow it has missed the right path.

JAMES T. BIXBY.

ART. VI. — *The Service of the Poor.* By CAROLINE EMELIA STEPHEN. London and New York: McMillan & Co. 1871.

THE title alone of this remarkable book does not give a correct impression of its contents. The title-page further announces it to be "An Inquiry into the Reasons for and against the Establishment of Religious Sisterhoods for Charitable Purposes." This amplification reveals the real task which the authoress has set herself, namely, a very close examination of the respective merits of religious and secular establishments for ministering to the sick, in the course of which she gives a history of the principal charitable sisterhoods on the Continent of Europe and their work, comparing the results with the experiment of a nurses' training-school, which is her example of the secular system. To find the most efficient method of relief for the poorer classes is a problem which has had so large a share of public attention of late years that an able book upon any subdivision of that subject is a valuable acquisition; and Miss Stephen has given the various modes of charitable succor of the sick thorough investigation, and weighed them with admirable clearness and judgment. But it is in its bearing on the more exciting topic of religious retreats for women that we think her work of most importance and interest. So much enthusiasm, romance, party spirit, personal feeling, and other emotions, both of a higher and lower nature, invest the question of sisterhoods, that great confusion has ensued as to the outward frame-work and inward spirit of such societies, while a sort of agitated interest in them is constantly increasing. In this country, where the interest is wider spread and more feverish in proportion to our ignorance of the nature and results of such communities in places where they have had time to take root and bear fruit, mere statistical knowledge alone would be of immense use, and a careful, comprehensive, impartial consideration of the subject of invaluable benefit to a very large class among us. Miss Stephen has, therefore, done a great service to the Christian, the civilized world, — and peculiarly to our portion of it, — in giving us what she calls "a fuller knowledge of the facts of the case," and a keen, profound, dispassionate — too dispassionate — inquiry into its

moral phenomena. Moreover, as a contribution to general literature the book deserves a very high place; it is a solid octavo volume of three hundred and fifty pages, whose accuracy of information, laborious collection of materials, judiciously condensed, earnest thought, sustained argument, vigorous, lucid, and agreeable style, make it, in all respects, a capital performance.

Miss Stephen begins her Preface by the incontestable position that "some kind of organization is necessary for providing a supply of trained women for works of charity, and for directing them when trained in the performance of such works." She distinguishes between the two bases of such organization as religious and secular, using the terms as representing respectively systems whose purpose is primarily the spiritual benefit of the performer or recipient of these works, and those whose ultimate object is charity. The first demands allegiance to some religious denomination as indispensable to membership of the association, and exacts the gratuitous service of all its members; such an association is called a "sisterhood." The other necessarily involves no such conditions. "Works of charity may be roughly divided into the three branches of teaching, nursing, and almsgiving." The first and last are dismissed, the former as a settled question, — settled in favor of secular institutions, — the latter as so unsettled that it is impossible to consider it in its present state; therefore, the only one to be examined is nursing. Miss Stephen illustrates her idea by reference to five sisterhoods, ancient and modern, Roman Catholic and Protestant, with an account of the Liverpool training-school for nurses, as an example of a purely secular establishment. This forms the first part of the book.

The first instance of a religious and charitable association among women is the female diaconate of the primitive church. Very little is known about them; they seem to have been the object of constant opposition from their first appearance, and to have exhibited very early some of the most marked features of monastic institutions, namely, perpetual vows, celibacy, addiction to penance and mortification, and reversion of the members' property to the religious establishment to which they were attached. They were suppressed in the Western

Church about the sixth century, in the Eastern about the twelfth.

The second example is the Béguines. They took their rise in Flanders at an obscurely early day, — during the seventh century, they say themselves; there is authentic mention of one at Vilvorden as early as 1065. In the following century they began to expand, and during the thirteenth, which has been called their golden age, they spread all over Europe. "Their original object was avowedly, not the performance of works of charity, but mutual perfection and the cultivation of spiritual perfection." They included men as well as women, the latter being always widows or blameless maids, who renounced the cares and pleasures of the world to devote themselves to a better life, reserving, however, the right to return and even marry. At first much liberty was accorded them; even in towns where a Béguinage, or house of the order, existed, they were permitted to live in their own homes, wearing the dress, frequenting the religious services, and sharing the duties of the members. In the fourteenth century abuses compelled them to put an end to this privilege. Originally, no age was fixed for admission; even children were received and wore the dress, although not allowed to take the vows or be considered members until reaching the age of fourteen; later, in consequence of the volatility of these youthful votaries, the age was fixed at forty in some places; it now ranges from eighteen to thirty, but is not made a point of. They managed their property at their own pleasure; but if a sister was expelled for misconduct, she forfeited what she had brought with her; if a novice withdrew without scandal, she took away what she had brought, paying a moderate sum for board. But if she had completed her novitiate and assumed the dress and pledges of the order, she was obliged to leave the greater part of her property to the society. This clause was so unpopular and gave rise to so many difficulties, complicated by the semi-secular constitution of the society, that it seems to have been one cause of the persecution which overtook them, reaching its climax under Popes Clement V. and John II., who issued edicts for their suppression, and confided the execution to the Inquisition. Under this oppression they sought the protection of the power-

ful monastic orders, and some of them adopted the rule of the Franciscans, others of the Dominicans. Under this storm the brotherhoods disappeared entirely, and most of the sisterhoods. Belgium subsequently became their head-quarters, and I believe it is only there that they are to be found at the present day. Their principal seat is Ghent, where there are two establishments, the Grand and the Petit Béguinages.

In the beginning the members lived together in one building, according to the custom of most religious communities; but by degrees the system of separate dwellings grew up, and the Grand Béguinage is a mimic city, with its miniature houses, its church, infirmary, streets, gates, and outer walls, in the heart of the old Flemish town. There is the residence of the Groote Jufrow (Great Maiden), Grande Dame, or Superior-General, the head of the community; there are the convents, eighteen in number, each with its own superior, where the Béguines live for the first six years, and permanently if they prefer it, the home of the poorer members who cannot find room with sisters who are better off; there, also, are the hundred and odd tiny brick houses, with their respective courtyards shielded by solid wooden fences from the small straight streets. Those able to afford it can thus live by themselves, sometimes hiring a *bonne* to do their errands and household work, sometimes taking in a poorer sister or two as lodgers. Applicants for admission must bring a certificate of irreproachable character and good conduct; as every inmate must live at her own expense, she must likewise show that she has a yearly income of one hundred and ten francs (less than twenty-five dollars), besides which on entering she is required to pay about as much more, to be divided equally between the church and her convent, for repairs, etc. These sums are paid in three instalments during the two years' novitiate, and are restored to the novice if she leaves the Béguinage. Those who have no further resources are obliged to work for their own support; the favorite industry is lace-making. "Each Béguine has a fortnight's holiday in the year, and may, in case of the illness of any of her relations, obtain leave of absence for any length of time, even for years, if she is wanted at home. The sisters living in separate houses may receive their near

male relations, fathers, brothers, uncles, for three days, or near female relations for a fortnight at a time, in their own houses. . . . . The sisters living in separate houses are free to go in and out of the Béguinage as they please; those living in convents must ask permission of their superior. I inquired particularly whether the sisters were at all employed as nurses or visitors among the poor, and was told that this is not considered as any part of their ordinary business. . . . . The sisters also have a free school for poor children in the Béguines; and in times of public distress, such as war and epidemics, when the other sisterhoods are not numerous enough, the Béguines form a sort of army of reserve, and act as Sisters of Charity." The rule of the order, Miss Stephen says, is never shown. She quotes Mosheim's account of the Béguinage of Strasburg, which says that the vows consisted merely in a promise of chastity and obedience, and were not perpetual; but when the writer of this article visited the Grand Béguinage, in 1871, it was admitted to her that a sister who left the community, after taking the full vows, was not well thought of. Their daily devotions, public and private, occupy about six hours a day.

The superior-general is elected by the superiors of the convents, with the concurrence of the bishop and priest (of the parish?); she governs the Béguinage with the aid of a small council chosen by herself among the worthiest members of the sisterhood; the superiors of the separate convents are elected yearly — generally re-elected — by their own sisters. The community belongs to the order of St. Dominic.

In 1793 the Béguinages of Ghent, after surviving so many former dangers, narrowly escaped disfranchisement, by an appeal to the record of their charitable deeds and donations; they were spared on condition of the transfer of their property to the administration of the hospitals, to whom the superiors now act as trustees, and render a monthly account. These revenues arise from certain legacies and donations; "the only common fund is that appropriated to the infirmary and for the relief of the sisters in any temporary emergency; this fund is privately administered by the superior-general. Miss Stephen gives no statistics as to the number of the Béguines, or their

increase or decrease; two years ago there were between six and seven hundred in the Grand Béguinage alone. When she was at that establishment in 1868, it was threatened by the hospital administration with several innovations which would essentially change its character, and might endanger its existence; but three years later they had not gone into effect, and nothing was said about them. The sisters resist such changes, and assert their claim to gratitude and respect for their services in times of public calamity, when they have sometimes fallen victims to their devotion. But as has already been stated, such work is no part of their professed object. The impression left upon the memory by the quaint and quiet little streets, which carriages are not allowed to enter, the charming costume of the Béguines, the picturesque evening service, when strangers may see them assembled, the privacy and liberty of the lives, is of an establishment calculated to secure an agreeable retirement for its members, rather than any active good for humanity at large.

The next association described is the Third Order of St. Francis. It grew out of the revival of religion in the thirteenth century caused by the preaching of St. Francis Assisi, and the desire of many whose circumstances forbade their joining either of his regular orders (the Minor Brethren, and Claristans, or Poor Ladies) for a religious rule of life. St. Francis for their benefit prescribed certain observances, and instituted a society called the Order of Penitence. The rule requires that a married man or woman wishing to join the order should have the consent of the husband or wife, *if the consort be a faithful member of the Roman Catholic Church.* There is a year of novitiate, the vows are perpetual; after making the full profession, a member can only leave the order to join a stricter one. A particular dress is enjoined, of which, however, only the Franciscan cord and scapulary are obligatory, and these may be worn beneath the outer garments. There is much detail as to religious observances, renunciation of worldly amusements, fasting, abstinence, and "spiritual favors"; a great deal of this is susceptible of modification in individual instances by the dispensation of the father director of the congregation to which the member belongs. The order is divided into

several classes: first, those who have taken the solemn vows (poverty, obedience, and chastity), and are living in a community, the Regular Tertiarians, who have in fact embraced the monastic life; second, those living in communities, but under renewable vows, — these Tertiarians (as all the members of the Third Order are called) are especially devoted to works of charity; third, those devoted to the service of the First and Second Orders; fourth, Tertiarians living with their own families, but under a vow of chastity; fifth, those living in the world, without any vows. These last are either isolated or members of regularly organized congregations. The rule is strict as to the good character of its candidates. The earliest age for postulants is between eighteen and twenty; women cannot belong to the fourth class above mentioned under forty. There is a clause requiring Tertiarians to make their wills within three months after profession, rather oddly accompanied by a statute forbidding father directors to advise or even permit the members, if consulted by the latter, to bequeath property to their own convent or church. The organization of the Third Order is exceedingly intricate: "It is placed under the direction of the First Order; the minister-general of each of the three branches of the First Order, the provincial for his province, and the *père gardien* for the district attached to each convent, are the superiors and *ex officio* visitors of the Third Order. The congregations have their special government as follows: a director; below him a rector for the men, and mother superior for the women; a deputy rector; master of the novices; secretary; treasurer; "zélateurs," "sacristans," "infirmiers," and other officers not enumerated who form a "discrétoire," or council, of which the director is president. The director is a priest appointed by the First Order; the other officers are elected triennially by their own congregations. Their various titles indicate their functions. "The 'zélateurs' are specially charged to watch secretly and with discretion over the strict observance of the rule, statutes, and usages of the Third Order. They are to inform the brother rector of the negligences and infractions of which brethren may be guilty. It also belongs to the 'zélateurs' to superintend the conduct of Tertiarians in the midst of the world," etc. "The 'infirmiers'

are either priests or old and experienced brothers, whose business it is to visit the sick, to apply to the rector for any relief which they may require, to see that the sick person receives the sacraments, makes his will," etc. In the "discrétoire" everything is decided by the majority of voices, the father director having a casting vote. "The correction of faults, which is one of the most important objects of the institution of the Third Order, is intrusted chiefly to the brother director, who is bound to give two warnings, a third being given by the father director before the final sentence of exclusion can be pronounced by the visitor." The influence and extent of this association was immense from its very foundation, and adapted itself marvellously to the needs of the age and the various positions of its members, which comprised people of every rank and calling. "In the time of Francis himself and of his immediate successors, the Franciscan cord (the emblem of the restraint in which the soul of man is to hold the beast to which it is wedded) was to be seen on countless multitudes, in the market-place, in the universities, in the tribunals, and even on the throne. In the camp it was still more frequent, for there was much latent significance in the exceptional term by which the general prohibition of military service had been qualified for the members of the Order of Penitence. In the early part of the thirteenth century, the defence of the Church, of the Catholic faith, and of their native land, was to Italian ears an intelligible periphrasis for serving either under the standard of the cross against the Albigenses, or under the standard of the Guelphs against the Ghibellines; and the third estate of the Minorites formed an enthusiastic, patriotic and religious chivalry, which the Pope could direct at pleasure against either his theological or political antagonists. . . . . One hundred and thirty-four crowned heads, and a great number of royal dukes and princes, and more canonized saints than all the other Third Orders put together (amongst others St. Louis of France, St. Elizabeth of Hungary, and St. Vincent de Paule), are claimed for it by the Manual. What is more to our purpose is, that from the middle or end of the thirteenth century its members have undertaken works of charity of all kinds. They had hospitals. . . . . They had also asylums and houses of rest for

pilgrims, orphanages, and refuges for fallen women. Their rule does not enjoin the practice of works of charity, except the relief of poor members, and the statutes even earnestly warn members 'not to associate themselves' with any such works, outside the congregation, without first having well ascertained that they will never be an obstacle to the accomplishment of the obligations and duties imposed upon them by their vocation as members of the Third Order, or without the permission of the council. Within these limits they seem still to have very numerous charitable institutions of every kind, which are under the direction of the council. These are carried on principally by the 'regular' branch of the order, that is, by nuns living in communities." The Third Order of St. Francis spread throughout Europe during the thirteenth century, and in the course of the three following through Asia and America. It encountered persecution from the first, chiefly at the hands of secular princes, but was always particularly favored by the popes, upwards of a hundred bulls having been published in its favor, and two general councils having approved it. During the suppression of religious orders in the last century it almost disappeared, but has revived in great vigor within the last few years Ten years ago it was officially reported that there were thirty thousand Tertiarians in France alone, and that their number was daily increasing.

The Sisters of Charity, best known of all religious fraternities, was founded by St. Vincent de Paule in 1617. It arose accidentally, in consequence of his recommending to his parishioners a poor family of the neighborhood which was in great want; such a number came to their assistance, that he organized them into a *confrérie de charité* for visiting the poor and sick of the whole district. The society, composed exclusively of women, spread with wonderful rapidity. St. Vincent established similar ones of men, and founded the congregation of the Prêtres de la Mission, but these did not succeed equally well. In less than ten years the society had gained such proportions that St. Vincent gave up all other occupations and placed himself at its head. In his first enterprise he had been seconded by two ladies of his congregation; and he placed the chief supervision in the hands of Madame Le Gras, known to us by her maiden name

of Louise de Marillac, a young widow who dedicated the remainder of her long life to the pious work. "The original plan of these societies was that the ladies belonging to them should themselves do all that was necessary for the sick, make their beds, dress their wounds, and administer food and medicine. In the country villages this was not altogether foreign to the habits of many of these ladies; but when the societies were established in Paris, they were joined by many ladies whose rank and circumstances made such a personal attendance on the poor impossible. Women of a lower class were therefore wanted, whom the ladies might employ to do what they could not themselves undertake." Thus arose the practice of training women for nurses. Next, it was found advisable to divide the ladies themselves into two classes, — one for supplying the material, the other the spiritual, wants of their poor; some prepared jams and jellies, and others visited the sick-beds with ghostly advice and consolation. During St. Vincent de Paule's lifetime he was the means of establishing the Foundling Hospital, Asylum for the Aged, Asylum for Convicts, besides the Sisters of Charity, who were already doing an immense work, not for the bodies alone, but for the souls, of those under their care, and were busy throughout France and in many foreign countries. Their constitution ordains a superior for every congregation, to be elected triennially by the majority of the members; she may be re-elected once, but not oftener; three other officers, an assistant to the superior, a treasurer, and a "dispensière" (bursar), to be chosen annually. The superior defers in everything to the director, or superior-general of the mission, but has entire charge and control of the Sisters and candidates; the three subordinate officers form a council for her assistance, and each acts respectively as deputy for the one above her, in case of absence. "All the Sisters are to obey the superior and her representatives, as obeying God in their persons; they are also to obey the director, as regards their conduct." The portion usually required on admission is five hundred francs (about one hundred dollars). The only article of ineligibility against a woman of good life is illegitimacy. The Sisters are not allowed to take solemn (i. e. perpetual) vows; they can leave the order when they please. The whole rule of

the order is quoted by Miss Stephen, with the exception of some missing articles. It sets forth as its chief object the honor of Jesus Christ, the source and model of all charity, by giving aid, corporeal or spiritual, to the poor, sick, helpless prisoners, and other needy; it enjoins special strictness and circumspection, as substitutes for the seclusion and privacy of the close orders; urges to humility, simplicity, charity, submission, self-abnegation, unworldliness, patience. Many of the articles turn entirely upon matters of dress and economy, the members having no money except what is allowed them by the superior; strict obedience to all officers is exacted, and to the physicians who have charge of their patients; a general effacement of self is greatly insisted upon, and a high religious interpretation of the significance of their name and office, "Sisters of Charity." The rule for daily life is somewhat minute, dividing the time of those who live in community down to half-hours; many directions are given about dressing and undressing, but no mention is made of any except holy-water; conversation, except on religious subjects, is almost entirely prohibited; all letters sent and received are to be previously read by the superior; all intimacies or friendships or preferences are utterly condemned, as savoring of the flesh, and not of God; "they must own no bond to any created thing, such as places, occupations, or persons, not even their parents, kind folks, or confessors"; nor allow themselves to feel greater interest or liking for one patient than another; one Sister may not even kiss another, except in token of reconciliation, and then the form is prescribed. The original rule, it is said, has never been changed; indeed, the superior-general of the mission told Miss Stephen that there is no power or provision for altering it in any particular. All the regulations for work and conduct as members of a community are full of Christian common-sense; those which apply to individual guidance tend to asceticism and triviality. Less than a hundred years after the foundation of the order, there were nearly two thousand Sisters; at the Revolution they were dispersed, but immediately after the Reign of Terror they reassembled at the Mother House in Paris, and were soon able to resume their dress and calling. Four years ago they were estimated at about twenty thousand in all parts of the world.

Their work has been a great and noble one. Where they have seen the least of our Lord's little ones hungry, they have fed them; naked, they have clothed them; sick or in prison, they have visited them; hopeless lunatics, still more hopeless criminals, have known their ministering offices; wherever there has been war, pestilence, or famine, they have brought help. But the church to which they belong allows of no work which does not bear her sign-manual.

The deaconesses of modern Germany come next on the list. The cradle of this order is a quiet village on the Rhine, called Kaiserswerth; its single street is as clean as a newly-swept room, and down the centre a double row of locust-trees forms a vista through which is seen the wide river flowing through a landscape which already shows the placid features of the Netherlands. The buildings of the institution constitute half the little town. They consist of the Mother House, where the deaconesses are trained, the Hospital, Insane Asylum; Deaconess School, where girls too young to begin the regular course of instruction are prepared; Infants' School; Orphan Asylum; Asylum for discharged Female Prisoners and Fallen Women; Seminary for Teachers; "Feierabend" House, or Holiday House of Rest, for Infirm and Aged Sisters; besides some co-operative farm buildings which must have been put up since Miss Stephen's visit. There is also a house called "Salem," about two hours from Kaiserswerth, whither the Sisters are sent for change of air and rest. These are all quaint, home-like looking houses, of dark brick with red tiled roofs, some small, some large, with a great deal of nicely kept garden ground about them. Nothing can be more touching than the narrative of the origin and rise of the institution, as given by its founder, Pastor Fliedner, with true German earnestness and simplicity. His little parish of Kaiserswerth, containing but two hundred souls, had just been ruined by the failure of a velvet-manufactory in which they were all employed. When he assumed the charge, in 1822, such destitution ensued, that after getting what help he could from neighboring parishes, he made a journey through England and Holland to collect funds for his poor flock. He was much struck by the charitable societies of these countries, especially the prison visiting, and in 1833 began his own humble

attempts under the following circumstances. The Prison Society at Düsseldorf was anxious to provide an asylum for discharged female prisoners, where they could receive religious and industrial training until fitted for respectable situations. There was no such asylum in Germany, and many people thought the scheme impracticable; Pastor Fliedner offered to try the experiment, though he considered the smallness of his parish an obstacle. A few years before, he had married a lady who had for years gratuitously superintended an orphan asylum, and was greatly interested in the prisoner question. A female friend left her home to join them in the work. These three trusting souls began without funds or other assistance, and the first inmates of the asylum were lodged in a summer-house in the parsonage garden, for want of room elsewhere. Shortly afterwards a house was hired, chiefly from the brave pastor's scanty means, and the summer-house was used as a knitting-school for poor children, which developed into an infant school. Three years passed, and already numbers of reformed female prisoners and children of every denomination coming for instruction had rewarded their patience and hopefulness. The care of the sick was the next issue. This was a more serious step, for it required a hospital and nurses. The only house in Kaiserswerth fit for such a purpose was offered for sale; its price was over sixteen hundred dollars in our money, — an immense sum for that country and class. "We had no money," writes the pastor; "my wife had been confined only three days before; but, nevertheless, she laid it upon me, in the name of the Lord, to buy the house, and the sooner the better. I bought it cheerfully on the 20th of April, 1836. The money was to be paid before Martinmas of the same year." The money was paid before that time.

Many people were beginning to feel an interest in the undertaking, but, at the same time, jealousy and prejudice, private and sectarian, were aroused, and particular opposition was made by the Roman Catholics. Entire religious liberality and absence of any desire to proselytize on the part of Pastor Fliedner partly disarmed this hostility. Two friends, single women, came to offer themselves for nursing in the hospital, the first Kaiserwerth deaconesses. "On the 13th October

the two maidens went into the house and arranged the lowest floor for themselves and a few sick very scantily. A table, a few chairs with half-broken backs, damaged knives, some forks with only two prongs, old-fashioned worm-eaten bedsteads of different shapes and colors, and similar furniture and utensils, which had been given us, — in such a servant-like condition we began, but with great gladness and thanksgiving." This was in 1836; in 1867, Pastor Disselhof, the son-in-law and successor of the good Fliedner, writes: "Such institutions were afterwards established in the Protestant churches of many other countries, mostly in connection with our Mother House at Kaiserswerth. In the year 1841 the Deaconess House at Paris was opened"; and he enumerates others at Strasburg, Echallens, Dresden, Utrecht, Berlin, Pittsburg (U. S. A.), Breslau, Königsburg, Stettin, Ludwigslust, Stockholm, Carlsrhue, Richen (near Bale), Neuendettelsan, Stuttgart, Augsburg, Halle, Darmstadt, Zurich, Hamburg, Berne, Hanover, London, Copenhagen, Dantzig, Treysa (in Hesse), Posen, Frankfort-on-the-Main, Frankenstein, and the Elizabeth Hospital of Berlin. "In the year of Fliedner's death, the Protestant Church counted thirty mother houses, with 1,590 deaconesses; now there are thirty-four, with more than 1,700 sisters." In 1868 there were forty-two mother houses and 2,106 deaconesses, and the total number of asylums, etc., connected with the order, was 566. At that time there were above 500 deaconesses at Kaiserswerth alone, 90 being engaged as teachers, the rest as nurses. On my own visit (October, 1871) there were seventy probationers in the seminary being educated as governesses, and one hundred and fifty in the Mother House learning to nurse; the number of deaconesses I forget.

Three years ago there were 145 "out-stations" in all parts of the world; some fifty hospitals and other charitable institutions all served by them; many sisters do parish work, and nursing or teaching in private positions; in time of war and epidemic they have always been prominent and efficient. The official name of the order is the Rhenish Westphalian Deaconess Association; it was formally recognized in 1846 by the King of Prussia. It is governed by a council of a president, a secretary, treasurer, the inspector of the institution, the

assessors of the Rhenish Westphalian provincial synods, and ten or twelve members, among whom must be a physician in practice; they must all be members of the Lutheran, or, as it is called in Germany, Evangelical Church. This council meets quarterly at Kaiserswerth, but may be called together by the secretary on an emergency. The internal management is carried on by the inspector and mother superintendent. The latter is assisted by a council, who, as well as her subordinate officers, are chosen by herself from among the deaconesses. Before admission the candidates are required to declare that they intend to adopt the calling for life; they have to pass through a probation of from six months to two or three years, as requisite; on consecration they bind themselves to serve for five years, unless special circumstances, admitted by the directors of the institution, compel them to give up their office earlier. The conditions of admission as nursing sisters demand, primarily, a certificate of good character from their pastors; to this is added a sketch of their own lives and spiritual experience by themselves. Much stress is laid on a pious and devout frame of mind, an earnest spirit, kindly temper, and cheerful disposition. Good health is required, and a physician's certificate for this also. The age is limited to between eighteen and forty, but exceptions are made. A knowledge of ordinary household duties, knitting, sewing, washing, cooking, reading, writing, and arithmetic is essential, and to speak German well. On application for admission, they must send in a certificate from the temporal authorities, and a written consent from their parents and guardians. During probation they receive their board gratis, and caps, collars, and aprons, which they are bound to wear; on admission they also receive pocket-money; they are expected to bring with them sufficient and suitable under-clothing, a few plain dark dresses, and their Bible and hymn-book. The general requisitions in a teaching sister are the same, and in addition to the rest of her vouchers she must send her school certificates. She must have a gift for singing and a musical ear; be able to write a letter and a short description without mistakes in spelling and grammar; to work sums in the four rules of arithmetic, simple and compound, for integers and fractions; to know several good hymns

by heart; be able to relate the principal Bible stories, and facts of German history; to have some knowledge of geography and natural history. The seminary course of training is one year at least for the infant school, two for the elementary, and three for the higher school. Probationers pay for their seminary expenses, and if they leave it from any cause before the time for which they are pledged is out, must repay what they have cost the institution. "All probationers must be unbetrothed and their heart still free." If deaconesses, in the faithful fulfilment of their office, become disabled or sick, and possess no means, the direction assists in providing for them for the future, either in the Mother House or otherwise. Deaconess pupils below the age of eighteen are received and trained, but not admitted as probationers until they reach that age. Upon their consecration they are required to sign the "Hausordnung," or rule, which is no longer made public, though it was frankly shown in the time of Pastor Fliedner, to pledge themselves to keep it faithfully, to discontinue all intimacy with men and other earthly ties, all unnecessary correspondence, and to devote themselves exclusively to their office. A great deal of judgment is shown in assigning to each the branch of household or hospital economy for which she seems best fitted; some cannot learn to cook, nor others to wash; their strong and weak points are soon discovered, and their work allotted accordingly, but always by authority, and not upon their own choice; even in the matter of nursing and teaching, although they enter the institution with an avowed intention of following one or the other, the ultimate decision is made for them. Notwithstanding the opposition of the Roman Catholics, a fear existed among other people that the order had a monastic tendency. In my visit, which included school-room, chapel, and every part of the establishment, I saw no trace or hint of aught but the most unadorned Evangelicalism, nor was there the least tinge of anything else in the conversation of the mother superintendent, the sisters at the head of the seminary and hospital, or several others with whom I spoke at length. The figure of a dove recurred in several places, and in the simple church appeared in a fresco, flying to our Saviour's arms. Seeing in this not so much Romanism as a little gentle mysti-

cism, I inquired its meaning, and was told that the dove is the symbol of the deaconess order, and means merely peace, and no rest upon earth, the church fresco pointing to the only and final rest. The consecration service is beautifully simple: a hymn; a short discourse and exhortation respecting the office; a pledge, not unlike in form that of confirmation in the Episcopal service; a prayer; another hymn; the celebration of the Eucharist; and a dismissal blessing. The whole conception of their ministry is unfolded in the solemn, touching words of this short service, — a ministry whose emblem is the dove, whose motto might be "Peace on earth, good-will towards men."

The next institution described is the Training-School for Nurses at Liverpool, together with their system of district nursing. It was established about ten years ago, and originated, not from a philanthropic movement, but from a practical conviction of the necessity of such an institution in connection with the Royal Infirmary. Its objects are: "1. To provide thoroughly educated nurses for the Infirmary; 2. To provide district or missionary nurses for the poor; 3. To provide sick-nurses for private families," — the supply in all these branches being entirely inadequate. Sufficient money was raised by donations and subscriptions, the usual boundless liberality of the English towards charitable purposes being fully displayed in this instance. "The school was the foundation of the enterprise," says the report of the committee, "and the school was of necessity dependent on the Infirmary. . . . . The house is built on the ground, and is the absolute property of the Infirmary. The committee of the school are selected from the Infirmary committee, the chairman and treasurer being *ex officio* members. . . . . The lady superintendent of the school should also be matron of the hospital, and the female officers of both should be entirely under her control. Our next step was to seek for a lady able and willing to undertake the office of superintendent. . . . . To take charge of such an institution from its very commencement, no ordinary qualities were required. A lady competent for such a post must be endowed with considerable energy and a hopeful spirit; must have strong religious principles, yet be free from anything like sec-

tarian prejudice and bigotry; must possess a clear and sound judgment; must be devoted to her work, and have skill to select, and moral and mental power to control and inspire, a number of young women brought together under circumstances affording them great opportunities of usefulness and self-improvement, but at the same time exposing them to considerable temptations. We were fortunate enough to find a lady who possessed the requisite qualifications, and to prevail upon her to undertake the work." The lady superintendent and a few probationers spent the first year in a hired house; on the 1st of May, 1862, the Nurses' Home was ready for them. Two years later the committee reports, that though thirty-three young women have been admitted as probationers within a few months, and several older women engaged as assistant nurses, the staff is entirely insufficient for the demand; and the house is too full to admit more, although there are applicants. Three years ago, though the house had not yet been enlarged, there were forty-five probationers. The rules exact that the nurses shall attend the sick, either rich or poor, at hospitals or in private houses, as the lady superintendent or committee may appoint; that no present, gratuity, or possession of a deceased patient is to be accepted, beyond some very trifling remembrance of or from the invalid; that the nurses while on duty wear the dress appointed by the establishment; that a certificate of capability and good conduct from the patient's family and physician is to be brought back by the nurse in every case; the rest relate to minor matters of order. The age preferred in applicants is from twenty-five to thirty-five; certificates of good health and character are required; the probationers are under the authority of the lady superintendent, and subject to the rules of the Infirmary and Training-School. They are supplied with board, lodging, and washing; there is a year's probation, during which the probationer receives £ 14 4 *s.* wages, — about $ 61. The only pledge given is a letter to the chairman of the committee, written after the first quarter, promising at the end of the twelvemonth to enter the service for two years. All are expected to be able to read and write. In cases where the patients can afford it, the nurses are paid, but the money belongs to the fund of the Training-School, and

private remuneration of any sort is forbidden. This is also the rule in religious associations whose members go out to nurse. The system of district nursing is carried on as much as possible with the co-operation of the clergy of the neighborhood and their congregations, and the medical men in charge of the dispensaries. There are now about twenty such districts in Liverpool. The organization of each belongs to a separate lady superintendent, who begins by establishing a centre whence supplies can be distributed, bedding and similar comforts lent, and where cooking can be done, under the charge of a trustworthy person. Applicants for assistance must bring recommendations either from a clergyman or physician, or responsible person in the district. The nurses are expected to give at least five or six hours daily to visiting the sick poor; if a case be more suitable for the hospital or workhouse, or require particular attention, the nurse reports it to the superintendent; she is expected to do everything which may tend to the patient's comfort, in keeping the room clean and aired, — in short, in rendering any needful service. Her board and wages are paid by the Liverpool Central Relief Society. The institution took its degree, so to speak, when the cholera broke out in Liverpool, in 1866. The city authorities applied to the Training-School for nurses; the available force was placed at their disposal, and as many others as the time would permit were trained as assistants. The heartiest testimony has been given by competent judges to their efficiency, activity, good-will, and self-devotion, and the happy results. Besides the immediate relief of suffering, the institution aims at a wider and deeper good, — the diffusion of habits of cleanliness, thrift, and self-help; of a knowledge of the elementary laws of health; an economy and judicious application of the means of relief, so munificently bestowed in England, often with no result; above all, the cheering and encouragement of the spirits of the poor and suffering, and removing the irritated sense of the barriers of class and injustice of society, so frequent among these unfortunate people, which tends to produce what are called "the dangerous classes."* The endeavor has been to exclude sec-

* Timely help and advice often sets honest households on their feet again, who are fast being carried into the ocean of pauperism by the illness of the father or mother. The effect in bringing about a better state of feeling towards those more

tarian spirit from the institution; all interference in religious matters, on the part of the nurses, is strictly forbidden; they are required, while living at the Home, to attend public worship, — according to the rites of the Church of England, I suppose. The religious nature of their work, and the necessity for the strongest religious motives to enable them to perform it faithfully, are constantly held before them; and, judging even from bare statistical evidence, the lady superintendent of the Home must set them a noble example.

Miss Stephen has shown discretion in avoiding the subject of English sisterhoods, though it is not quite fair to say that she does so because "there is no one sufficiently widespread or long established," there being more than one of older date and more extensive operation than the Liverpool Training-School for Nurses.

So ends Part I. Part II. treats the question whether charitable purposes are best served by religious or secular institutions. Difficult as it has been to bring Miss Stephen's very full accounts of the various sisterhoods within the limits of a review, it would be impossible and most unjust to her to attempt to crowd the reasoning of one hundred and fifty-five closely printed pages into such a compass. The whole Second Part is most interesting and searching; and although the professed object of the book is to examine the merits of sisterhoods "for charitable purposes," that vexed and momentous question is really discussed in all its bearings. The successive chapters of Part I. are only so many premises on which she bases her arguments and forms her conclusions. She deduces from her observation of the two systems (secular and religious) the effects on their members, on the poor, and on society at large, and considers the abstract questions on which both rest.* Utility in its highest, deepest, to speak properly, in its *sacred* sense, is Miss Stephen's touchstone. Her opinion

blessed with this world's goods has been no less beneficial. "The nurse — who, after the first week's visiting, came back crying, saying she could not bear the scenes she had to witness — soon found the good she could do so clear and satisfactory, that she is happy and contented, and has quite given up her wish to return to her former work of nursing the rich."

* The titles of the chapters of Part II. may give an idea of the ground which is gone over in the process: The Wants of the Poor; The Interests of Charitable Women; The Public Good; and The Theological Questions at Issue.

is, that certain evils are inseparable from sisterhoods, and that the good done by them could be done as effectually by secular institutions. The personal question involved is discussed comprehensively and powerfully under "The Interests of Charitable Women," and almost exhausts that branch of the subject. Almost, not quite. Miss Stephen ignores "vocation," a cant term for an undeniably real thing; she overlooks the desire — which in some natures is a necessity — for seclusion, meditation, *recueillement*, offering as our only alternative the old self-centred idea, of the "religious life" where everything is done for one's own soul's salvation, or a busy existence of charitable activity in the outer world however uncongenial, taking no note of the possibility of a middle course like that offered by an establishment on the principle of the Béguinage. Perhaps Miss Stephen, in dealing exclusively with things as they are, and putting forward no scheme of her own, found no place for these considerations; but she proclaims utility as the primary and final article of her code, and the Liverpool Training-School as its exemplar. In the chapter on the "Public Good," she observes with rare good sense: "It seems to be taken for granted that the poor are exposed to every want which is felt by their richer neighbors, with the addition of those arising from poverty. Now a very little observation will show that, if money satisfies some wants, it originates at least as many others, especially when it has been applied to its best purpose, that of education. It would be truer to say that the rich experience every want which is felt by their poorer neighbors, with the addition of those arising from wealth and leisure." She goes on to say: "If the fact of suffering be that which constitutes a claim upon the ministrations of good women, the rich are entitled to such ministrations at least as much as the poor." Some people might demur to this, and esteem those ministrations as part of the great system of compensation, to counterbalance the lack of other alleviations which the rich can always command, but which the poor must ever want. But Miss Stephen further assumes, or rather has previously assumed, that the majority of women who wish to enter religious or charitable fraternities are not those of recognized social standing or in-

dependent — if limited — means. How true this may be in England, we cannot judge; but it is certainly not true of this country. Therefore, in this view of the equal claims of rich and poor to our sympathy and aid, she overlooks the extreme difficulties which present themselves to many women in going as hired or even volunteer nurses among the former, — difficulties common to the nurse and her patients and their families. Taking two women equally devoted to their calling and obedient to the rules of their association, every one must perceive the difference in the moral attitude of her who goes as sick-nurse into a rich house and her who goes to a poor one: in the latter, whether paid or not, she is a minister; in the former a servant, and only the badge of a professedly religious life which has pledged its members to become the servant of servants can relieve such a relation of much mutual embarrassment. Miss Stephen also seems to me to lay too much stress on the value of such intercourse to female minds; her remarks may apply to those who shut themselves off from it at eighteen, but hardly to women who have known the world and life; women can get from books the greater part of what they learn from men, though the converse is not true, and at least at their present *status* they are less likely to become mere partisans by reading what is written upon all sides of a subject than by hearing it talked of by a father or a brother who takes only one view of it. She also gives too little weight to the hold of a vow, whether perpetual or limited, on most minds. It may be that this hold is a relic of superstition, and that it would be better if vows and oaths could be dispensed with on all occasions, civil and religious; but while they have more power over the human mind than mere force of conscience, can we do without them? The abuse of such forms proves nothing, their disuse will not dispel superstition; but the gradual evaporation of superstition will lead to the disuse of the forms.

In fine, with all our admiration for Miss Stephen's book, we cannot consider it "the last word" about sisterhoods; but there is no doubt that it is the weightiest that has yet been spoken, and no one who is interested in the subject can do better than go to it for information and food for reflection.

Sarah B. Wister.

Art. VII. — CRITICAL NOTICES.

1. — *Meta Holdenis.* Par Victor Cherbuliez. Paris: Hachette. 1873.

We hardly know to what extent M. Cherbuliez is known and admired by English readers in general; to ourselves, we confess, he is an old friend, and a new novel from his hand has all the dignity of a literary event. Our friendship for him was formed more than ten years ago, over his *Comte Kostia*, the work by which he made his mark among the French romancers of the day. We doubt if this charming romance has ever become popular, but we are safe to say that it has had no indifferent or ungrateful readers. To our sense it seemed full of brilliant promise; it was impossible that so genuine an artist should not do more and better. M. Cherbuliez has done more, and has given his early masterpiece half a dozen successors; but we have often vainly wondered whether, on the whole, he has done better. We inclined to think not, and this *Meta Holdenis*, clever as it is, has put an end to our doubts. The author's talent has become more and more flexible and polished, and, in the way of mere manner, the volume before us is still a masterpiece; but it has parted — parted fatally, we think, in the present case — with a certain essential charm, — a turn of fancy in which spontaneity and culture went hand in hand with singular grace. M. Cherbuliez's career, through his several novels, would be a study for a penetrating analyst, and demands more space than we can bestow. His talent is peculiarly delicate, and its development very much a matter of fine shades; but to trace these shades would be suggestive of many things, possibly of some reflections not altogether cheerful. A certain melancholy element there is in the history of all marked talents: the fact, we mean, that the growth of skill is always attended with the loss of simplicity. The genius ripens, but — unlike peaches and plums — it hardens. An author's first really strong work (especially when it is a work of imagination) is always more or less *classic*, as compared with works produced after he has caused something to be expected of him; it has a more virile compactness, it is more simply and contentedly itself. *Vanity Fair* is classic as compared with the *Newcomes; Oliver Twist* is classic as compared with *David Copperfield;* and *Adam Bede*, to our mind, is signally classic as compared with *Middlemarch*. So, to proceed from greater things to lesser, the *Comte Kostia* is classic as compared with *Meta Holdenis*. The charm of the former tale is difficult to describe, and we recommend our readers to taste it at first-

hand. The story is perfectly a romance, and yet it is profoundly real. It is a piece of the finest artistic polish, and yet it bristles with "sensations"; it is the work at once of a master of style and of a consummate story-teller. But its great merit in this age of dingy realism is that it is simply beautiful, and that the author has ventured to remember that it is not precisely amiss that a work of art should be lighted with a ray of idealism. The book is an excellent example of the discreet use of this ingredient; it leaves the story, mechanically, as perfect as possible; it only furnishes an atmosphere for the mechanism to work in. M. Cherbuliez is a Swiss, his native city of Geneva playing a part in most of his tales; and although we may be sure, in the light of his last performance, that he will not thank us for doing so, we may nevertheless express a sense of the characteristically Genevese complexion of his talent in its earlier form, — a mental complexion lighted, indirectly perhaps, but none the less visibly, from Germany as well as from France. The Genevese mind, in so far as a stranger may guess at it, is less vivacious than the French, and says things incomparably less agreeably; but it feels them strongly enough, and, whatever they are, it has a way of taking them more seriously. This serious way of taking things we have always regarded as a result of its having a side-light open to German influences. How many Parisians of average culture can read Goethe in the original? This is a very common accomplishment in Geneva. M. Cherbuliez had read Goethe to good purpose, and his first two novels were the work of a man who took things seriously. *Meta Holdenis* is written to prove that German seriousness is very likely to be a humbug; it may be or may not; what remains true is, that the discerning reader of the *Comte Kostia* and *Paule Méré* felt himself in contact with an imagination whose poetically blue horizon, in one direction at least, lay well beyond the Rhine. The second of these tales is an attempted exposure, rather youthful in its unsparing ardor, of the narrowness and intolerance of Genevese society. How true the picture is, we are unable to say; but the story is admirably touching, and it has an aroma much less of the Parisian asphalt than of the cropped and drying grass on the mountain slopes that descend into the Lake of Geneva. The heroine is a delightfully tender conception, and though perhaps she is not absolutely natural, we prefer her, taking one piece of false drawing with another, to Meta Holdenis. In spite of the relative *naïveté* of imagination that we have touched upon, the author's first two tales were clever enough to leave us no surprise at the cleverness of the *Roman d'une Honnête Femme;* and what we felt, beside the pleasure of reading a very interesting story, was a certain suspicious

regret at the eclipse of this same *naïveté*. The blue German mountains on the horizon had become extremely vague, and the book had much less a perfume of Goethe than of Octave Feuillet. M. Cherbuliez has remained, to our taste, a writer of an intellectual force which would not be represented by an addition of twenty Octave Feuillets; the greater pity that he has come at last to pitch his tone in the same key, — a note skilfully modulated, certainly, but a falsetto for all that. Of this intellectual force his two next tales — *Prosper Randoce* and *L'Aventure de Ladislas Bolski* — gave brilliant evidence. Each is an extremely ingenious study of an eccentric character: one of a man essentially a rascal, in spite of many gifts; the other of a poor fellow essentially a hero, in spite of many follies. Prosper Randoce is a Parisian scribbler, with a genius three parts tinsel to a fourth part silver, and a *morale* containing very little pure metal indeed. He is a portrait from the general type on which two powerful French novels have been based, — the "Horace" of George Sand, and the *Grand Homme de Province* of Balzac; the type of the self-deceiving charlatan, with now and then an honest impulse just so timed as fatally to confound the light and shade of his character, and extort the credulity which is foredoomed to repentance. The picture is admirably ironical, and the tone of the rabid realist of recent French poetry and fiction is burlesqued with extraordinary wit. *Ladislas Bolski* is the history of an infatuated young Pole, whose reason has succumbed to the tribulations incurred by the fantastic impetuosity of his temperament, related by himself in an interval of sanity. It is the most ingenious of the author's conceptions, and perhaps the most profound; in its attitude of detailed and sustained psychological introspection it resembles one of Mr. Browning's dramatic monologues. The author always rises to the level of his opportunity when he deals with a poetic element. His unbalanced but heroic young Pole, the dupe of his generosity and the victim of his passionate illusions, is a very poetic creation. When M. Cherbuliez gives the rein to his imagination, he does finer things than when he allows *carte blanche* to his wit and his remarkable skill in epigram. His imagination is always generous, and we pay it none too ponderous a compliment in adding, agreeably philosophical; his wit is apt to savor of an incisive but narrow irony, than which, says an authority in his own tongue, no attitude of the mind has less to do with philosophy. *Ladislas Bolski* is a tragedy, and marches roundly to a picturesquely dark *dénouement*. In this, as in all his tales, M. Cherbuliez is an admirable narrator; and if he gives the reader a constant literary pleasure, it is quite without detriment to the surprises and sensations attendant upon all properly regulated

novels. In this respect the tale preceding the present one, *La Revanche de Joseph Noirel*, is perhaps his most powerful performance, as it is indeed in every way his most brilliant one. It is more than entertaining, and more even than characteristically clever; it has a certain imaginative elevation, which recalls the best elements of the *Comte Kostia*. If in *Meta Holdenis* he did not seem to us to have lost ground, we should say that in *Joseph Noirel* he had taken a fresh start. Here again he has selected an eccentric type of character, and has unfolded it with elaborate ingenuity. Joseph Noirel is a young Genevese mechanic, of the most sordid origin, but of a temperament which throws him into ardent sympathy with red radicalism, the International, and the Commune. He falls in love with his master's daughter, but is brought to a bitter sense that she is not for such as him, — a conclusion which fatally aggravates his moral irritability. She, meanwhile, — and a singularly enchanting and appealing figure the author has made of her, — is married in zealous haste by her parents to a Frenchman of title, but of enigmatic antecedents. The enigma is found in the course of time to have a very dark answer, and the young wife becomes entangled in sufferings and terrors, amid which she is very glad to receive the advice and assistance of the despised Joseph. Here begins his *revanche;* it is overwhelming and complete, and his compensation is even more fatal to his happiness than his disappointment was. The incidents will hardly bear repetition, and it takes all the author's tact and skill to make them probable. Probable or not, they are vastly thrilling, and it is really a novel pleasure to see situations such as would delight the heart of Mr. Wilkie Collins unfolded with such intellectual mastery. The novel appeared originally in the *Revue des Deux Mondes*, and we well remember as one of the most poignant sensations of our career as a novel-reader the absolutely *balked* state in which the imagination was left at the close of the last number but one. The characters were in a situation from which the compass of a single number could disentangle them only by some expedient of really heroic ingenuity. M. Cherbuliez's device is powerful, and his whole *dénouement* one of the most effective in the range of modern fiction. We have heard its probability, its logic, its taste, its decency, all earnestly discussed; but we must again refer the reader to the tale itself for an opinion. He can hardly fail to be struck with the forcibly discriminated portraiture of the aggressive, brooding, bilious, declamatory little artisan, who dreams of overturning society, and yet cannot keep himself on his feet. He is a singularly vivid image, and yet he is no caricature, but a conception belonging essentially to the day, to the hour.

The heroine of *Meta Holdenis* is, in two words, a German Becky Sharpe. The author assures us, at least, that she is a German, but this is just the point on which his story provokes discussion. With regard to German matters, one would say that he was not a man to deal in cheap burlesques; he knows the country and its literature, and has published some brilliant papers on several German writers; notably, an admirable one on Lessing. The presumption is, therefore, that he tells the truth, and it would carry us far if it did not encounter the adverse evidence of the very tone of the book itself. M. Cherbuliez's story is altogether a *pièce de circonstance*, a really rabid anti-Teutonic pamphlet in the disguise of a novel. We have read it with the dissatisfaction naturally produced by seeing an indifferent partisan spoil an excellent romancer. What need is there, we have even ventured to demand, for M. Cherbuliez's being a partisan at all? Let him stick to disinterested verity, and to an honest German point of view, and leave M. Dumas *fils* unaccompanied in his amazing enterprise of showing us that his *Femme de Claude* was a modern Messalina, because she was the daughter of the "Baron de Fieradlen, — *de très vieille famille bavaroise*." If Meta Holdenis is not exactly a Messalina, she is very nearly as nefarious a personage, and she is held up to our opprobrium with an almost Juvenalian acerbity. The story is told by the hero to a supposititious female friend (a German, to do her justice), who has tried to persuade him into matrimony with a pair of *yeux célestes*. This heavenly pair of eyes warns him off, and reminds him of the penalty he paid for falling in love with those of Meta Holdenis. He was a poor art-student, and she the eldest daughter of a pious and prosperous hardware merchant, who had lately emigrated from Elberfeld to Geneva. She is not pretty, and yet she is altogether too handsome to be ugly, and her striking and expressive physiognomy is very happily rendered. She cuts bread-and-butter for her numerous brothers and sisters, she sings hymns with a delicious voice, and she effectually fascinates the hero. They are betrothed under a very unctuous parental blessing, and, in the expansion of his confidence, the young man invests ten thousand francs (twelve are the modest amount of his fortune) in his prospective father-in-law's business. The virtuous Holdenis immediately suspends payment, and refers his indignant dupe to the Scriptures for consolation. The daughter plays him false with a grotesque little German baron, and he leaves Geneva in disgust and despair. But his despair makes a man of him, and he works to such good purpose that six years later he is well on the way to wealth and fame. We find him at this moment domesticated with a certain M. de Maussere, a French diplomatist, who has retired from public life to outweather the

scandal of having eloped with a married woman. The fruit of this escapade is an intractable little girl, who is about to be committed to the care of a very superior governess. The governess arrives, and Tony (the hero) recognizes the faithless Meta. She is more ambiguously and dangerously handsome than ever, and has brought her genius for duplicity to perfection. The rest of the tale is occupied with her attempts to win a matrimonial prize, — attempts so zealous that she plays a double game, and tries at once to re-entangle Tony and to fascinate M. de Mauserre. She brings both schemes very nearly to a happy conclusion, and lies and plots and counterplots with touching plausibility; but she goes too far, overreaches herself, and is brought to dreadful confusion at the eleventh hour. She departs in wrath, joins a Protestant sisterhood, and talks of the hero and his friend her employer to whoever will listen to her, as a couple of horrible Frenchmen who had tried to seduce her.

M. Cherbuliez's design has been to create anything but a vulgar figure, and his imagination has doubtless dwelt as complacently on Meta Holdenis as on his Prosper Randoce or his Joseph Noirel. But the figure, nevertheless, can only be called, at best, a clever failure, partly because there is nothing so difficult as to draw a hypocrite (particularly a religious hypocrite), but especially because the writer's art is vitiated and vulgarized, made dry and hard, by his obtrusive *parti pris*. He starts with the thesis that a German is in nine cases out of ten a Pharisee and a humbug; a person fond of sentimentalizing about the stars and the angels, the Scriptures and his conscience, but excessively sly and tenacious in his pursuit of the main chance. This view of the German character is nowhere formally stated, but it is constantly implied, often, certainly, in a very witty manner. The hero's reflections on his attempt to paint Meta's portrait are a very good specimen of the author's epigrammatic touch: —

"Ce n'est pas tout: il y avait dans cette angélique figure autre chose encore que j'aurais bien voulu rendre. Il y a, madame, anges et anges. Ceux qu'on voit en Allemagne ne ressemblent point aux autres; leurs yeux, qui sont souvent de la couleur des turquoises, ont ceci de particulier, que sans qu'il s'en doutent, ils promettent dans une langue mystique des plaisirs qui ne le sont pas. Quiconque a voyagé dans votre pays comprendra ce que je veux dire; il y a sûrement rencontré d'adorables candeurs qui respirent la volupté qu'elles ignorent, de virginales innocences, capables de convertir un libertin au mariage et à la vertu, parcequ'il lui semble qu'il y trouvera son compte, et pour tout dire, des anges qui ne savent rien, mais que rien n'étonnera."

How far M. Cherbuliez is right on this point hardly matters, though we doubt that he is right enough to justify his indefatigably sarcastic

tone; a satirist, he ought to remember, should be very right indeed, and we fancy that the sham morality of the Fraulein Holdenis would not have seemed so very typical if the Emperor William had not been so careful to thank God at the end of his bulletins. He little thought that he was going to make a clever novelist misconceive a masterpiece. The desire to make his heroine vividly typical has been fatal to the freedom of the author's hand, to that certainty of touch which is so conspicuous in his other tales. She is rigid, forced, illogical, seen altogether from without. German or not, we very little care: we wish to feel the living, breathing woman, in her virtues or in her vices. We greatly wonder that an artist of M. Cherbuliez's habitual tact and taste should not have seen the vice of his attitude of *showing up* his heroine, of forever working at the reader over her shoulder. It gives an uncommon smartness and pertness to his narrative, but it makes it small art instead of large. Thackeray described the adventures of Becky Sharpe in a very different way, and certainly Thackeray had temptation enough to be satirical. But his satire, where Becky is concerned, always goes hand in hand with a certain tender, sympathetic comprehension of her, with the thoroughly human tone which belongs to perfect insight. M. Cherbuliez, on the contrary, treats us to a kind of brutal exposure of his heroine, which has not even the merit of seeming tragic, for the reason that we don't see her, feel her, believe in her. She is made to order, — made to supply the extraordinary Parisian demand for evidence that German morality is a whited sepulchre, and the German conscience a delicious joke. The demand, as it has chiefly found expression, seems to us unspeakably puerile, and the author's alacrity in ministering to it has an air of unwisdom really disappointing to those who owe him great enjoyment. It seems rather a melancholy matter that this should have been *his* contribution to the moral situation of France and Germany. The truth is, we fear, that M. Cherbuliez is fatally clever, and that he will not believe he has grown unwise so long as he remains so very consciously readable. His polemic impulse in the present case has given a magical point to his pen and an admirable neatness to his style; anything lighter, more impertinent, than the whole movement of his tale, it would be difficult to imagine. But it is a sad falling off for the author of the *Comte Kostia* now to be stringing clever sneers, and offering them to us as a novel. The hard, metallic glitter of his style is a disagreeable substitute for the charming atmosphere of his early works. It is not unfair to speak of the ironical side of his tale as the whole substance of it, for the portraiture of the persons opposed to Meta has caught the infection of her own superficiality. There is an odd sort of levity in the whole picture of the situation of

M. and Madame de Mauserre. In his emulation of the tone of novelists more trivial than himself he certainly hits the mark. Does he really see nothing indelicate in the walk and conversation of Madame de Mauserre, or does he simply put a brave face on it because prudery is a German virtue? This lady is living in what, out of a French novel, you will hardly find called by a politer term than concubinage with the gentleman whose name she has exchanged for that of her husband. Her conduct is irregular, but, if the author insists upon it, we are willing to believe that she is the most estimable person in the world. When, however, receiving, before half a dozen people, a letter announcing her husband's death, and making it possible to legitimate her union, she overflows into an amorous ecstasy, and calls upon every one to share her joy, we rather retract our admiration, and incline to think that she lacked a certain sense of the becoming, without which a lady's charms are precarious. This is simply a slight detail in evidence of the fact that every detail is perverted when the central idea is inharmonious. In a work pitched in a different key, we should, perhaps, have forgiven Madame de Mauserre her want of reserve. Heaven preserve us, says the author in conclusion, from *les consciences subtiles*. The subtlety of the conscience makes half its virtue, and we are afraid that M. Cherbuliez says more than he means, — or more than, as a disinterested student of human nature, he ought to mean. What, in fact, does all this prove, but that art should be before all things disinterested, and that a beautiful imagination may show to very poor advantage when impressed into the service of a transitory aim?

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2. — *Antiquities of the Southern Indians, particularly of the Georgia Tribes.* By CHARLES C. JONES, JR. New York: D. Appleton and Company. 1873. Large octavo. 532 pages. 31 plates.

THE author of this important work, a Georgian by birth, began at an early age to collect the Indian relics abounding in his native State. In the course of time this tendency developed itself into a regular scientific pursuit, resulting in the publication of various minor essays relative to aboriginal antiquities, but principally of the volume whose title is placed at the head of this notice. In this work the author presents the native inhabitants of Georgia, and the Southern States in general, as they were first seen by Europeans; enlarging on their physical characteristics, form of government, modes of war and hunting, games, domestic and matrimonial relations, religion, medical art, funeral customs, manufactures, and many other topics bearing on their condition

of existence. The greater portion of the book, however, is taken up with descriptions and representations of the earthworks of the district under notice, and of such implements, utensils, and ornaments of stone, clay, shell, etc., as belong to a period anteceding the occupation of the present Southern States by the white race. The aborigines of that region, it is well known, were more advanced in many respects than the tribes living farther north. The former, no longer in the pure hunter state, had become agricultural to some extent, cultivating maize and other nutritious plants, and thus, probably, derived their chief sustenance from the vegetable kingdom. As a consequence, they had abandoned the roaming habits of the more northern hunting tribes, and lived in large communities, governed by chiefs who exerted a despotic power over their subjects. Sun-worship was prevalent among them. Their manufactures, such as tools and weapons of chipped and polished stone, clay vessels, shell-ornaments, etc., were superior to those made by their Northern neighbors, and they paid more attention to the construction of their dwellings. Those of the chiefs were sometimes erected on artificial mounds. Yet, notwithstanding their approach to a more comfortable mode of life, they had not yet emerged from the age of stone, being totally unacquainted with metallurgy, though they sometimes hammered pieces of native copper, which they doubtless obtained from the Lake Superior region, into the shapes of implements or objects of personal adornment.

Several chapters of the work are devoted to descriptions of the earth-structures of Georgia. The tumular erections of that State chiefly occur in the valleys of the Etowah, Savannah, Ocmulgee, and Ogeechee Rivers, and were principally constructed for religious or sepulchral purposes. Shell-mounds abound along the coast and on the sea-islands. Of particular interest is a large tumulus on Stalling's Island in the Savannah River, above Augusta. This curious aboriginal monument of large dimensions is chiefly composed of river-shells, and served, doubtless, for many succeeding generations, as a depository for the dead. A few stone graves, that is, rude sarcophagi constructed of stone slabs, have lately been discovered in the Nacoochee Valley. They are often met — many of them together and forming regular cemeteries — in Illinois, Missouri, Tennessee, and other Western and Southern States.

From the contemplation of these more conspicuous tokens of Indian occupancy the author passes over to a full and minute description of aboriginal weapons, utensils, and ornaments, which forms the standard that enables us to judge of the skill displayed by the former occupants in fashioning stone, copper, clay, and other materials of which they availed themselves in producing those objects. This portion of the

book, which constitutes at least one half of its contents, will be particularly appreciated by all who take an interest in the minor details of North American archæology, more especially in the articles of stone, which are here, for the first time, fully and systematically described and figured. About twenty-five years ago, Messrs. Squier and Davis published the "Ancient Monuments of the Mississippi Valley," a work of great merit, which chiefly describes the earthworks of the State of Ohio, and also many of the objects of art discovered in the mounds during the survey. At that period, however, minor Indian relics attracted not that degree of attention which they command now, in consequence of the stimulus given by the important prehistoric discoveries in Europe. The large volumes of Schoolcraft likewise contain a certain amount of information concerning Indian stone implements, ornaments, etc.; but the data are scattered through the text without much order,— *disjecta membra* at best,— while the conclusions arrived at by the author are unsatisfactory in many instances. But the work under notice presents, for the first time, a full account of the various types of Indian objects of use and ornament, together with exhaustive historical evidence bearing on the methods of their application. It may be stated in this connection, that the author stands unsurpassed in point of research, having availed himself of all existing literary sources in order to elucidate the topics he discusses; and he has been particularly careful to quote, in support of his statements, the oldest works on North America, which are supposed to present the Indians as seen by the first Europeans. A glance at the numerous references will convince the reader of the great amount of study that necessarily preceded the composition of the volume.

In Chapter XI. the author treats of arrow and spear-heads, describing their endless varieties and the modes of manufacture. They mostly consist of flint; but the common white quartz was also employed, and a few in the author's collection are made of beautiful transparent rock crystal. Such exquisite specimens, apparently too costly to be applied to practical use, probably served only for show. These articles are always chipped, never ground. In addition, the chapter contains interesting details relating to Indian archery. Chapter XII. enumerates grooved axes, hand and wedged-shape axes (called celts in Europe), perforated and ornamental or ceremonial axes, chisels, gauges, scrapers, flint-knives, awls or borers, leaf-shaped implements, smoothing-stones, and, lastly, flint implements resembling those of European drift. Of these articles the grooved axes, commonly called tomahawks, and the wedge-shaped implements, occur very frequently, and are mostly made of dioritic stone, while perforated axes are far less numerous. The latter

represent neither weapons nor tools, but, doubtless, emblematic objects, which, attached to handles, were worn by the chiefs as badges of distinction. They are mostly of small size, but elegantly shaped and highly finished. The following chapters (XIII. and XIV.) are devoted to agriculture and fishing, and to the utensils employed in these pursuits, such as mortars and pestles, crushing-stones, net-sinkers, plummets, etc. Chapter XV. describes discoidal stones and the curious Chungkee-game (mentioned by Adair, Du Pratz, and others), in which these disks are used. In Chapter XVI. stone tubes, probably tools in the hands of the conjurers or medicine-men, are discussed. Chapter XVII. relates to stones for rounding arrow-shafts, to whetstones or sharpeners, pierced tablets, pendants, amulets, and other typical objects. In the following chapter (XVIII.) the author enlarges on the use of tobacco and the various kinds of Indian pipes, made either of stone or of clay. Some of the specimens figured are remarkable for their shapes and sizes. Chapter XIX. treats of the idol-worship and of idols. A remarkable stone image, found in the Etowah Valley, and perhaps belonging to the last-named class, is described and figured. The closing chapters (XX. to XXII.) give accounts of pottery, the use of pearls among the Southern tribes, and the utensils and ornaments made of shells. All these matters are well and thoroughly treated. The section on pottery derives special interest from the fact that the author's collection is particularly rich in excellent specimens of aboriginal ceramic art, which, it is well known, had arrived at a higher degree of perfection in the South than in other parts of the present United States. His remarks concerning the various applications of shells (utensils, money, ornaments) are equally interesting, and present the subject with a completeness never attained before.

The illustrations, representing nearly three hundred objects of Indian workmanship, and including several types hitherto not described, have been produced by the photolithographic process, and are faithful copies of the originals, with which the writer of this notice is well acquainted. With only a few exceptions the figured specimens are in the excellent collection of the author, who has made it a point not to present a single drawing that has appeared in any previous publication. Everything, therefore, is entirely *new*, — a feature that will be duly appreciated by all readers conversant with modern archæological writings, who are accustomed to see certain objects constantly reproduced in different books.

Enough has been said to illustrate the general character of the work, which really supplies a long-felt want, and certainly is destined to occupy a prominent rank among the archæological literature of our days.

Already the book has been most favorably noticed by the best authorities of Europe. Professor Carl Vogt, for instance, who certainly never indulges in praise where praise is not due, calls the volume in question "a work splendid in appearance and rich in contents, that must be classed with the best of its kind produced in our time."

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3. — *Essays, Philological and Critical, selected from the Papers of* James Hadley, LL. D. New York: Holt and Williams. 1873.

The volume of Professor Hadley's Essays seems fully to justify the strong expressions of praise and regard in the Preface of his friend, Professor Whitney. These specimens show an exact and wide learning, a nice sense of truth, and an enthusiastic and genial spirit. Evidently, Professor Hadley was no mere pedantic classicist, devoted to writing poor poetry in dead languages, or even satisfied with a narrow range of microscopic verbal criticisms. He was a student of language with wide views, in accord with the most advanced modern notions of philological study, and had paid attention to Sanskrit and the comparative grammar of the Indo-European languages. The publication of his views on these subjects is very timely, when the leading journal of the country, the supposed exponent of high scholarship, often contains a covert sneer at comparative philology. Professor Hadley is a worthy example, to the classical students of this country, of the judicious combination of exact classical knowledge with a wide range of linguistic investigation. He was not, perhaps, an original authority in these matters, like his friend Professor Whitney, but he was always an intelligent critic of the labors of the most advanced pioneers. For, from the cast of his mind, he seems to have been rather a critic than an original investigator, and these pages show less original genius than perhaps might be expected in so inspiring a branch of study as philology. Still, we have not so much originality in this field, in this country, that we can afford to despise the remarkable excellence of Professor Hadley.

A little less than a third of the book treats of purely Greek subjects, though even here are traces of wider studies.

The first article, on the "Ionian Migrations," deals with Dr. E. Curtius's theory of the early settlement of Ionians on the eastern shore of the Ægean, before the migration from Greece proper. From the nature of the subject the criticism is not decisive, but it throws the weight of the author's opinions against the theory, and is as good a statement of the arguments as can be found.

The second reviews Bekker's digammated Homer.

The fifth is more valuable, and contains a summary, with occasional criticism, of the doctrines of Greek rhythm and metre, as derived by Westphal and Rossbach from the more careful study of Greek musicians. This learning, which is exceedingly unintelligible in the German, Professor Hadley has put in a very plain and readable form, — a task for which he seems to have been very well qualified by having a nice ear and some knowledge of music, two things absolutely necessary for any real understanding of Greek metres.

The fifth will be to most persons, we think, the best of the whole, and has a real and permanent value. It is a very thorough and able treatise on the whole nature and theory of the ancient accent.

The leading idea is that the effects in Greek and Latin, which we call accent, were *melodic*, consisting in pitch, not *dynamic*, consisting in stress. This idea is ably set forth and supported by convincing argument. To this is added a less certain theory that the Greek had an inherited, intermediate tone, between the acute and unaccented syllable. Upon this theory the position of the Greek and Latin accent is ably explained. It is probable that these doctrines are true of Greek, but they can hardly be true of Latin, — in the historical period, at least. Certainly no mere melodic accent could have played such havoc with words, and especially with final syllables, as was made in Latin before the language becomes known to us. Probably the Latin began early to substitute stress for its old inherited pitch accent, but this tendency was somewhat checked by the cultivation of Greek forms of metre.

The seventh is an interesting essay on Greek pronunciation in the tenth century, which throws light on the earlier pronunciation also.

The next division of the book consists of articles on more general topics of philology, and occupies a little more than a third of the whole. Of these, number eight is of a kind that is now somewhat rare, because, fortunately, the necessity has passed away. When published, in 1858, it was, no doubt, very timely, and might still be read by many with profit. It is a review of a reactionary book which attempted to stop the progress of linguistic science, and decry Sanskrit studies; a book somewhat like that of Professor Key, which was thoroughly reviewed by Professor Whitney in his last volume of Essays. The antidote is well administered, and we commend this article to all school committees, teachers, and book-makers who think comparative philology is outgrown in Germany, or indeed anywhere.

Number two, though treating of a Greek etymology, seems to belong in this part of the book. It attempts to connect *θεοπρόπος* with the root *prak*, which appears in Lat. *precor*, Sk. *prach*, and German *fragen*. It does not seem successful, though we have not ourselves anything better

to offer. Number three, also, is on a Greek subject, — the origin of the ablative functions of the Greek genitive; but the treatment is in the style of comparative grammar. It is well done, and has the true scientific method. Numbers nine, ten, and eleven are also upon topics of comparative grammar, the Indo-European aspirates, the future tense, and passive voice, respectively. They are all excellent summaries of the views held by scholars on these subjects, accompanied by learned and sharp-sighted criticism. They are well worthy of preservation, though they are superseded in some details by later investigations. Number twelve, on the Latin subjunctive, though containing some valuable hints, seems to us the least worthy in the volume, especially in view of its date (1870). The author seems not entirely emancipated from the metaphysical method of grammar, and the result seems unsatisfactory on account of a wrong fundamental conception. Starting from the well-established formal origin of the Indo-European optative, from some form of the root I, the author supposes the form to have originally expressed a wish. This view, we think, is wrong. The meaning of *wish* is rare in any form of this root, and confined to Sanskrit, so there is no ground for believing the meaning original Indo-European. Nor, again, is there any reason to suppose this meaning in order to account for the meanings of the mood. Says Professor Hadley: "The Latin subjunctive is used to express an action as desired or wished for." Hence, a root to *wish* is the most natural factor of the mood. But, in fact, this is true only of a desiderative, where the wish is in all cases the wish of the subject. In the subjunctive (optative) the wish is not that of the subject, and cannot be so, except in the first person. It is impossible to trace the meaning of the expression *di meliora duint* from any form of wishing, on the part of the gods. It is possible, of course, that wishing might fade out into mere futurity, as in our own future with *will*, and through that develop modal meanings. But this requires an unnecessary step, for the idea of *going*, the original meaning of the root I, yields such a future at once. The potential subjunctive is made by Professor Hadley to grow out of the subjunctive of result, — an obvious error. The potential uses are among the most primitive of all, while those of result are later, and confined to Latin.

Number thirteen treats of the old question, the origin of the English possessive case, maintaining forcibly the prevalent view that the *s* is original, and not a corruption of *his*. Number fourteen is an excellent review of Ellis's Early English Pronunciation, already published in this Review, Vol. CX., 1870.

Number fifteen, on "English Vowel Quantity," is to us the best in the volume, though not of so general interest. The accented system of

poetry has become so firmly established, in English especially, that we have almost ceased to think of quantity as belonging to vowels at all. We see this disregard of quantity in the many bad hexameters we have. Perhaps it would not be possible, with the remnants of quantity that we have, to make perfect rhythmical verses; yet when obviously long syllables are used as short, in a dactyl, the jar is perceptible, though most persons do not stop to think of the cause. Professor Hadley recognizes natural quantity as still existing in modern English, and compares it with that of the thirteenth century, which is indicated by the peculiar spelling of the Ormulum. The general result is, that with some regular exceptions, which follow fixed principles, the quantity has remained the same. The comparison is very carefully made, and the essay is quite German in its minuteness and thoroughness. He does not recognize quantity by position. But to our ear the word *strength* is a long syllable, on account of the combination of consonants, though the vowel is short. If the author's conclusions are correct, it is unfortunate that we have allowed our sense of rhythm to become so obtuse as to lose rhythmic poetry almost entirely, and even to give the language a harsh, unmusical flow.

The remaining third of the volume is of a more popular magazine style, and we cannot help wishing, from our own point of view, that they had been published in another volume. As a memorial for circulation among the friends of Professor Hadley, it is a more complete picture of his literary activity; but, on the other hand, few persons who buy the book for what there is in it will want to read this last third. It seems a pity, therefore, as the price of the book is rather large at any rate (four dollars), that the first two thirds cannot be purchased without the necessity of paying for memorial literature. Of course, no one knows this better than Professor Whitney, and undoubtedly he felt compelled by sufficiently strong reasons, under the peculiar circumstances of the case, to publish in this form, which probably on the whole is best. The mechanical execution of the book is remarkably good, and the whole is creditable alike to American scholarship and American skill.

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4. — A *new variorum Edition of Shakespeare.* Edited by Horace Howard Furness. Vol. II., Macbeth. Philadelphia: J. B. Lippincott & Co. 1873.

This work can hardly fail to mark a most important era in Shakespearian literature; that, too, not only for the American people, but for the whole English-speaking world, if, indeed, its importance is to be bounded by any circumscriptions of language. It is now fifty-two

years since the last variorum edition of Shakespeare made its appearance. During that period Shakespeare has advanced more rapidly than ever before towards supremacy as a universal classic. Especially is this the case in Germany, where a great, wise, thoughtful people accept him as their "Emperor of Literature," setting him above all their national kings and princes of thought, and laying their vast treasures of learning and philosophy under contribution to interpret and illustrate his teachings. In fact, he may now be said to have made a full conquest of the whole German mind. Very great progress towards the same end has also been achieved in France. The tone with which Voltaire and other lawgivers in poetry used to speak of him has pretty much ceased to be heard. He is not, indeed, so reverentially studied there as in Germany, for reverential study in anything is not much the custom there; and, though the French mind does not yet appear to take to him cordially, it appears to be growing more and more into the persuasion that it ought to do so.

Within the same period of time, Shakespearian criticism has undergone an almost entire revolution. Both in its spirit and its method it is now quite another thing than it was fifty years ago. Shakespeare has on all hands come to be regarded as an authentic and ultimate lawgiver in his province. His critics, instead of affecting to teach him, or to sit in judgment upon him, are content to sit at his feet, and accept his deliverances as authoritative legislation in the realm of thought; they take him as their canon both of poetical and of human wisdom, and deem themselves happy if they can make their philosophy large enough and deep enough to comprehend and interpret the facts of his workmanship.

These great and wide-reaching changes in men's thought and discourse about Shakespeare afford ample reason why a new variorum edition of his works should be forthcoming. It may almost be said, indeed, that the just rights of Shakespearian literature imperatively call for such an undertaking. And it must be added, withal, that the same causes which authenticate the demand at the same time very much augment the labor and difficulty of the enterprise. High, very high indeed, must be a man's endowments in learning and judgment, to qualify him for doing the work as the present condition of the subject requires. To set forth a full and fair digest and compendium of what has been written about Shakespeare during the last fifty years is in truth a herculean task. Scholarship at once profound and varied and comprehensive; a discrimination naturally quick and keen, and largely exercised, besides, in the accumulated and diversified specialties of the matter; a judicial calmness and equanimity of temper; a firm grasp

of general principles, together with a minute and exact attention to details; a vigilance that nothing can escape, a diligence that nothing can tire, a patience that nothing can exhaust; — these are among the qualifications fairly requisite for the due performance of such an undertaking. This supposes, indeed, a very rare combination of faculties: memory, reflection, judgment, taste, industry, exactness, all working together; and the process involving at every step great breadth and delicacy of perception, and the constant exercise of a mind prompt to seize the essential point, and skilled to sift it clear of encumbrances and obscurations.

So far as we are able to judge in the matter, the specimen before us warrants the assurance that the work has fallen into the right hands. Mr. Furness is evidently a workman of no ordinary stamp. He has a just and clear understanding of what such a work ought to be; he shows an ample mastery of his tools; and he walks as one well at home in all the parts of his wide field. His plan is as original as any plan ought to be in an enterprise of that nature; and it is exceedingly bold withal, though not bold in such a sense as to preclude the modesty of a well-poised judgment; in fact, it seems almost a marvel that any man should find the courage and resolution to grapple with an undertaking of such magnitude and requiring so great a stress of labor.

We must endeavor to make some tolerable statement of what his plan is, and what it includes. And here it will not be out of place to remark, that in his Preface to the second volume the Editor tells us he has somewhat modified the plan with which he set out. The modification, however, is in the way of enlargement, and does not touch the essential virtue of the thing. In the case of "Romeo and Juliet," which occupies the first volume, he took the variorum edition of 1821 as his point of departure, not intending to go back of that in the matter of the annotation. In that edition, the notes were selected and made up as the editors judged best from the whole range of preceding commentators; and the design of Mr. Furness was to accept their work as a sort of finality in reference to that part of the field. Of course, such a limitation would very much abridge the labors of his task. Nevertheless, he now repeals that limitation; and he is assuredly right in doing so. For, however well and wisely the editors of 1821 may have done their work, still there is no good reason, except for the saving of time and toil, why the ground which they included should not be traversed and explored again. Mr. Furness has satisfied himself, as indeed he well might, that much of valuable matter, which was overlooked or rejected by the editors of 1821, is still to be gleaned in the walks of commentary whence their gatherings were made. And it is abundantly

certain that no available aids and resources towards ascertaining and elucidating Shakespeare's thought and language ought to be dispensed with or neglected in a work of such encyclopedian character. So that Mr. Furness's plan, as now enlarged, just takes in the whole field. Accordingly, for the material of the annotation in his second volume he draws upon the entire range of editors and commentators from Rowe down to the present time. Doubtless the work done in 1821 will very much facilitate his survey and assist his harvest; still he has in all conscience work enough on his hands.

Now for some particulars of his plan. First in order, he aims, of course, to set forth, as well as may be, the poet's genuine text. This is a labor requiring the nicest tact; and nothing but a long steeping in the poet's idiom of language can rightly prepare one for the attempt. On this point, his workmanship strikes us as eminently judicious. He is cautious and wary in a very high degree. We have to confess, indeed, that he is rather more conservative than we should be; but the error, if it be one, is certainly on the right side. It is better to be too slow than too fast in accepting the results of conjectural emendation. For instance, he retains the original reading in the following passage, Act I. Sc. 2: —

> "If I say sooth, I must report they were
> As cannons overcharg'd with double cracks;
> So they *doubly* redoubled strokes upon the foe."

Walker notes *doubly* as a probable interpolation. Whether the word came there by interpolation or by accidental repetition from *double* in the line before, we make no question that it ought to be omitted; both sense and metre cry out against it. Nevertheless, Mr. Furness is probably right in retaining the word in his text; for he marks the proposed reading in his notes, and furnishes all the matter that we need in order to judge for ourselves how the text ought to be.

Next in order comes the point of different readings. This is a matter requiring the utmost vigilance and exactness. To be sure, this part of the work is not a little furthered and lightened by what the editor finds done to his hand. Especially, as he remarks in his Preface, the Cambridge editors, by their accurate collation of the old copies, have been of great service to him. Yet he does not rest satisfied with this; he takes nothing at second-hand, and lets no item of their collation pass without verifying it for himself. And his indebtedness on this score is most handsomely acknowledged. "Although," says he, "the present collation is entirely original, and no reading is recorded at second-hand, yet it should be always borne in mind that I had the great

advantage of a check-list, so to speak, in the foot-notes of the Cambridge Edition."

As "Macbeth" was first printed in the folio of 1623, the editor, of course, had no quarto copies to help or hinder him in the record of various readings. That first edition was reprinted in 1632, 1664, and 1685; and as all these reprints were conducted under editorial supervision, such as it was, they have many differences of text among themselves. It is in these that the work of collation needs to be prosecuted with the most care and minuteness of attention. Mr. Furness has, with almost incredible diligence sifted out and marked down all the varieties of reading in these copies that can be of the slightest moment to average students, and a great many besides that are quite superfluous except to the most inquisitive Shakespearians. Nor does he stop with verbal and literal differences, but carries his discriminating record into minute varieties of punctuation. All this, no doubt, is as it should be; though it may well be thought that with much less of labor on the editor's part he would still have left us without any cause to complain of his work. As it is, even the strongest weakness of fault-finding can get nothing here, apparently, to stick upon.

All this, however, is little more than the beginning of his work of collation. Besides the four folios which may be termed old copies, his collation embraces upwards of forty modern editions, scattered all the way from Rowe's, in 1709, to the latest issue in 1871. Here we have even in the brief compass of one play a long list of various readings from the inexhaustible spring of conjectural emendation. Many of these, indeed, are so wide of the mark, or so absurd in themselves, that no one would deem it worth the while to reproduce them; but all or nearly all of them fairly worth considering are duly registered by the learned and indefatigable editor. Even this, however, is far from adequately describing the extent of his labor in the record of textual varieties. Besides the work of Shakespeare's many editors, a vast deal has been written towards correcting his text by other hands. This matter is spread over a wide surface, in the shape of notes and essays published in all sorts of periodicals, quarterly, monthly, weekly, and daily. Many volumes, also, have been published, entirely or mainly devoted to the same purpose; these ranging over a long period of time, from Heath's "Revisal of Shakespeare's Text" to the sagacious and exquisite labors of Walker and Lettsom in our day. There is, indeed, almost no end to the proposed changes in the poet's text, — changes varying in worth from nothing, or perhaps less than nothing, to what may be called first-class corrections. A careful and searching review of all this matter, and a sifting-out of every grain of thought

that may be deemed worth preserving, is also included in the editor's scope in regard to various readings.

We have said that Mr. Furness registers all or nearly all the variations of text that are fairly worth considering. It occurs to us to note one seeming exception to this statement. We refer to the well-known passage in Act I. Sc. 7: —

> " Was the hope drunk
> Wherein you dress'd yourself? hath it slept since?
> And wakes it now, to look so green and pale
> At what it did so freely? "

In a note on this, the editor justly quotes the following from Bailey: " Surely it is on the confines at least of absurdity to speak of dressing yourself with what may become intoxicated. The substitution of two letters restores, I apprehend, the genuine text. Read *bless'd* for *dress'd*, and all is plain and apposite and Shakespearian." Now it seems to us at least worth considering whether *dress'd* is not used here in the old sense of *addressed*, that is, *made ready* or *prepared*. " Was it a drunken man's hope *in the strength* of which you *made yourself ready* for the killing of Duncan?" This not only relieves the metaphor of the incongruity, as Abbott puts it, of " making hope a person and a dress in the same breath," but also sets the passage in full accordance with what the same speaker says a little after: —

> " When you durst do it, then you were a man.
> . . . . Nor time nor place
> Did then adhere, and yet you would make both:
> They have made themselves, and that their fitness now
> Does unmake you."

And here no change is required but the putting of an apostrophe before *dress'd* thus: " Wherein you 'dress'd yourself." So in " King Henry V." Act IV. Sc. 1: —

> " Besides, they are our outward consciences,
> And preachers to us all; admonishing
> That we should *'dress* us fairly for our end."

But it is, we suspect, in the article of annotation that the editor's labors will prove the most generally useful and acceptable. A part of what we had to say on this point has been anticipated in speaking of his enlargement of plan. Here we are really something at a loss whether his comprehensiveness of design or his judgment in the execution be the more to be approved. Probably it was in this part of the work that he found his patience and his discrimination the most severely taxed. Every one at all conversant with the subject knows that the

entire literature of Shakespeare's age has been ransacked through and through for the purpose of ascertaining and expounding his meaning. At no time has this work been plied so busily or on so large a scale as during the last fifty years. Vast indeed is the accumulation of textual and exegetical commentary thence resulting. And it all has to be explored, scanned, and weighed line by line, in order to make up a complete course of variorum annotation. To discriminate and select and condense and arrange what is most valuable out of such a huge mass of "matter and impertinency mixed" is what Mr. Furness has undertaken in his notes; and, to the best of our judgment, he has in a very signal measure made good his purpose. We do not well see how anything more or better can be desired in the way of showing what has been done. Nor does the editor here limit himself to the circle of English commentary. Of late years the German Shakespearians have taken a good deal to the work of explanatory comment; and Mr. Furness is well at home in what they have written in that kind, and draws largely from it in his selection of notes.

In such a varied and elaborate course of annotation there will needs be many and great diversities of judgment and choice. Probably no two minds, equal in competency, would often hit together in their selections of matter. The process of selection is indeed a very delicate one, and requires the powers of discrimination to be kept on a stretch of exertion at once keen and cool. Mr. Furness displays admirable candor and fairness in conducting the process. In reference to a given passage, he often cites a number of very different and even contradictory explanations; yet so austere and so sustained is his self-restraint, that he seldom, if ever, betrays the least sign of his own preference. The firm, cold, uncompromising impartiality with which he lays together mutually oppugnant comments has at times the effect of piercing irony. And this we reckon to be among the highest merits of which such workmanship is naturally capable.

Thus much must suffice touching the main body of the volume. About two fifths of the volume are occupied with an Appendix, in which the editor discovers the same breadth and largeness of design.

Here we have, first, a literal reprint of Davenant's version of the play, printed in 1674, as it was then acted at the Duke's Theatre. This is an exceedingly valuable addition to the contents of the volume. Davenant was himself a poet of high reputation in his time; his early years were passed more or less in the companionship of Shakespeare's friends, if not of Shakespeare himself; and he probably carried more of Shakespeare's mental atmosphere in his person than any other man then living. In recasting the play to suit the taste of the times, he

took very large liberties with the matter, in the way both of omission and of addition; and it is both curious and instructive to compare his part of the text with that of the original play. The students of Shakespeare are under great obligations to the editor for making this rare piece so accessible to them.

This is followed by a full presentation of matter relating to the source of the plot, including, especially, so much of Holinshed and of Wyntoun's "Cronykil" as can throw any light on the historical incidents of the play. Besides these large extracts, we have various other items gathered and condensed from Chalmers's "Caledonia," from Farmer, Simrock, and others.

Next comes an exhaustive statement and reproduction of all that is known as to the date of the composition. Capell, Malone, Chalmers, Collier, Hunter, White, Halliwell, and the Clarendon editors have discussed the subject learnedly and variously; and the marrow of their discussions is drawn together.

The editor then proceeds to "The Witch" of Thomas Middleton, and works out a careful digest of all that has been written touching the relation between that play and Shakespeare's tragedy. In this part of his work the editor justly reprints in full the several witch scenes of Middleton's play. Students of Shakespeare will amply find their account in collating the witch matter of the two authors.

The costume of the play, and the question whether Shakespeare was even in Scotland, also take their turn in the editor's attention. These, to be sure, are subordinate topics, and are accordingly despatched with comparative brevity; yet their claims were by no means to be slighted in a work of so comprehensive a nature.

The remainder of the Appendix is mostly occupied with what to many will perhaps be the most acceptable part of the whole volume. The editor here traverses the entire field of Shakespearian criticism, both English and foreign, in reference to the characterization of the play. The matter is drawn from a very wide range of authors, and is presented with the same fairness and candor as mark the selection of the notes. Of course, it were quite out of the question to reprint in such a work all that has been written on the characters in "Macbeth"; a liberal, varied, and even-handed selection is the utmost that can be expected, or ought to be desired. And the selection were probably best guided by the two principles of intrinsic value and of rarity. So the editor himself appears to have judged: we have not, indeed, found him saying this in so many words, nor was there any need of doing so; but the nature and scope of his selections seem fairly to warrant the conclusion. Among the English critics from whom he

largely quotes, we have the names of Thomas Whately, John P. Kemble, Hazlitt, Steevens, Coleridge, Mrs. Siddons, Mrs. Jameson, Campbell's "Life of Mrs. Siddons," Maginn, Dr. Bucknill, Fletcher, Hunter, De Quincey, and Rolfe; among the Germans, of Schlegel, Börne, Ulrici, Rötscher, Tiecke, Gervinus, Kreyssig, Flathe, Rümelin, Petri, Friesen, and Leo; among the French, of Chasles, Lacroix, Mezières, and Lamartine. Perhaps we ought to add that the pieces from the German and French are all translated into clear and handsome English.

Of course, there is in these criticisms a good deal from which we should dissent *in toto*, as the editor himself probably does, but the matter is none the less welcome on that account. To our thinking, the quotation from Campbell is itself worth the cost of the volume.

There are several other points that we should like to remark upon, but our notice has already exceeded the limits we had prescribed to ourselves. The only fault we have to find with the work is its being prosecuted on so grand a scale that the editor will need as many as two or three ordinary lives in order to get through the whole series of Shakespeare. But he no doubt judges, as indeed he should, that a part done just as well as he can do them is better than the whole done in manner less than his best. The spirit in which he pursues his task, his clear, manly, bracing austerity of judgment, and his self-withdrawing disinterestedness of bearing, are indeed above all praise. We wish him God speed in his noble work; yes, heartily.

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5. — *Rousseau.* By JOHN MORLEY. London: Chapman and Hall. New York: Scribner, Armstrong, & Co. 1873. 2 vols. 8vo. pp. xii, 344; x, 342.

A MORE unpleasant subject for his pen than Rousseau, it would have been hard for Mr. Morley to find, nor yet one which it is of more importance for an age which is reaping so much of the fruit of his writings to know. Rousseau tore off the veil from his private life with an immodesty which is fortunately rare; he showed himself in all his repulsive nakedness, a liar, a cheat, a hypocrite, a living satyr, in fact a madman, whom one would wish forgotten as soon as possible; yet his words were as eloquent as those of any man of his time, and his influence has not yet ceased working, sometimes for good, and often, in unhealthy minds, for evil. Of his life but a few words need be said; Mr. Morley has told it as unoffensively as possible, dwelling less on its darker scenes than on the few redeeming points of innocence. It is

with admirable delicacy that he treats of the rottenness of French society a century ago; and in the way of warning against whatever may seem like a tempting example, he preaches incidentally many a useful sermon.

Mr. Morley's method is to bring up the account of Rousseau's life to the time of publication of his writings, and then to make an interlude, containing an analysis of the work. In this way we have very interesting and important chapters about the great Frenchman, but we miss any final judgment of Rousseau on the whole, and of the connection between his various works. A final judgment it would be hard to form; he was a man of such sensitiveness without, and such hardness within, his words so differed from his deeds, that we may be willing to forgive the omission of what at the best would be very uncertain, but one cannot notice it without regret.

Mr. Morley's own philosophic and religious views are clearly marked in his book, and one of his freaks, which is one of a sort that generally indicates the noisy mind of a fanatic, namely, his writing "god" instead of "God," has everywhere met with the reproof it deserves. His whole tone about Christianity shows everywhere the attempt to be sincere without affectation, but it presents somewhat the appearance of singularity which would be more remarkable in a man who so far refused to sully his lips by inaccuracies of speech that in the face of all custom he would avoid saying that the sun rose and set. His readers will be more struck by Mr. Morley's singularity, by his distance from Christianity, than by any defects in what is so important and a part of the civilization of all of us, not even excepting Mr. Morley.

Perhaps the most important chapters in the book are those which contain the analyses of Rousseau's writings. Possibly they fail to give the English reader an adequate idea of the charm of the writer's style, nor do they make perfectly clear to us, though that is not Mr. Morley's fault, the reason for the intense enthusiasm which they aroused in Germany as well as in France. Goethe, as well as the most frivolous of French women, was affected by it. The whole of both nations felt the charm in a way that it is hard now to understand. But we cannot help being grateful for a book which throws so much light on a man of the influence of Rousseau, and of whom, it must be said, so little was generally known. In interest we consider this book inferior to his life of Voltaire, but this is in a great measure due to the difference between the two men. Voltaire was human, we can all sympathize even with his weaknesses; but with Rousseau one can never feel at home. Voltaire can be defined, but Rousseau evades every attempt at complete definition. They are both thoughtful books, and well deserve reading.

6. — *Reisen in Indien und Hochasien. Von H. von Schlagintweit-Sakünlünski.* III^ter^ Band. *Tibet; zwischen der Himálaya- und der Karakorum-Kette.* Jena: Hermann Costenoble. 1872.

Any one who has occasion to compare the more recent maps of High Asia with those of even ten years ago must be struck at the first glance with the extent and importance of the increase of our knowledge of the topography of that region. Only a few years ago, the maps of ancient and modern Chinese geographers, essentially improved by the astronomical observations of the Catholic missionaries commissioned by the Chinese government early in the last century, formed the cartographical basis for all the vast interior of Asia. During the first half of the present century, this frame-work was partially filled in with a large number of topographical details, obtained to a great extent by collecting and comparing the itineraries of native caravan routes. The discussion of these and of the occasional travels of Europeans by Klaproth, Humboldt, Ritter, Biot, and others, forms not only a literature by itself, but is a monument of inductive research in physical geography. But systematic exploration is now yearly lessening the area of the *terra incognita*.

The volume of which we have given the title is the general narrative of the explorations of the brothers Hermann, Adolph, and Robert von Schlagintweit in Tibet, between the Himalaya and the Karakorum range. The greater portion — nearly all — of the volume relates to travels and observations in the westernmost third of Tibet; the central and eastern portions, which constitute the political Tibet of to-day, remained almost wholly closed to these daring explorers.

The most important part of the one chapter treating of Eastern Tibet is that devoted to the question of the tributaries of the Brahmapútra. By most geographers, European and Chinese, the Dihong, the long stream which rises near Lake Mausaraur (Mauasarowa), and flowing eastward along the northern foot of the Himalaya, suddenly turns to the south, and enters the valley of Assam at Sudya, has been considered to be the only great source of that river. But Herr von Schlagintweit-Sakünlünski looks upon this as simply the chief of three tributaries; the other two being the Wei-tsu or Nu-kiang and the Lantsan-kiang, which have hitherto been regarded, respectively, as the upper courses of the two largest rivers of Farther India, namely, the Salween and the Mekon. The data on which this attempt to solve a hydrographical paradox of long standing is based do not seem to be sufficient, although they are strong as far as they go. These are found

in the facts that the Brahmapútra has a greater volume of water above the mouth of the Dihong than it receives from that stream, and that its valley retains its northeast course both above and below the entrance of the Dihong Valley. It would seem that next to actual exploration of the one (or three) river system in question, the most light might be obtained by a comparison of the times of high-water of the Brahmapútra above Sudya with those of the Irawaddy, Salween, Meikon, and Upper Yangtse-kiang. The Wei-tsu and Lan-tsan-kiang are supposed to have their sources in the same great region of snows and glaciers, to the melting of which the great summer flood of the Yangtse-kiang is due. If the Wei-tsu and Lan-tsan-kiang are the sources of the Salween and Meikon, then these latter streams should have floods corresponding in time to that of the Yangtse, certain allowances being made for difference of length and fall. If they are sources of the Brahmapútra, then the same correspondence with the Yangtse flood should exist above Sudya; and the Salween and Meikon floods should be due to the much earlier melting of snow on the much lower and more southern mountains of Northwestern Yunnan. It is not improbable that the Wei-tsu may be found to be a tributary of the Brahmapútra, while the Lan-tsan-kiang may be the upper course of either the Salween or Meikon.

The volume is chiefly devoted to a general narrative of the work of the brothers in the Italian province of Guári Khórsum; the English province of Spiti; the region of the salt lakes; and in Balti and Ladak. Guári Khórsum (Nari) is both the central elevation of Tibet geographically, and the westernmost province politically. It is in this province that the Indus, the Sutlej, and the Dihong branch of the Brahmapútra have their sources less than a score of miles apart.

In entering this province the brothers Adolph and Robert had their first view of Tibetan scenery. They had reached the top of the Kiúngar pass (17,331 feet elevation) on the 12th of July, 1855, and stood upon the sharply defined boundary between two extremes of climate. "The gloomy mantle of the rainy season was spread over the whole southern declivity of the Himalaya; while on the Tibetan side the last isolated cloud-masses vanished just north of the crest line, and the green mountain meadows, near the distant station Laptél, lay clearly defined in the full light of a sub-tropical sun."

Although the narrative is intended partly for the non-scientific reader, we miss in it almost every approach to sentiment, almost every trace of the poetry that must be aroused in the traveller in this unique world where Nature has her grandest throne, and where events pregnant with the destinies of races stand out boldly in the radiating vistas

of historic and prehistoric times. Here, if anywhere, we might expect a letting loose of the "nerve-currents."

But if the author does not give us pictures imbued with the color and life of subjectivity, it would seem to be because he has purposely eliminated this element as foreign and dangerous in purely scientific research. His pictures have a stereoscopic faithfulness; the lengths and breadths, distances, heights, and depths, are based on astronomic, trigonometric, and barometric observations, and on panoramic profiles; and the data for "atmosphere" abound in the results of long and careful meteorological research. But we may, nevertheless, thankfully recognize the true artist in the following philosophical definition of "atmosphere" and its effects on different landscapes: —

"So pleasant had been the impression produced by five days of cloudless heavens, that the few isolated cloud-masses which stood in bold relief on the blue sky made a depressing impression not less on me than on my native Tibetan companions. It might be supposed that one would, after a time, miss the ever-changing forms of the clouds; but experience has taught me that the pleasant effect of the brilliant lustre which the clear sky, notwithstanding its deep azure color, radiates upon these high mountains, is never equalled when the heavens are in any way covered.

"On the landscape, on the other hand, the influence of cloudiness and also that of dimness — whether this be due to minute dust-particles or to mist — is somewhat different; it is dependent upon the size of the object offered to view. With very great transparency of the air, whether brought about by rarefaction at a standpoint of high elevation, or by that degree of atmospheric moisture at which, without regard to the quantity of vapor present, condensation to mist has not yet taken place, only great forms show themselves quite satisfactorily; only those where the distances between the separate parts are so great that even by exceptional transparency of the air the contrasts of sharpness of outline and of light and shade are clearly visible. Here, and throughout High Asia, these conditions are satisfied by the colossal character of the surface configuration. . . . . But in smaller mountains, or where the visual distance is small, the effect of the landscape is much increased by a diminished transparency of the air.

"What I had seen in my native Franconian hills I found repeated under the tropical illumination in Bahar, in Central India, and in Ceylon. Dimness of the atmosphere, when not too pronounced, produces distance in such landscapes, and only then do the various features become sufficiently individualized; in this manner, even the scenery in mountains of medium size often approaches in character that of grander mountain regions."

The routes of the brothers form a network on the map of Western Tibet. The greater part of this volume is devoted to discussions of the topography, surface geology, and climates along these routes, — a register of facts observed. The second volume contained a more gen-

eralized description of all High Asia, based very largely on the result of the Schlagintweit expeditions. The results of these journeys form one of the most valuable contributions to geographical knowledge made during this century.

The author's generalizations with regard to the surface configuration of the country are best seen in his map, compiled on a scale of 1 : 4,050,000, from the observations of the brothers Schlagintweit, and from those of the members of the Great Trigonometrical Survey.

In comparing this map with former representations of the same region, we are struck first by the extent to which the details of topography and political geography have been filled in, and next by the great persistence of the Karakorum range, which has only so recently been found to exceed all the mountains of the world in mean height, to be indeed "the culminating ridge of the earth." We observe a well-defined parallelism not only between the Himalaya, Karakorum, and Kwenlun ranges, but also among the ridges and valleys that lie between the two former. In at least several of the valleys thus formed there are immense deposits of tertiary fresh-water lakes, which in places, as in the basin of the Upper Sutlej, are more than 1,500 feet thick, and mark the extent of former large water areas. These have long been drained by an erosion which has deepened the outlets and cut backwards drainage channels often 1,200 to 1,500 feet deep in the tertiary strata of the lake bottoms.

The present lakes of Western Tibet are the remnants of these formerly grand inland seas, which at elevations of 5,000 to 15,000 feet washed the bases of mountains towering 5,000 to 10,000 feet above their mirrors. Herr von Schlagintweit devotes a chapter to a very interesting description of these lakes, and a discussion of their origin. Among them are the salt lakes, which, according to the author, owe their saline character wholly to absence of outlet, and to the consequent concentration by evaporation. An interesting fact is the occurrence of what seemed to be a kind of salmon in the double lake Tsomognalari. The upper lake is fresh, and empties during the time of high-water into the lower lake, which has no outlet, and is salt, and the fish seems to make its migrations between the two.

The disappearance of so considerable an area of water surface must have produced marked changes in the climate, and yet the author expressly states that there are no indications of a former general extension of the glaciers beyond their present limits. On the contrary, one of the unexpected results of their investigations was the discovery that the lowest glaciers of High Asia (allowing for the climatic zone in which they lie) reach to a relatively lower level than those of the Alps.

In only one instance did he find the traces of an extinct glacier, though he observed areas of diminished *nevés;* but both of these occurrences he considers as comparatively local consequences of the decrease of moisture due to the gradual drying up of neighboring lakes.

Perhaps future explorations on the more northern Kwenlun and Tlinshan may show the remains of a formerly far more extensive glacial action contemporaneous with the former submergence of the Siberian and Russian steppes.

There is a chapter discussing the Tibetan climate, which, owing to the elevated position of so great an area, and to its highly rarefied and dry air, is one of diurnal and annual extremes, but in which these extremes have a considerable regularity as regards times of recurrence. The dryness of the atmosphere has here for its necessary consequence a scarcity of soil; and in valleys of over twelve thousand feet elevation, as in Upper Spiti, large areas even of the valley plains are without even the color of vegetable soil. Isolated agriculture was found only near springs or along rivulets whose channels were not cut deep, or where irrigation was possible. But the volume gives, practically, no new information concerning the agricultural products of Western Tibet.

The articles of export are sheep's wool, the hair of the Tibetan goat for shawl manufacture, live sheep and goats, borax and coarse salt, and recently gold from the mines of Thok-jalung.

The principal imports are tea and grain, chiefly in form of flour; rice comes in large quantities from India. Tea comes still almost wholly from China. The low price of the Chinese "brick-tea" gives it an advantage over the tea of the Himalaya plantations, and, besides this reason, the Himalaya varieties are considered inferior in aroma to the Chinese. The commerce is conducted largely at fairs, and consists in an exchange of products in which one volume of salt is considered equal to one and one half volumes of flour; it was found that this was equal to one hundred pounds of flour or sixty pounds of rice for one hundred pounds of salt.

Although opium forms an important part of the merchandise which passes through Ladak on its way to China, it is not used at all by the natives.

"The goat of Tibet and of the countries lying to the north, and also of those immediately south, furnishes the best shawl material. This is the short wool — *pashm* — which lies under the long goat-hair."

Some interesting remarks concerning shawl-wool and shawl manufacture are quoted by the author from Dr. Watson's "Textile Manufactures, 1867," and may be reproduced in this notice.

"The dearest shawl-wool comes to Cashmere, not from Tibet, but from Turfán Kichar via Yárkland. It costs in Cashmere three to four shillings per pound for the uncleaned, and six to seven shillings for the cleaned. . . . . In the manufacture of a shawl of the best material, weighing seven pounds, and selling in Cashmere for £ 300, the items of cost are, £ 30 for material; £ 100 for labor; £ 50 for expenditure on mechanical arrangements, etc.; £ 70 for tax in Cashmere."

There is an attractive chapter on the interesting province of Ladak, which lies at an elevation of between 11,000 and 12,000 feet.

In regard to longevity, the inhabitants enjoy a moderately good average. But the population is small even when compared with the capacity of the land for supporting life, — a fact for which Herr von Schlagintweit finds an explanation in the prevalence of the Tibetan custom of polyandry. Although this remark is the only reference to this custom in this volume, it is a recognition of its existence, by a cautious observer. In this variety of marriage the eldest son of a household selects one woman to be the only wife of all the brothers, and the children are apportioned to the husbands successively in the order of the ages of the latter. The wife is said to be the head of the household, and to manage the affairs of all her husbands, however diverse the occupations of these may be.

Among the diseases common in Tibet is cretinism, which occurs even in the highest inhabited localities. Diseases of the eye are also frequent, and are caused to a great extent by the dust-storms of summer, and by the smoke that fills the houses in winter. But severe costiveness is the national trouble of the Tibetans, and is due, the author thinks, partly to the indigestible character of their food, and largely to permanent residence in a region of low barometric pressure and extreme dryness, and where, consequently, the body suffers a great loss of moisture by evaporation.

Besides the map, this volume contains seven finely executed full-page views of characteristic scenery, and a series of admirable panoramic profiles, in which three degrees of distance are defined by shading.

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